Respondents claim in Washington

1930The general rule, as we understand it, is that boundary lines may be determined by adverse possession, and we so held in Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14 , 64 Pac. 936 .” Appellants further contend, in this connection, that adverse possession' cannot be initiated and held by a tenant, but must be instituted by the landlord, citing cases and texts to the effect that mere possession will be presumed to be in subordination to the title of the true owner.

1930The general rule, as we understand it, is that boundary lines may be determined by adverse possession, and we so held in Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14 , 64 Pac. 936 .” Appellants further contend, in this connection, that adverse possession' cannot be initiated and held by a tenant, but must be instituted by the landlord, citing cases and texts to the effect that mere possession will be presumed to be in subordination to the title of the true owner.

2007In accordance with our recent decision in Pierce County v. State, 159 Wn.2d 16, 39-41 , 148 P.3d 1002 (2006), we hold that the Respondents’ article II, section 19 challenge is precluded by these subsequent amendments. 7 Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Respondents.

2007In accordance with our recent decision in Pierce County v. State, 159 Wash.2d 16, 39-41 , 148 P.3d 1002 (2006), we hold that the Respondents' article II, section 19 challenge is precluded by these subsequent amendments. [7] Therefore, we reverse *497 the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Respondents.

2007In accordance with our recent decision in Pierce County v. State, 159 Wn.2d 16, 39-41 , 148 P.3d 1002 (2006), we hold that the Respondents’ article II, section 19 challenge is precluded by these subsequent amendments. 7 Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Respondents.

2007In accordance with our recent decision in Pierce County v. State, 159 Wash.2d 16, 39-41 , 148 P.3d 1002 (2006), we hold that the Respondents' article II, section 19 challenge is precluded by these subsequent amendments. [7] Therefore, we reverse *497 the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Respondents.

2003Appellants’ reliance on State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315 , 893 P.2d 629 (1995), is proper as there was not a complete failure to raise the issue and no real prejudice or inconvenience is present.

2003Appellants’ reliance on State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315 , 893 P.2d 629 (1995), is proper as there was not a complete failure to raise the issue and no real prejudice or inconvenience is present.

2001Furfaro, 97 Wash.App. at 540 , 984 P.2d 1055 .

2001Furfaro, 97 Wn.

2025App. 517, 522-23 , 6 P.3d 22 (2000). 3 No. 87170-6-I/4 Veterinarian Respondents cannot be held liable for Ms. Cruz's injuries and damages sustained, costs of collection of the same which may result from the civil action, or an apportionment of fault or damages under RCW 4.22.070.” This is so—the Respondents claim— based on the plain language of chapter 16.08 RCW and because Cruz cannot establish a prima facie case of professional negligence against them due to the original tortfeasor rule.

2025Airlines, Inc., 115 Wn.2d 194, 200-01 , 796 P.2d 412 15 Elkharwily argues that the court erred in granting Respondents’ motion for sanctions under CR 11.

2025Airlines, Inc., 115 Wn.2d 194, 200-01 , 796 P.2d 412 15 Elkharwily argues that the court erred in granting Respondents’ motion for sanctions under CR 11.

2001App. 763 , 801 P.2d 274 (1990), the respondents claim that whether the State was legally required to perform an action is irrelevant as long as the prosecutor agrees to perform the act upon order of the court.

2000We construe court rules in accord with their purpose “as though they were drafted by the Legislature.” Nevers v. Fireside, Inc., 133 Wn.2d 804, 809 , 947 P.2d 721 (1997) (citation omitted).

2000We construe court rules in accord with their purpose “as though they were drafted by the Legislature.” Nevers v. Fireside, Inc., 133 Wn.2d 804, 809 , 947 P.2d 721 (1997) (citation omitted).

1996Then, before the trial court heard Respondents’ motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court again analyzed the ordinance in light of RCW 36.70A.210, and held the ordinance was not ultra vires because, as stated in Anderson I, the statute did not affect citizens’ legal rights, and because the statute did not "alter the land-use powers of the cities.” Snohomish County v. Anderson, 124 Wn.2d 834, 842 , 881 P.2d 240 (1994) {Anderson II).

