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59 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1924–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Merrittgreen2 sentences2023Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985); see Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. 1997) (“Negligence per se is a common-law doctrine in which a duty is imposed based on a standard of conduct created by a . . . statute rather than on the reasonably prudent person test used in pure negligence claims.”). 2018“Negligence per se is a common-law doctrine in which a duty is imposed based on a standard of conduct created by a penal statute rather than on the reasonably prudent person test used in pure negligence claims.” Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. 1997). | 29 | 29 |
Omega Contracting, Inc. v. Torresgreen2 sentences2009Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. 1997); Omega Contracting, Inc. v. Torres, 191 S.W.3d 828, 839 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (op. on reh’g.) (discussing negligence per se in the context of nondelegable duties under the FMCSR). 2009Smith v. Merritt , 940 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. 1997); Omega Contracting, Inc. v. Torres , 191 S.W.3d 828, 839 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (op. on reh’g.) (discussing negligence per se in the context of nondelegable duties under the FMCSR). | 5 | 5 |
Williams v. Jenningsgreen2 sentences2009Williams v. Jennings , 755 S.W.2d 874, 882 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (citing Blocker v. Davis , 241 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. Civ. 2009Williams v. Jennings, 755 S.W.2d 874, 882 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied). | 4 | 4 |
Blocker v. Davisgreen2 sentences2009Williams v. Jennings , 755 S.W.2d 874, 882 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (citing Blocker v. Davis , 241 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. Civ. 2009Williams v. Jennings, 755 S.W.2d 874, 882 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (citing Blocker v. Davis, 241 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. Civ. | 4 | 4 |
HUE NGUYEN v. Chapagreen2 sentences2024Thus, a lienholder is charged with knowledge of all facts that appear in the chain of title through which it claims “‘that would place a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to the rights of other parties in the property. . . .’” See id. (quoting Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 324-25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)). 2013Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. 2007). ―[E]very purchaser of land is charged with knowledge of all facts appearing in the chain of title through which he claims that would place a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to the rights of other parties in the property conveyed.‖ Noble Mortg. & Invs. v. D & M Vision Invs., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (quoting Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 325 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)). | 3 | 6 |
Noble Mortgage & Investments, LLC v. D & M Vision Investments, LLCgreen2 sentences2016See Noble, 340 S.W.3d at 76 (“[E]very purchaser of land is charged with knowledge of all facts appearing in the chain of title through which he claims that would place a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to the rights of other parties in the property conveyed.”); Waggoner, 932 S.W.2d at 627 ; see also Tex Prop. 2016See 11 Noble, 340 S.W.3d at 76 (“[E]very purchaser of land is charged with knowledge of all facts appearing in the chain of title through which he claims that would place a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to the rights of other parties in the property conveyed.”); Waggoner, 932 S.W.2d at 627 ; see also TEX. | 3 | 6 |
Supreme Beef Packers, Inc. v. Maddoxgreen2 sentences2020Our sister court in Supreme Beef Packers explained that for a jury instruction regarding negligence per se to be appropriate, the violation must not leave any room for the driver to make a discretionary call. 67 S.W.3d at 456 . 2003Smith v. Merritt , 940 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. 1997); Supreme Beef Packers, Inc. v. Maddox , 67 S.W.3d 453, 455 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied). | 2 | 3 |
Ward v. ACS STATE AND LOCAL SOLUTIONS, INC.green2 sentences2023Ward v. ACS State & Local Sols., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 648, 652 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (citing Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. 1997)). 2018Ward v. ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc., 328 S.W.3d 648, 652 (Tex. –27– App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Carter v. William Sommerville and Son, Inc.green2 sentences2018AVPM Corp. v. Childers, No. 05-17-00372-CV, 2018 WL 3238131 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 3, 2018, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (“Negligence per se is a tort concept whereby a legislatively imposed standard of conduct is adopted by the civil –4– courts as defining the conduct of a reasonably prudent person.”) (citing Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. 1979)); Thomas v. Uzoka, 290 S.W.3d 437 , 444–46 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (citing Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. 1997)). 1997See El Chico, 732 S.W.2d at 312 ; Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex.1979); Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552 , 324 S.W.2d 201, 204 (1959). | 2 | 2 |
