benefits privilege in Washington

2026In criminal cases, “[a]pplication of the privilege requires a balancing of the benefits of the privilege against the public interest of full revelation of the facts.” State v. Stark, 66 Wn.

2014In criminal cases, a] pplication of the privilege requires a balancing of the benefits of the privilege against the public interest of full revelation of the facts." State v. Stark, 66 Wn.

2006Health, 440 Mass. 309 , 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003) (denial of civil marriage to same-sex couples violates state equal protection principles).

2006Health, 440 Mass. 309 , 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003) (denial of civil marriage to same-sex couples violates state equal protection principles).

2006Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194 , 744 A.2d 864 (1999) (under the state constitution’s common benefits clause, plaintiffs seeking same-sex marriage are entitled to benefits and obligations like those accompanying marriage); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.

2006Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194 , 744 A.2d 864 (1999) (under the state constitution’s common benefits clause, plaintiffs seeking same-sex marriage are entitled to benefits and obligations like those accompanying marriage); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.

2006Without the benefit of hearing and other advantages of legislative process, it asserts that "the benefits of applying the rule outweigh the burdens." Id.

2006Without the benefit of hearing and other advantages of legislative process, it asserts that “the benefits of applying the rule outweigh the burdens.” Id.

2001Although I understand In re Marriage of Lindsey purported to overrule Creasman within a narrowly defined "`appropriate set of circumstances,'" Lindsey, 101 Wash.2d at 304 , 678 P.2d 328 (quoting Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash.2d 550, 555 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976)), to sanction an ever-broadening set of circumstances to replace the traditional rule invites the very "unpredictable and at times onerous" considerations which were said to justify the limited exception to the Creasman rule in the first instance.

2001Although I understand In re Marriage of Lindsey purported to overrule Creasman within a narrowly defined “ ‘appropriate set of circumstances,’ ” Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d at 304 (quoting Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550, 555 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976)), to sanction an ever-broadening set of circumstances to replace the traditional rule invites the very “unpredictable and at times onerous” considerations which were said to justify the limited exception to the Creasman rule in the first instance.

2001I should think this scenario would be ample reason to reconsider the benefits of the rule articulated in Creasman v. Boyle that property acquired by an individual, notwithstanding his or her living relationship short of marriage, in the absence of some trust relationship, “belongs to the one in whose name the legal title to the property stands.” 31 Wn.2d 345, 351 , 196 P.2d 835 (1948).

2001I should think this scenario would be ample reason to reconsider the benefits of the rule articulated in Creasman v. Boyle that property acquired by an individual, notwithstanding his or her living relationship short of marriage, in the absence of some trust relationship, “belongs to the one in whose name the legal title to the property stands.” 31 Wn.2d 345, 351 , 196 P.2d 835 (1948).

2001Although I understand In re Marriage of Lindsey purported to overrule Creasman within a narrowly defined “ ‘appropriate set of circumstances,’ ” Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d at 304 (quoting Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550, 555 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976)), to sanction an ever-broadening set of circumstances to replace the traditional rule invites the very “unpredictable and at times onerous” considerations which were said to justify the limited exception to the Creasman rule in the first instance.

2001Although I understand In re Marriage of Lindsey purported to overrule Creasman within a narrowly defined “ ‘appropriate set of circumstances,’ ” Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d at 304 (quoting Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550, 555 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976)), to sanction an ever-broadening set of circumstances to replace the traditional rule invites the very “unpredictable and at times onerous” considerations which were said to justify the limited exception to the Creasman rule in the first instance.

1997State v. Smith, 84 Wn.

1997App. 392, 396-97 , 597 P.2d 406 (1979), (quoting RCW 10.58.010 ("The rules of evidence in civil actions, so far as practicable, shall be applied to criminal prosecutions.”)) Therefore, in a criminal case, "[application of the privilege requires a balancing of the benefits of the privilege against the public interest of full revelation of the facts.” State v. Stark, 66 Wn.

1992"Appellant must, at a minimum, make a showing of blamelessness or reasonable conduct under the circumstances or [they are] without standing to assert estoppel as a defense." Stohr v. Randle, 81 Wn.2d 881, 884-85 , 505 P.2d 1281 (1973) (quoting Kozak v. Fairway Finance-Seattle, Inc., *216 60 Wn.2d 500, 504 , 374 P.2d 1011 (1962)); Puget Sound Bank v. Richardson, 54 Wn.