1996Then, before the trial court heard Respondents’ motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court again analyzed the ordinance in light of RCW 36.70A.210, and held the ordinance was not ultra vires because, as stated in Anderson I, the statute did not affect citizens’ legal rights, and because the statute did not "alter the land-use powers of the cities.” Snohomish County v. Anderson, 124 Wn.2d 834, 842 , 881 P.2d 240 (1994) {Anderson II).

1994We have previously disapproved such practices, see In re G.V., 124 Wn.2d 288, 297 , 877 P.2d 680 (1994), and do so again here. 3 Because we reverse the dismissal of the petition to detain J.M. on the ground the commissioner made an error of law in interpreting the provisions of RCW 71.05, we need not reach the issue whether the commissioner also abused his discretion in refusing to allow the State to amend the petition. 4 The Respondents challenge the constitutionality of RCW 71.05.040 on the ground it is vague and overbroad, and that it violates due process and equal protection.

1994We have previously disapproved such practices, see In re G.V., 124 Wn.2d 288, 297 , 877 P.2d 680 (1994), and do so again here. 3 Because we reverse the dismissal of the petition to detain J.M. on the ground the commissioner made an error of law in interpreting the provisions of RCW 71.05, we need not reach the issue whether the commissioner also abused his discretion in refusing to allow the State to amend the petition. 4 The Respondents challenge the constitutionality of RCW 71.05.040 on the ground it is vague and overbroad, and that it violates due process and equal protection.

1959There was, nevertheless, a duty of care otherwise imposed upon the bus driver, as in the case of Steadman v. Shackelton, 52 Wn (2d) 22, 322 P. (2d) 833 (1958).

1951Adjustment Dept., Olympia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Smedegard, post p. 962, 236 P. (2d) 560 .

1951Co., 123 Wash. 136 , 212 Pac. 166 , where we stated: “It is the settled law that, where a broker in good faith procures a purchaser ready, able and willing to buy upon the terms fixed by the seller and the seller refuses to complete the contract, the broker is entitled to his commission.” Respondents’ motion to strike the amended complaint was on the following grounds: “I “Said amended complaint is inconsistent with plaintiff’s original complaint in that it alleges that plaintiff procured a ready, willing and able purchaser when in fact the contract pleaded in the original complaint conclusive

1951Co., 123 Wash. 136 , 212 Pac. 166 , where we stated: “It is the settled law that, where a broker in good faith procures a purchaser ready, able and willing to buy upon the terms fixed by the seller and the seller refuses to complete the contract, the broker is entitled to his commission.” Respondents’ motion to strike the amended complaint was on the following grounds: “I “Said amended complaint is inconsistent with plaintiff’s original complaint in that it alleges that plaintiff procured a ready, willing and able purchaser when in fact the contract pleaded in the original complaint conclusive

1947Grange Store v. Riddell, ante p. 134, 177 P. (2d) 78 .

1923As opposed to the conclusion we have reached, there is cited the case of Russell v. Johns-Manville Co., 53 Cal. App. 572, 200 Pac. 668 , a short opinion by the intermediate appellate court of California.

1923As opposed to the conclusion we have reached, there is cited the case of Russell v. Johns-Manville Co., 53 Cal. App. 572, 200 Pac. 668 , a short opinion by the intermediate appellate court of California.

1920Lockerby v. Amon, 64 Wash. 24 , 116 Pac. 463 , Ann.

1920Lockerby v. Amon, 64 Wash. 24 , 116 Pac. 463 , Ann.

1914Under the above authorities, the respondents could only claim a forfeiture and put the appellant in default by tendering a deed and demanding payment of the purchase price. . . .” Tacoma Water Supply Co. v. Dumermuth, 51 Wash. 609 , 99 Pac. 741 .

