Respondents challenge in Pennsylvania

2021Here, in Respondents’ brief to the Superior Court as the appellants, they relied upon Kituskie v. Corbman, 714 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1998), in setting forth the elements of the cause of action pursued in the operative pleading (a second amended complaint).

2018Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 . . . (1991).

2017However, a copy of grievance 607357, along with supporting documentation, is attached to Respondents’ brief in support of their preliminary objections at Exhibit A. 8 level response.” Id.

2016Contrary to Respondents’ view, we find Petitioners are directly impacted by the Executive Order. 18 In denying legislative standing to Senators of the Majority Caucus, our Supreme Court reasoned, “challengers exist who are, from a standing perspective, sufficiently impacted by the Governor’s issuance of [Executive Order], as amply demonstrated by the parties in this matter who include patients, [DCWs] and institutional health care providers.” Markham, 136 A.3d at 146 .

2006The common pleas court noted that this Court had determined that Brown had previously accumulated more than “three strikes” under Section 6602(f)(1) of the PLRA in Brown v. James, 822 A.2d 128 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2003), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 577 Pa. 736 , 848 A.2d 930 (2004).

2002See Holloway; Rockwell v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm’n, 15 Pa.Cmwlth. 348 , 327 A.2d 211 (1974). *1001 In view of the foregoing, we deny Respondents’ motion to quash, vacate the Board’s September 4, 2001 order and remand this matter to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

2002See Holloway; Rockwell v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm’n, 15 Pa.Cmwlth. 348 , 327 A.2d 211 (1974). *1001 In view of the foregoing, we deny Respondents’ motion to quash, vacate the Board’s September 4, 2001 order and remand this matter to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

2002Jennison Family Limited Partnership v. Montour School District, 802 A.2d 1257 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002). [12] Section 6602(c) of the Judicial Code provides as follows: (c) Payment of filing fees.—Following payment of an initial partial filing fee [following the grant of in forma pauperis status], the prisoner shall make monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account.

1983In Rizzo v. Schmanek, 63 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 547 , 439 A.2d 1296 (1981), we held that “mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy which will only issue to compel .the performance of a ministerial act or a mandatory duty where the petitioner has a clear legal right, the respondent has a corresponding duty and there is no other appropriate and adequate remedy”.

1983In Rizzo v. Schmanek, 63 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 547 , 439 A.2d 1296 (1981), we held that “mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy which will only issue to compel .the performance of a ministerial act or a mandatory duty where the petitioner has a clear legal right, the respondent has a corresponding duty and there is no other appropriate and adequate remedy”.

1962Since the first contingent fee agreement was restricted to representation in the lower court, on December 18, 1959, another agreement was made, the pertinent language of which is: “I hereby agree to represent you in the pending appeal before the Supreme Court (No. 44 of January Term 1960), on the following basis: “(1) Immediate payment of the sum of $150. in cash, and without regard for the outcome of the case in the Supreme Court; “(2) An increase in the previous contingent percentage of 60% to 70% of the amount recovered in excess of $21,000. upon the same provisions as in (3) of the previou

1962Since the first contingent fee agreement was restricted to representation in the lower court, on December 18, 1959, another agreement was made, the pertinent language of which is: “I hereby agree to represent you in the pending appeal before the Supreme Court (No. 44 of January Term 1960), on the following basis: “(1) Immediate payment of the sum of $150. in cash, and without regard for the outcome of the case in the Supreme Court; “(2) An increase in the previous contingent percentage of 60% to 70% of the amount recovered in excess of $21,000. upon the same provisions as in (3) of the previou

1954Because of manifest misconceptions entertained by the respondents to the rule it seems necessary to point out (1) the existence of the power exercised by this court; (2) the method employed in its exercise; (3) why it should be exercised in the present case. (1) The existence of the power: More than tAVo centuries ago section XIII of the Act creating the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth (Act of May 22, 1722, 1 Sm.- L. 131) provided that the court should “minister justice to all persons, and exercise the jurisdictions and powers hereby granted concerning all and singular the premises accordin

1945President Judge Palmee in his dissenting opinion held that if the charges made against these respondents are true they committed the crime of extortion at common law, citing Commonwealth v. Channing, 55 Pa. Superior Ct. 510 , and that they should be proceeded against only in the criminal courts.

1925Following the authority of Nicely v. Raker, 250 Pa. 386 , previously cited in this opinion, substituting the term “county commissioners” for “county controller” there used, we must hold “the duties of the county commissioners are purely ministerial,” and cannot do otherwise than enter decree in favor of the plaintiff and against the respondents at bar.