1992"Appellant must, at a minimum, make a showing of blamelessness or reasonable conduct under the circumstances or [they are] without standing to assert estoppel as a defense." Stohr v. Randle, 81 Wn.2d 881, 884-85 , 505 P.2d 1281 (1973) (quoting Kozak v. Fairway Finance-Seattle, Inc., *216 60 Wn.2d 500, 504 , 374 P.2d 1011 (1962)); Puget Sound Bank v. Richardson, 54 Wn.

1992Petersen v. State, 100 Wn.2d 421, 429 , 671 P.2d 230 (1983).

1992Petersen v. State, 100 Wn.2d 421, 429 , 671 P.2d 230 (1983).

1992"Appellant must, at a minimum, make a showing of blamelessness or reasonable conduct under the circumstances or [they are] without standing to assert estoppel as a defense." Stohr v. Randle, 81 Wn.2d 881, 884-85 , 505 P.2d 1281 (1973) (quoting Kozak v. Fairway Finance-Seattle, Inc., *216 60 Wn.2d 500, 504 , 374 P.2d 1011 (1962)); Puget Sound Bank v. Richardson, 54 Wn.

1992"Appellant must, at a minimum, make a showing of blamelessness or reasonable conduct under the circumstances or [they are] without standing to assert estoppel as a defense." Stohr v. Randle, 81 Wn.2d 881, 884-85 , 505 P.2d 1281 (1973) (quoting Kozak v. Fairway Finance-Seattle, Inc., *216 60 Wn.2d 500, 504 , 374 P.2d 1011 (1962)); Puget Sound Bank v. Richardson, 54 Wn.

1992"Appellant must, at a minimum, make a showing of blamelessness or reasonable conduct under the circumstances or [they are] without standing to assert estoppel as a defense." Stohr v. Randle, 81 Wn.2d 881, 884-85 , 505 P.2d 1281 (1973) (quoting Kozak v. Fairway Finance-Seattle, Inc., 60 Wn.2d 500, 504 , 374 P.2d 1011 (1962)); Puget Sound Bank v. Richardson, 54 Wn.

1992"Appellant must, at a minimum, make a showing of blamelessness or reasonable conduct under the circumstances or [they are] without standing to assert estoppel as a defense." Stohr v. Randle, 81 Wn.2d 881, 884-85 , 505 P.2d 1281 (1973) (quoting Kozak v. Fairway Finance-Seattle, Inc., *216 60 Wn.2d 500, 504 , 374 P.2d 1011 (1962)); Puget Sound Bank v. Richardson, 54 Wn.

1988In such circumstances, the public interest in full disclosure outweighs the benefits of the privilege and "all available evidence of defendant's mental condition should be put before the jury." Bonds , at 21. *815 Under circumstances analogous to those here, we declined to follow the proscriptions of RCW 71.05.390(10) in a dependency proceeding, even though we acknowledged "no direct authority . . . allows [RCW 71.05.390] to be avoided in a dependency or termination proceeding." In re Cover-dell, 39 Wn.

1988App. 887, 892 , 696 P.2d 1241 , review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1009 (1984).

1981Dike v. Dike, 75 Wn.2d 1 , 448 P.2d 490 (1968).

1981Dike v. Dike, 75 Wn.2d 1 , 448 P.2d 490 (1968).

1972Moreover, in Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wn.2d 833, 837 , 454 P.2d 205 (1969), the court noted that the benefits of the rule of strict liability extend “to all whom the manufacturer should reasonably expect to use his product.” Plaintiff’s expert welders testified that diesel oil need not be cleaned from the interior of an enclosed tank prior to welding and that it was customary practice not to so clean metal storage tanks.

1972Moreover, in Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wn.2d 833, 837 , 454 P.2d 205 (1969), the court noted that the benefits of the rule of strict liability extend “to all whom the manufacturer should reasonably expect to use his product.” Plaintiff’s expert welders testified that diesel oil need not be cleaned from the interior of an enclosed tank prior to welding and that it was customary practice not to so clean metal storage tanks.