1914Under the above authorities, the respondents could only claim a forfeiture and put the appellant in default by tendering a deed and demanding payment of the purchase price. . . .” Tacoma Water Supply Co. v. Dumermuth, 51 Wash. 609 , 99 Pac. 741 .

1910This court, in Weingarten v. Shurtleff, 51 Wash. 602 , 99 Pac. 739 , said: “While the numerous deeds under and through which the respondents claim title only purport to convey lots one and two, it nevertheless, clearly appears that the respondents and their predecessors in interest have at all times claimed that the dividing line between the two lots was the line established and marked by Libbey and Bertelson, that they have claimed up to that line for much more than the statutory period, and that their possession has been open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, and under claim of right.” And in

1910This court, in Weingarten v. Shurtleff, 51 Wash. 602 , 99 Pac. 739 , said: “While the numerous deeds under and through which the respondents claim title only purport to convey lots one and two, it nevertheless, clearly appears that the respondents and their predecessors in interest have at all times claimed that the dividing line between the two lots was the line established and marked by Libbey and Bertelson, that they have claimed up to that line for much more than the statutory period, and that their possession has been open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, and under claim of right.” And in

1910This court, in Weingarten v. Shurtleff, 51 Wash. 602 , 99 Pac. 739 , said: “While the numerous deeds under and through which the respondents claim title only purport to convey lots one and two, it nevertheless, clearly appears that the respondents and their predecessors in interest have at all times claimed that the dividing line between the two lots was the line established and marked by Libbey and Bertelson, that they have claimed up to that line for much more than the statutory period, and that their possession has been open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, and under claim of right.” And in

1910This court, in Weingarten v. Shurtleff, 51 Wash. 602 , 99 Pac. 739 , said: “While the numerous deeds under and through which the respondents claim title only purport to convey lots one and two, it nevertheless, clearly appears that the respondents and their predecessors in interest have at all times claimed that the dividing line between the two lots was the line established and marked by Libbey and Bertelson, that they have claimed up to that line for much more than the statutory period, and that their possession has been open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, and under claim of right.” And in

1909Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14, 64 Pac. 936 ; Suksdorf v. Humphrey, 36 Wash. 1 , 77 Pac. 1071 ; Wilcox v. Smith, 38 Wash. 585, 80 Pac. 803 ; Noyes v. Douglas, 39 Wash. 314 , 81 Pac. 724 ; Lindley v. Johnston, 42 Wash. 257 , 84 Pac. 822 ; Thornley v. Andrews, 45 Wash. 413 , 88 Pac. 757 .

1909Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14, 64 Pac. 936 ; Suksdorf v. Humphrey, 36 Wash. 1 , 77 Pac. 1071 ; Wilcox v. Smith, 38 Wash. 585, 80 Pac. 803 ; Noyes v. Douglas, 39 Wash. 314 , 81 Pac. 724 ; Lindley v. Johnston, 42 Wash. 257 , 84 Pac. 822 ; Thornley v. Andrews, 45 Wash. 413 , 88 Pac. 757 .

1909Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14, 64 Pac. 936 ; Suksdorf v. Humphrey, 36 Wash. 1 , 77 Pac. 1071 ; Wilcox v. Smith, 38 Wash. 585, 80 Pac. 803 ; Noyes v. Douglas, 39 Wash. 314 , 81 Pac. 724 ; Lindley v. Johnston, 42 Wash. 257 , 84 Pac. 822 ; Thornley v. Andrews, 45 Wash. 413 , 88 Pac. 757 .

1909Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14, 64 Pac. 936 ; Suksdorf v. Humphrey, 36 Wash. 1 , 77 Pac. 1071 ; Wilcox v. Smith, 38 Wash. 585, 80 Pac. 803 ; Noyes v. Douglas, 39 Wash. 314 , 81 Pac. 724 ; Lindley v. Johnston, 42 Wash. 257 , 84 Pac. 822 ; Thornley v. Andrews, 45 Wash. 413 , 88 Pac. 757 .