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7 Iowa opinions name it 1 courts 1938–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc.green2 sentences2010E.g., Norville v. Carr-Gottstein Foods Co., 84 P.3d 996, 1001-02 (Alaska 2004); Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal.3d 488 , 220 Cal.Rptr. 818 , 709 P.2d 837, 843 (1985); Golf Mgmt. 2010E.g., Norville v. Carr-Gottstein Foods Co., 84 P.3d 996, 1001-02 (Alaska 2004); Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal.3d 488 , 220 Cal.Rptr. 818 , 709 P.2d 837, 843 (1985); Golf Mgmt. | 2 | 2 |
List v. Dahnkegreen2 sentences2010In assessing the reasonableness of Agans Brothers’ refusal, the district court applied a reasonably prudent person standard, relying on List v. Dahnke, 638 P.2d 824, 825 (Colo.Ct.App. 1981), for the proposition that “arbitrary consideration[s] of personal taste, convenience, or sensibility are not proper criteria for withholding consent under such a lease provision.” We note many other jurisdictions, as well as several secondary treatises, have addressed the issue and reached a similar conclusion. 2010In assessing the reasonableness of Agans Brothers’ refusal, the district court applied a reasonably prudent person standard, relying on List v. Dahnke, 638 P.2d 824, 825 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981), for the proposition that “arbitrary consideration[s] of personal taste, convenience, or sensibility are not proper criteria for withholding consent under such a lease provision.” We note many other jurisdictions, as well as several secondary treatises, have addressed the issue and reached a similar conclusion. | 2 | 2 |
Norville v. Carr-Gottstein Foods Co.green2 sentences2010E.g., Norville v. Carr-Gottstein Foods Co., 84 P.3d 996, 1001-02 (Alaska 2004); Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal.3d 488 , 220 Cal.Rptr. 818 , 709 P.2d 837, 843 (1985); Golf Mgmt. 2010E.g., Norville v. Carr-Gottstein Foods Co., 84 P.3d 996 , 1001–02 (Alaska 2004); Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 843 (Cal. 1985); Golf Mgmt. | 1 | 2 |
Weiss v. Balgreen1 sentence2014Id. 600.74 (emphasis added). 2 The sudden emergency instruction “is merely an expression of the reasonably prudent person standard of care.” Weiss v. Bal, 501 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Iowa 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Meyer Ex Rel. Meyer v. Johnsongreen1 sentence1993Meyer v. Johnson, 254 N.W.2d 107, 110-11 (S.D.1977); Prosser § 33, at 196-97. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rowling v. Sims
green
2 sentences2014“It expresses the notion that the law requires no more from an actor than is reasonable to expect in the event of an emergency.” Id. 2014“A jury should only be instructed on the category of legal excuse supported by the evidence.” Id. 6 “Unlike the doctrine of legal excuse — which exonerates a party from liability for negligence per se — the sudden emergency doctrine is merely an expression of the reasonably prudent person standard of care.” 7 Weiss , 501 N.W.2d at *674 481. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Borland v. Lenz
neutral
1 sentence1941Borland v. Lenz, 196 Iowa 1148 , 194 N. W. 215 . | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Glanville v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1938Co., 196 Iowa 456 , at page 460, 193 N. W. 548 , 550, is in line with the general rule: “The instant case calls for the application of the reasonably prudent person rule. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.