reasonably prudent person standard in Michigan

2018“To determine whether a condition is ‘open and obvious,’ or whether there are ‘special aspects’ that render even an ‘open and obvious’ condition ‘unreasonably dangerous,’ the fact-finder must utilize an objective standard, i.e., a reasonably prudent person standard.” Mann v Shusteric Enterprises, Inc, 470 Mich 320, 328-29 ; 683 NW2d 573 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2018“To determine whether a condition is ‘open and obvious,’ or whether there are ‘special aspects’ that render even an ‘open and obvious’ condition ‘unreasonably dangerous,’ the fact-finder must utilize an objective standard, i.e., a reasonably prudent person standard.” Mann v Shusteric Enterprises, Inc, 470 Mich 320, 328-29 ; 683 NW2d 573 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023“The doctrine of sudden emergency is a logical extension of the reasonably prudent person rule, and as such is not an affirmative defense.” Szymborski v Slatina, 386 Mich 339, 341 ; 192 NW2d 213 (1971) (quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted).

2023“The doctrine of sudden emergency is a logical extension of the reasonably prudent person rule, and as such is not an affirmative defense.” Szymborski v Slatina, 386 Mich 339, 341 ; 192 NW2d 213 (1971) (quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted).

2014Our Supreme Court explained the rationale behind the sudden-emergency doctrine: “One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the -3- impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.” [Id., quoting Huddy on Automobiles (8th ed), p 359.] The sudden-emergency doctrine is an extension of the reasonably prudent person r

2014Our Supreme Court explained the rationale behind the sudden-emergency doctrine: “One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the -3- impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.” [Id., quoting Huddy on Automobiles (8th ed), p 359.] The sudden-emergency doctrine is an extension of the reasonably prudent person r

2023The doctrine applies “when a collision is shown to have occurred as the result of a sudden emergency not of the defendants’ own making.” Vander Laan v Miedema, 385 Mich 226, 231 ; 188 NW2d 564 (1971).

2023The doctrine applies “when a collision is shown to have occurred as the result of a sudden emergency not of the defendants’ own making.” Vander Laan v Miedema, 385 Mich 226, 231 ; 188 NW2d 564 (1971).

2022The sudden-emergency doctrine does “not apply if the peril was caused by negligence on the part of plaintiff’s driver or if his negligence contributed to such result.” Socony Vacuum Oil Co, 313 Mich at 546 . -3- “The doctrine of sudden emergency is a logical extension of the reasonably prudent person rule . . . .” Szymborski v Slatina, 386 Mich 339, 341 ; 192 NW2d 213 (1971) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2014“To come within the purview of this rule the circumstances attending the accident must present a situation that is ‘unusual or unsuspected.’ ” Vander Laan v Miedema, 385 Mich 226, 232 ; 188 NW2d 564 (1971), citing Barringer v Arnold, 358 Mich 594, 599 ; 101 NW2d 365 (1960).

2014“To come within the purview of this rule the circumstances attending the accident must present a situation that is ‘unusual or unsuspected.’ ” Vander Laan v Miedema, 385 Mich 226, 232 ; 188 NW2d 564 (1971), citing Barringer v Arnold, 358 Mich 594, 599 ; 101 NW2d 365 (1960).

2004Id. at 517 , 629 N.W.2d 384 . [9] To determine whether a condition is "open and obvious," or whether there are "special aspects" that render even an "open and obvious" condition "unreasonably dangerous," the fact-finder must utilize an objective standard, i.e., a reasonably prudent person standard.

2004Id. at 517 . 9 To determine whether a condition is “open and obvious,” or whether there are “special aspects” that render even an “open and obvious” condition “unreasonably dangerous,” the fact-finder must utilize an objective standard, i.e., a reasonably prudent person standard.

1982In Jenkins v Starkey, supra , this Court reiterated the proper standard of care to be applied in a negligence action against a police officer.

1982In Jenkins v Starkey, supra, this Court reiterated the proper standard of care to be applied in a negligence action against a police officer.

1966Whereas, at one time, the application of the statute (assured clear distance) was strictly construed and applied as evidenced by the rule in the case of Lewis v. Yund (1954), 339 Mich 441 , recent cases indicate that the statute must be reasonably construed and exceptions to the statutory edict have been created to accomplish justice, including bringing the assured clear distance rule to qualification by the test of due or ordinary care, exercised in the light of the attending conditions.