regard defense in California

2008(Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 436, 449 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 ].) The court erred by ordering the Serranos to pay the full expedited service fees *1040 charged by Coast without determining whether those amounts were reasonable.

2008(Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 436, 449 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 ].) The court erred by ordering the Serranos to pay the full expedited service fees *1040 charged by Coast without determining whether those amounts were reasonable.

2006The controlling discussion in this regard is the analysis of our Supreme Court in Kasky v. Nike, supra, 27 Cal.4th at page 957, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 , an opinion issued after U.D.

2006The controlling discussion in this regard is the analysis of our Supreme Court in Kasky v. Nike, supra, 27 Cal.4th at page 957, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 , an opinion issued after U.D.

1999"Double Counting" of Section 190.3, Factor (a) The jury was instructed to consider "[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance found to be true." (See CALJIC No. 8.85.) As in People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 68 , 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 , defendant contends "the court was obliged, on its own motion, to instruct the jury not to `double count' the same facts as circumstances *248 of the crime and as special circumstances." As we stated in Cain , "We have repeatedly rejected claims of reversib

1999"Double Counting" of Section 190.3, Factor (a) The jury was instructed to consider "[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance found to be true." (See CALJIC No. 8.85.) As in People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 68 , 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 , defendant contends "the court was obliged, on its own motion, to instruct the jury not to `double count' the same facts as circumstances *248 of the crime and as special circumstances." As we stated in Cain , "We have repeatedly rejected claims of reversib

1998We do not disapprove the other aspects of the decision in Ravenscroft, including its conclusion that the ATM card in that case was inserted into the air space of the ATM. ( Ante, at p. 774 of 76 Cal.Rptr.2d, at p. 1087 of 958 P.2d; see People v. Nible (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 838, 843-844 , 247 Cal.Rptr. 396 .) In reaching its conclusion in Ravenscroft, the Court of Appeal relied upon a federal court decision, United States v. Goudy (7th Cir.1986) 792 F.2d 664 , that affirmed a conviction under a federal criminal statute prohibiting entering a bank with the intent to commit a felony. ( 18 U.S.C.

1998We do not disapprove the other aspects of the decision in Ravenscroft, including its conclusion that the ATM card in that case was inserted into the air space of the ATM. ( Ante, at p. 774 of 76 Cal.Rptr.2d, at p. 1087 of 958 P.2d; see People v. Nible (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 838, 843-844 , 247 Cal.Rptr. 396 .) In reaching its conclusion in Ravenscroft, the Court of Appeal relied upon a federal court decision, United States v. Goudy (7th Cir.1986) 792 F.2d 664 , that affirmed a conviction under a federal criminal statute prohibiting entering a bank with the intent to commit a felony. ( 18 U.S.C.

1997In this regard the rule is consonant with the policy behind requiring a bond or deposit on appeal: to assure collection of a money judgment and protect it against “passage of time, delay, or other reasons.” (Grant v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 929, 935 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 564 ], italics added.) If we were to rule the defendant’s death during appeal extinguished the judgment as to punitive damages, one of the “other reasons” would be allowed to *996 frustrate the purpose for the bond or deposit.

1997In this regard the rule is consonant with the policy behind requiring a bond or deposit on appeal: to assure collection of a money judgment and protect it against “passage of time, delay, or other reasons.” (Grant v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 929, 935 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 564 ], italics added.) If we were to rule the defendant’s death during appeal extinguished the judgment as to punitive damages, one of the “other reasons” would be allowed to *996 frustrate the purpose for the bond or deposit.

1997French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717,719 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 899 , 355 P.2d 643 ].) 3 Appellant sought such order in its motion to strike Cal Pak’s opening brief and we did not address it in our order of January 4, 1996. 4 We note in this regard that rule 3-700 (D) of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part that “[a] member [of the bar] whose employment has terminated shall: [IQ (1) Subject to any protective order or non-disclosure agreement, promptly release to the client, at the request of the client, all the client papers and property. ‘Client papers and property’ include

1997French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717,719 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 899 , 355 P.2d 643 ].) 3 Appellant sought such order in its motion to strike Cal Pak’s opening brief and we did not address it in our order of January 4, 1996. 4 We note in this regard that rule 3-700 (D) of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part that “[a] member [of the bar] whose employment has terminated shall: [IQ (1) Subject to any protective order or non-disclosure agreement, promptly release to the client, at the request of the client, all the client papers and property. ‘Client papers and property’ include

1997The Court of Appeal further held that the judgment in this case must be reversed because the trial court erred in refusing to permit Owens-Illinois to present a “tobacco company defense.” The Court of Appeal’s judgment in this regard was error requiring reversal under our recent holding in Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 985, 988-989 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 103 , 928 P.2d 1181 ], a case consolidated and tried with the instant action and three others.