Reeder v. Danielgreen2 sentences2003Reeder v. Daniel , 61 S.W.3d 359, 361-62 (Tex. 2002); Smith v. Merritt , 940 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. 1997). 2003Reeder v. Daniel, 61 S.W.3d 359, 361-62 (Tex.2001); Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex.1997). | 2 | 2 |
Robert F. Ford, Jr. v. Exxon Mobil Chemical Company, a Division of Exxonmobil Corporationgreen2 sentences2024Thus, a lienholder is charged with knowledge of all facts that appear in the chain of title through which it claims “‘that would place a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to the rights of other parties in the property. . . .’” See id. (quoting Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 324-25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)). 2013Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. 2007). ―[E]very purchaser of land is charged with knowledge of all facts appearing in the chain of title through which he claims that would place a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to the rights of other parties in the property conveyed.‖ Noble Mortg. & Invs. v. D & M Vision Invs., 340 S.W.3d 65, 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (quoting Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 325 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)). | 1 | 2 |
Thomas v. Uzokagreen2 sentences2018AVPM Corp. v. Childers, No. 05-17-00372-CV, 2018 WL 3238131 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 3, 2018, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (“Negligence per se is a tort concept whereby a legislatively imposed standard of conduct is adopted by the civil –4– courts as defining the conduct of a reasonably prudent person.”) (citing Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. 1979)); Thomas v. Uzoka, 290 S.W.3d 437 , 444–46 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (citing Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. 1997)). 2012Thomas v. Uzoka, 290 S.W.3d 437, 444 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). | 1 | 2 |
Middleton v. Palmergreen1 sentence2026See Venegas v. Argueta, No. 01-20-00285-CV, 2021 WL 1679543 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 29, 2021, no pet.) (“A driver’s failure to yield the right-of-way or the mere occurrence of a collision does not give rise to negligence as a matter of law.”); Middleton v. Palmer, 601 S.W.2d 759, 765 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (whether the failure to yield at a right-of-way constitutes negligence is a fact issue for the jury); see also Williams v. Mutia, No. 01-19-00340-CV, 2021 WL 3729312 , at *5–7 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 24, 2021, no pet.) (failure to yield th | 1 | 1 |
Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.green1 sentence2023Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985); see Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. 1997) (“Negligence per se is a common-law doctrine in which a duty is imposed based on a standard of conduct created by a . . . statute rather than on the reasonably prudent person test used in pure negligence claims.”). | 1 | 1 |
Ridgecrest Retirement & Healthcare v. Urbangreen1 sentence2020Code, 545.054 [. . .] “Negligence per se is a common-law doctrine in which a duty is imposed based on a standard of conduct created by a penal statute rather than on the reasonably prudent person test used in pure negligence claims.” Ridgecrest Ret. & 10 Healthcare v. Urban, 135 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Rudes v. Gottschalkgreen2 sentences1997See El Chico, 732 S.W.2d at 312 ; Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex.1979); Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552 , 324 S.W.2d 201, 204 (1959). 1997See El Chico, 732 S.W.2d at 312 ; Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex.1979); Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552 , 324 S.W.2d 201, 204 (1959). | 1 | 1 |
El Chico Corp. v. Poolered2 sentences1997See El Chico, 732 S.W.2d at 312 ; Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex.1979); Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552 , 324 S.W.2d 201, 204 (1959). 1997See El Chico, 732 S.W.2d at 312 ; Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex.1979); Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552 , 324 S.W.2d 201, 204 (1959). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Waggoner v. Morrow
green
