benefits rule in California

1979"Given this critical purpose, neither judicial reliance on previous appellate endorsements of [the prior statutory construction] nor any effects on the administration of justice require us to deny the benefits of this rule to cases now pending on appeal." ( People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 853 [ 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 , 566 P.2d 997 ].) A defendant whose conviction is now final, however, will be entitled to relief by writ of habeas corpus only if there is no material dispute as to the facts relating to his conviction and if it appears that the statute as construed in this opinion did not pro

1979"Given this critical purpose, neither judicial reliance on previous appellate endorsements of [the prior statutory construction] nor any effects on the administration of justice require us to deny the benefits of this rule to cases now pending on appeal." ( People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 853 [ 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 , 566 P.2d 997 ].) A defendant whose conviction is now final, however, will be entitled to relief by writ of habeas corpus only if there is no material dispute as to the facts relating to his conviction and if it appears that the statute as construed in this opinion did not pro

1981The court further stated: ‘“Given this critical purpose, neither judicial reliance on previous appellate endorsements of [the prior statutory construction] nor any effects on the administration of justice require us to deny the benefits of this rule to cases now pending on appeal.’ (People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 853 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 566 P.2d 997 ].) A defendant whose conviction is now final, however, will be entitled to relief by writ of habeas corpus only if there is no material dispute as to the facts relating to his conviction and if it appears that the statute as construed in

1981The court further stated: ‘“Given this critical purpose, neither judicial reliance on previous appellate endorsements of [the prior statutory construction] nor any effects on the administration of justice require us to deny the benefits of this rule to cases now pending on appeal.’ (People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 853 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 566 P.2d 997 ].) A defendant whose conviction is now final, however, will be entitled to relief by writ of habeas corpus only if there is no material dispute as to the facts relating to his conviction and if it appears that the statute as construed in

2026(See Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221, 223; Richardson v. Perales (1971) 402 U.S. 389, 410 (Richardson).) The combination of adjudicator and investigator functions is “ ‘inquisitorial rather than adversarial.’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221; see also Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 52 .) In Richardson, for example, the high court rejected a separation-of- functions challenge to a federal Social Security proceeding in which the individual hearing examiner was “charged with 11 developing the facts” as well as adjudicating the applicant’s benefits claim.

2026(See Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221, 223; Richardson v. Perales (1971) 402 U.S. 389, 410 (Richardson).) The combination of adjudicator and investigator functions is “ ‘inquisitorial rather than adversarial.’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221; see also Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 52 .) In Richardson, for example, the high court rejected a separation-of- functions challenge to a federal Social Security proceeding in which the individual hearing examiner was “charged with 8 developing the facts” as well as adjudicating the applicant’s benefits claim.

2026(See Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221, 223; Richardson v. Perales (1971) 402 U.S. 389, 410 (Richardson).) The combination of adjudicator and investigator functions is “ ‘inquisitorial rather than adversarial.’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221; see also Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 52 .) In Richardson, for example, the high court rejected a separation-of- functions challenge to a federal Social Security proceeding in which the individual hearing examiner was “charged with 8 developing the facts” as well as adjudicating the applicant’s benefits claim.

2026(See Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221, 223; Richardson v. Perales (1971) 402 U.S. 389, 410 (Richardson).) The combination of adjudicator and investigator functions is “ ‘inquisitorial rather than adversarial.’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221; see also Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 52 .) In Richardson, for example, the high court rejected a separation-of- functions challenge to a federal Social Security proceeding in which the individual hearing examiner was “charged with 8 developing the facts” as well as adjudicating the applicant’s benefits claim.

2021(See Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 313, 332 (Franklin Mint) [“ ‘[C]ollateral estoppel must be proved [in the trial court] or it is waived’ ”], quoting Jordan v. Consolidated Mut.

2021(See Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 313, 332 (Franklin Mint) [“ ‘[C]ollateral estoppel must be proved [in the trial court] or it is waived’ ”], quoting Jordan v. Consolidated Mut.

