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9 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas, Inc.green1 sentence2015The standing inquiry “focuses on the question of who may bring an action.” Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex.1998). | 1 | 1 |
Paramount Pipe & Supply Co. v. Muhrgreen1 sentence2015Pa£amou^_Pipj_&__Sup^Co^_v._Muhr, 749 SW2d 491,494 (Tx.1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Peacock v. Bradshaw
green
2 sentences1979In Peacock v. Bradshaw, 145 Tex. 68 , 194 S.W.2d 551 (1946), the Court stated: “Respondents’ brief in the Court of Civil Appeals seems to argue that they may have had two places of residence, one in Arizona and one in El Paso County, Texas, and that the pleas might be sufficient as pleading the privilege of being sued in El Paso County. 1979In Peacock v. Bradshaw, 145 Tex. 68 , 194 S.W.2d 551 (1946), the Court stated: “Respondents’ brief in the Court of Civil Appeals seems to argue that they may have had two places of residence, one in Arizona and one in El Paso County, Texas, and that the pleas might be sufficient as pleading the privilege of being sued in El Paso County. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Chain v. Potts
neutral
2 sentences1969The trial court overruled Petitioner's plea that Respondents' suit was barred by the four-year statute of limitations, Article 5529, and thereafter granted Respondents' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment ordering Petitioner to "delete, remove and strike" each of the instruments from the record "wherein the same is recorded so that henceforth there will be no record of any of the said above described instruments recorded in any place or any official record in the office of the County Clerk of Starr County, Texas, * * *." The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the action of the trial 1969The trial court overruled Petitioner’s plea that Respondents’ suit was barred by the four-year statute of limitations, Article 5529, and thereafter granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment ordering Petitioner to “delete, remove and strike” each of the instruments from the record “wherein the same is recorded so that henceforth there will be no record of any of the said above described instruments recorded in any place or any official record in the office of the County Clerk of Starr County, Texas, * * The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the action of the trial cou | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks
green
2 sentences1969No question is presented as to when the statute of limitations commenced to run; as stated by the Court of Civil Appeals, citing Gulf Coast Investment Corp. v. Lawyers Surety Corp., 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Sup.1967), Respondents made no attempt to establish when they discovered the wrongful admission of the instruments to record. 1969No question is presented as to when the statute of limitations commenced to run; as stated by the Court of Civil Appeals, citing Gulf Coast Investment Corp. v. Lawyers Surety Corp., 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Sup.1967), Respondents made no attempt to establish when they discovered the wrongful admission of the instruments to record. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
McClung v. Lawrence
neutral
1 sentence1968Tex.Civ.App., 420 S.W.2d 419 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1968The trial court granted Respondents’ motion and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed upon the twofold holding that the deed is unambiguous and should be construed favorably to Respondents under the rule of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940), and that Petitioners’ suit for reformation was barred by the statute of limitation. 1968The trial court granted Respondents’ motion and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed upon the twofold holding that the deed is unambiguous and should be construed favorably to Respondents under the rule of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940), and that Petitioners’ suit for reformation was barred by the statute of limitation. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Crain v. Davis
green
1 sentence1967The recent decision of our Supreme Court in Crain v. Davis, 417 S.W.2d 53 (Tex.Sup.Ct., June 28, 1967) reiterates the applicable rules concerning •sufficiency of summary judgment affidavits and evidence, as follows: “We turn now to the sufficiency of Respondents’ motion for summary judgment and the supporting affidavits attached to such motion. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Landers v. B. F. Goodrich Co.
neutral
2 sentences1963Tex.Civ.App., 361 S.W.2d 909 . 1963Tex.Civ.App., 361 S.W.2d 909 . | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Schroeder v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.
green
1 sentence1963Co., Tex.Civ.App., 243 S.W.2d 261 , no writ history. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Penn
green
1 sentence1962Tex.Civ.App., 355 S.W.2d 239 . | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.