2 sentences2016See Noble, 340 S.W.3d at 76 (“[E]very purchaser of land is charged with knowledge of all facts appearing in the chain of title through which he claims that would place a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to the rights of other parties in the property conveyed.”); Waggoner, 932 S.W.2d at 627 ; see also Tex Prop. 2016See 11 Noble, 340 S.W.3d at 76 (“[E]very purchaser of land is charged with knowledge of all facts appearing in the chain of title through which he claims that would place a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to the rights of other parties in the property conveyed.”); Waggoner, 932 S.W.2d at 627 ; see also TEX. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Thigpen v. Locke
green
2 sentences1996Id. at 482 (citing Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.1962)). 1983Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.1962). | 2 | 1983–1996 |
Riley v. First State Bank, Spearman
green
2 sentences1996In the Riley ease, this court commented, “[t]he test is not diligence or negligence; and it is immaterial that appellee may have had notice of such facts as would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry which would lead to discovery, unless appellee had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would amount to bad faith.” Id. at 816 . 1996In the Riley case, this court commented, "[t]he test is not diligence or negligence; and it is immaterial that appellee may have had notice of such facts as would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry which would lead to discovery, unless appellee had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would amount to bad faith." Id. at 816 . | 2 | 1974–1996 |
West v. First Bap. Ch. of Taft
green
2 sentences1968West v. First Baptist Church, 123 Tex. 388 , 71 S.W.2d 1090 (1934); Quanah, A. & P. Ry. 1968West v. First Baptist Church, 123 Tex. 388 , 71 S.W.2d 1090 (1934); Quanah, A. & P. Ry. | 2 | 1966–1968 |
Laughlin v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
green
1 sentence1996Id. at 482 (citing Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.1962)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992Id. 1992Id. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Wilson v. Denton
green
2 sentences1966In the case of West v. First Baptist Church of Taft, 123 Tex. 388 , 71 S.W.2d 1090 on page 1096, (1934), the court, quoted with approval from its earlier decision in Wilson v. Denton, 82 Tex. 531 , 18 S.W. 620, 622 , the following: “ ‘The ordinary rule of constructive notice which applies to the purchaser of property is not applicable in the case of negotiable instruments. 1966In the case of West v. First Baptist Church of Taft, 123 Tex. 388 , 71 S.W.2d 1090 on page 1096, (1934), the court, quoted with approval from its earlier decision in Wilson v. Denton, 82 Tex. 531 , 18 S.W. 620, 622 , the following: “ ‘The ordinary rule of constructive notice which applies to the purchaser of property is not applicable in the case of negotiable instruments. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Glasscock v. First National Bank
green
2 sentences1964The question is answered by our Supreme Court in the case of Glasscock v. First National Bank of San Angelo, 114 Tex. 207 , 266 S.W. 393 , 36 A.L.R. 320 . 1964The question is answered by our Supreme Court in the case of Glasscock v. First National Bank of San Angelo, 114 Tex. 207 , 266 S.W. 393 , 36 A.L.R. 320 . | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Bustillos v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co.
green
1 sentence1940Woolworth Co., Tex.Civ.App., 277 S.W. 223 ; Texas-Louisiana Power Company v. Webster, 127 Tex. 126 , 91 S.W.2d 302, 306 ; Bustillos v. Southwestern Portland Cement Company, Tex.Com.App., 211 S.W. 929 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Graham v. F. W. Woolworth Co.
neutral
1 sentence1940Woolworth Co., Tex.Civ.App., 277 S.W. 223 ; Texas-Louisiana Power Company v. Webster, 127 Tex. 126 , 91 S.W.2d 302, 306 ; Bustillos v. Southwestern Portland Cement Company, Tex.Com.App., 211 S.W. 929 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Texas-Louisiana Power Co. v. Daniels
green
2 sentences1940Woolworth Co., Tex.Civ.App., 277 S.W. 223 ; Texas-Louisiana Power Company v. Webster, 127 Tex. 126 , 91 S.W.2d 302, 306 ; Bustillos v. Southwestern Portland Cement Company, Tex.Com.App., 211 S.W. 929 . 1940Woolworth Co., Tex.Civ.App., 277 S.W. 223 ; Texas-Louisiana Power Company v. Webster, 127 Tex. 126 , 91 S.W.2d 302, 306 ; Bustillos v. Southwestern Portland Cement Company, Tex.Com.App., 211 S.W. 929 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Williams v. Daniels
neutral
1 sentence1936Ramirez v. Bell (Tex.Civ.App.) 298 S.W. 924 ; Williams v. Daniels (Tex.Civ.App.) 4 S.W.(2d) 189 . | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Ramirez v. Bell
green
1 sentence1936Ramirez v. Bell (Tex.Civ.App.) 298 S.W. 924 ; Williams v. Daniels (Tex.Civ.App.) 4 S.W.(2d) 189 . | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Morris v. Beaumont National Bank neutral | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.