1975“There is no compelling reason ... for requiring that the party asserting the plea of res judicata must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation.” (Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 812 [ 122 P.2d 892 ]; see also People v. Taylor, 12 Cal.3d 686, 692 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 70 , 527 P.2d 622 ].) The trial court here found that the allegations in the complaint in the instant case were decided point by point against appellant in. the 1970 appellate court opinion and thus granted the.motion for judgment on the pleadings 11 (Colberg, Inc. v. State of California ex.

1975“There is no compelling reason ... for requiring that the party asserting the plea of res judicata must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation.” (Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 812 [ 122 P.2d 892 ]; see also People v. Taylor, 12 Cal.3d 686, 692 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 70 , 527 P.2d 622 ].) The trial court here found that the allegations in the complaint in the instant case were decided point by point against appellant in. the 1970 appellate court opinion and thus granted the.motion for judgment on the pleadings 11 (Colberg, Inc. v. State of California ex.

1975“There is no compelling reason ... for requiring that the party asserting the plea of res judicata must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation.” (Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 812 [ 122 P.2d 892 ]; see also People v. Taylor, 12 Cal.3d 686, 692 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 70 , 527 P.2d 622 ].) The trial court here found that the allegations in the complaint in the instant case were decided point by point against appellant in. the 1970 appellate court opinion and thus granted the.motion for judgment on the pleadings 11 (Colberg, Inc. v. State of California ex.

1975“There is no compelling reason ... for requiring that the party asserting the plea of res judicata must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation.” (Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 812 [ 122 P.2d 892 ]; see also People v. Taylor, 12 Cal.3d 686, 692 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 70 , 527 P.2d 622 ].) The trial court here found that the allegations in the complaint in the instant case were decided point by point against appellant in. the 1970 appellate court opinion and thus granted the.motion for judgment on the pleadings 11 (Colberg, Inc. v. State of California ex.

2014The applicability of Civil Code section 1671 depends upon the actual facts not the words which may have been used in the contract.” (Cook v. King Manor and Convalescent Hospital (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 782, 792 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 471 ], italics added.) Here, the stipulation that allowed for entry of judgment in the amount of almost $60,000 was likewise an unenforceable penalty because the underlying settlement was for $38,000.

2014The applicability of Civil Code section 1671 depends upon the actual facts not the words which may have been used in the contract.” (Cook v. King Manor and Convalescent Hospital (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 782, 792 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 471 ], italics added.) Here, the stipulation that allowed for entry of judgment in the amount of almost $60,000 was likewise an unenforceable penalty because the underlying settlement was for $38,000.

2000This arrangement does not foreclose a section 1021.5 award; the reason why was explained in Serrano v. Priest, supra, 20 Cal.3d at page 48 : “Because the basic rationale underlying the ‘private attorney general’ theory [is] to encourage the presentation of meritorious . . . claims affecting large numbers of people, ... a denial of the benefits of the rule to such attorneys would be essentially inconsistent with the rule itself.” (See Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 941-942.) In any event, The Future was responsible for costs, a quite substantial risk given the complexity of this case.

1979(See generally Woodland Hills Residents Assn. v. City Council of Los Angeles (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 942-948 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 503 , 593 P.2d 200 ]; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 38-42 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 569 P.2d 1303 ] [Serrano III].) The substantial benefits exception arose out of corporate litigation involving a stockholders’ derivative action (see Fletcher v. A. J.

1998The County seeks an award of attorney’s fees under the substantial benefits doctrine, relying on Card v. Community Redevelopment Agency (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 570, 582-583 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 153 ].) The substantial benefits doctrine permits a discretionary award of attorney’s fees to be made “when a litigant, suing in a representative capacity, obtains a decision resulting in the conferral of a substantial, actual and concrete, pecuniary or nonpecuniary benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter makes possible an award that will spread the

1998The County seeks an award of attorney’s fees under the substantial benefits doctrine, relying on Card v. Community Redevelopment Agency (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 570, 582-583 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 153 ].) The substantial benefits doctrine permits a discretionary award of attorney’s fees to be made “when a litigant, suing in a representative capacity, obtains a decision resulting in the conferral of a substantial, actual and concrete, pecuniary or nonpecuniary benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter makes possible an award that will spread the

2025However, our Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that competent attorneys 11 “Although often referred to as ‘battered women’s syndrome,’ ‘intimate partner battering and its effects’ is the more accurate and now preferred term.” (In re Walker (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 533, 536, fn. 1 .) 17 may rationally conclude that the risk of highlighting unfavorable testimony by requesting a limiting instruction outweighs the benefits of the instruction.