1997The Court of Appeal further held that the judgment in this case must be reversed because the trial court erred in refusing to permit Owens-Illinois to present a “tobacco company defense.” The Court of Appeal’s judgment in this regard was error requiring reversal under our recent holding in Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 985, 988-989 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 103 , 928 P.2d 1181 ], a case consolidated and tried with the instant action and three others.

1995(See People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 867 , 750 P.2d 741 ] [noting "theoretical" problem of double counting but finding "possibility of actual prejudice ... remote"].) We have repeatedly rejected claims of reversible error in this regard where the defense did not request an instruction against double counting, and there was no misleading argument by the prosecutor suggesting the same facts should be weighed twice, once under each rubric. ( People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 550; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 858; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 93

1995(See People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 867 , 750 P.2d 741 ] [noting "theoretical" problem of double counting but finding "possibility of actual prejudice ... remote"].) We have repeatedly rejected claims of reversible error in this regard where the defense did not request an instruction against double counting, and there was no misleading argument by the prosecutor suggesting the same facts should be weighed twice, once under each rubric. ( People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 550; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 858; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 93

1995(People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 550; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 858; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 , 820 P.2d 214 ].) Here there was neither a defense request nor any misleading prosecutorial argument on the point. 24 Nor do we agree the instruction’s reference to special circumstances unfairly “weighted” the jury’s decision in favor of death.

1995(See People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 867 , 750 P.2d 741 ] [noting "theoretical" problem of double counting but finding "possibility of actual prejudice ... remote"].) We have repeatedly rejected claims of reversible error in this regard where the defense did not request an instruction against double counting, and there was no misleading argument by the prosecutor suggesting the same facts should be weighed twice, once under each rubric. ( People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 550; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 858; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 93

1995(People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 550; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 858; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 , 820 P.2d 214 ].) Here there was neither a defense request nor any misleading prosecutorial argument on the point. 24 Nor do we agree the instruction’s reference to special circumstances unfairly “weighted” the jury’s decision in favor of death.

1995(See People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 867 , 750 P.2d 741 ] [noting "theoretical" problem of double counting but finding "possibility of actual prejudice ... remote"].) We have repeatedly rejected claims of reversible error in this regard where the defense did not request an instruction against double counting, and there was no misleading argument by the prosecutor suggesting the same facts should be weighed twice, once under each rubric. ( People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 550; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 858; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 93

1995(See People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 867 , 750 P.2d 741 ] [noting “theoretical” problem of double counting but finding “possibility of actual prejudice . . . remote”].) We have repeatedly rejected claims of reversible error in this regard where the defense did not request an instruction against double counting, and there was no misleading argument by the prosecutor suggesting the same facts should be weighed twice, once under each rubric.

1995(See People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 867 , 750 P.2d 741 ] [noting “theoretical” problem of double counting but finding “possibility of actual prejudice . . . remote”].) We have repeatedly rejected claims of reversible error in this regard where the defense did not request an instruction against double counting, and there was no misleading argument by the prosecutor suggesting the same facts should be weighed twice, once under each rubric.

1957(West Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 720, 728 [ 128 P.2d 777 ].) Stated otherwise, “The essence of doing business is that the corporation is present within the state sufficiently to constitute it just and equitable that it be amenable to process within the state.” (Fielding v. Superior Court, 111 Cal.App.2d 490, 494 [ 244 P.2d 968 ].) And in this regard the test is not confined to a mechanical weighing of whether the activity is “a little more or a little less” ( 326 U.S. 319 ) than the minimal activity necessary to come within the rule.

1957(West Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 720, 728 [ 128 P.2d 777 ].) Stated otherwise, “The essence of doing business is that the corporation is present within the state sufficiently to constitute it just and equitable that it be amenable to process within the state.” (Fielding v. Superior Court, 111 Cal.App.2d 490, 494 [ 244 P.2d 968 ].) And in this regard the test is not confined to a mechanical weighing of whether the activity is “a little more or a little less” ( 326 U.S. 319 ) than the minimal activity necessary to come within the rule.

1957(West Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 720, 728 [ 128 P.2d 777 ].) Stated otherwise, “The essence of doing business is that the corporation is present within the state sufficiently to constitute it just and equitable that it be amenable to process within the state.” (Fielding v. Superior Court, 111 Cal.App.2d 490, 494 [ 244 P.2d 968 ].) And in this regard the test is not confined to a mechanical weighing of whether the activity is “a little more or a little less” ( 326 U.S. 319 ) than the minimal activity necessary to come within the rule.

1957(West Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 720, 728 [ 128 P.2d 777 ].) Stated otherwise, “The essence of doing business is that the corporation is present within the state sufficiently to constitute it just and equitable that it be amenable to process within the state.” (Fielding v. Superior Court, 111 Cal.App.2d 490, 494 [ 244 P.2d 968 ].) And in this regard the test is not confined to a mechanical weighing of whether the activity is “a little more or a little less” ( 326 U.S. 319 ) than the minimal activity necessary to come within the rule.