2009The Iowa Supreme Court, in affirming the constitutional right of gays and lesbians to marry, recently recognized the importance of this promise of equality, stating: “If gay and lesbian people must submit to different treatment without an exceedingly persuasive justification, they are deprived of the benefits of the principle of equal protection upon which the rule of law is founded.” (Varnum v. Brien, supra, 163 N.W.2d 862, 906, italics added.) Of particular importance for this case is that discrimination against disfavored minorities is presumptively suspect under the equal protection clause

2009The Iowa Supreme Court, in affirming the constitutional right of gays and lesbians to marry, recently recognized the importance of this promise of equality, stating: “If gay and lesbian people must submit to different treatment without an exceedingly persuasive justification, they are deprived of the benefits of the principle of equal protection upon which the rule of law is founded.” (Varnum v. Brien, supra, 163 N.W.2d 862, 906, italics added.) Of particular importance for this case is that discrimination against disfavored minorities is presumptively suspect under the equal protection clause

2005Such inequity would not be consistent with the goal of estoppel, which “is applied defensively; it operates to prevent one from taking an unfair advantage of another but not to give an unfair advantage to one seeking to invoke the doctrine.” (Varela v. Board of Police Commissioners (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 816, 822 [ 238 P.2d 62 ].) For these reasons, we conclude the Court of Appeal correctly held Honeywell’s failure to provide a claim form in October 1998 began the 90-day period under section 5402, subdivision (b) if and only if the parties’ words and conduct sufficed to establish an estoppel pr

2005Such inequity would not be consistent with the goal of estoppel, which “is applied defensively; it operates to prevent one from taking an unfair advantage of another but not to give an unfair advantage to one seeking to invoke the doctrine.” (Varela v. Board of Police Commissioners (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 816, 822 [ 238 P.2d 62 ].) For these reasons, we conclude the Court of Appeal correctly held Honeywell’s failure to provide a claim form in October 1998 began the 90-day period under section 5402, subdivision (b) if and only if the parties’ words and conduct sufficed to establish an estoppel pr

2005(See American Can Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 276, 278-279 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 164 ] [employer not estopped to assert statute of limitations where no evidence applicant relied on conduct or words of employer’s agents to delay claim].) Under the WCAB rule, the 90-day period apparently would run from the point the employer should have known of the injury and failed to provide the claim form, regardless of whether the employee was actually misled into believing no such form was available or required, and of whether delay in filing a claim form resulted in any prejudice to the emp

2005(See American Can Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 276, 278-279 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 164 ] [employer not estopped to assert statute of limitations where no evidence applicant relied on conduct or words of employer’s agents to delay claim].) Under the WCAB rule, the 90-day period apparently would run from the point the employer should have known of the injury and failed to provide the claim form, regardless of whether the employee was actually misled into believing no such form was available or required, and of whether delay in filing a claim form resulted in any prejudice to the emp

2003As explained in FUTURE , even where counsel agree to provide representation without charge, with the understanding that they will be compensated if the court ultimately awards attorney fees to their clients under section 1021.5, “[t]his arrangement does not foreclose a section 1021.5 award.” (FUTURE, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 522 [“ ‘Because the basic rationale underlying the “private attorney general” theory [is] to encourage the presentation of meritorious . . . claims affecting large numbers of people, ... a denial of the benefits of the rule to such attorneys would be essentially inconsi

2001(See Ringer, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 611, 614-615, 104 S.Ct. 2013 .) A closer question than that posed in Ringer , however, arises where the complaint seeks, on state tort law grounds, not reimbursement for an assertedly covered procedure, but, rather, damages assertedly flowing from conduct only incidentally related to the wrongful denial of a benefits claim.