for-cause challenge in Florida

2019The evidence of the juror’s actual bias must “be plain on the face of the record,” id. at 324 , and amount to “something more than mere doubt about that juror’s impartiality,” Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1265 (Fla. 2016).

2019The evidence of the juror's actual bias must "be plain on the face of the record," id. at 324 , and amount to "something more than mere doubt about that juror's impartiality," Mosley v. State , 209 So.3d 1248 , 1265 (Fla. 2016).

2014See Carratelli, 832 So.2d at 855-57 (finding that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s for-cause challenge of three jurors, but affirming the conviction because the objections had not been properly preserved).

2010“An appellate court reviews a trial judge’s decision on a for-cause challenge for an abuse of discretion.” See Carratelli v. State, 832 So.2d 850, 854 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

2025A for-cause challenge “must be granted if there is any reasonable doubt as to a potential juror’s impartiality.” Pelham v. Walker, 135 So. 3d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) 2 We reject the homeowners’ suggestion that the insurer waived its argument because it did not include a preservation analysis and “harmful error” analysis in its brief. 3 (citing Darr v. State, 817 So. 2d 1093, 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)); see also Smith v. State, 699 So. 2d 629, 635 (Fla. 1997).

2022To achieve such a laudable goal, “[a] juror must be excused for cause if any reasonable doubt exists as to whether the juror possesses an impartial state of mind,” Smith v. State, 699 So. 2d 629, 635 (Fla. 1997).

2020Rather, the issue in Hayes was “whether the trial court erred, first, in expressly applying the for-cause standard—rather than the ‘genuineness’ standard—to its evaluation of the neutral reason the proponent gave for the strike.” Id. (citing Hayes, 94 So. 3d at 456-57 ).

2012Cf. id. at 465 (concluding that the trial court misapplied Melbourne by employing a for-cause analysis to a peremptory challenge rather than undertaking a peremptory-challenge analysis).

2025A for-cause challenge “must be granted if there is any reasonable doubt as to a potential juror’s impartiality.” Pelham v. Walker, 135 So. 3d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) 2 We reject the homeowners’ suggestion that the insurer waived its argument because it did not include a preservation analysis and “harmful error” analysis in its brief. 3 (citing Darr v. State, 817 So. 2d 1093, 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)); see also Smith v. State, 699 So. 2d 629, 635 (Fla. 1997).

2025Weinstein Design Grp., Inc. v. Fielder, 884 So. 2d 990, 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

2025A for-cause challenge “must be granted if there is any reasonable doubt as to a potential juror’s impartiality.” Pelham v. Walker, 135 So. 3d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) 2 We reject the homeowners’ suggestion that the insurer waived its argument because it did not include a preservation analysis and “harmful error” analysis in its brief. 3 (citing Darr v. State, 817 So. 2d 1093, 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)); see also Smith v. State, 699 So. 2d 629, 635 (Fla. 1997).

2022See also Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 23-24 (Fla. 1959) (holding “if there is basis for any reasonable doubt as to any juror's possessing that state of mind which will enable him to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence submitted and the law announced at the trial he should be excused on motion of a party, or by the court on its own motion”); Nash v. Gen.

2020San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1343 (Fla. 1997).

2017See Evans v. State, 995 So.2d 933, 942 (Fla. 2008) (“Although [the juror] clearly supported the death penalty and initially indicated that a case of self-defense would be the only time she would recommend life, she immediately confirmed that she would listen to the judge’s instructions, ‘consider all circumstances’ and follow the law.

2017See Evans v. State, 995 So. 2d 933, 942 (Fla. 2008) (“Although [the juror] clearly supported the death penalty and initially indicated that a case of self-defense would be the only time she would recommend life, she immediately confirmed that she would listen to the judge’s instructions, ‘consider all circumstances’ and follow the law.

2014To preserve for appellate review the denial of a for-cause challenge of a juror, the defendant must “object to the jurors, show that he or she has exhausted all peremptory challenges and requested more that were denied, and identify a specific juror that he or she would have excused if possible.” Kearse v. State, 770 So.2d 1119, 1128 (Fla.2000).

2009See Reaves v. State, 826 So.2d 932, 939 (Fla.2002) (holding that when the record does not show a reasonable basis to assert a for-cause challenge, a claim by the defendant that more information would have been forthcoming had counsel properly followed up with further questioning is mere conjecture and thus is not a legally sufficient claim for postconviction relief); see also Green v. State, 975 So.2d 1090, 1105 (Fla.2008) (following Reaves); cf. Davis v. State, 928 So.2d 1089, 1118 (Fla.2005) (holding that allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to “follow up” with certain jurors

2009See Reaves v. State, 826 So.2d 932, 939 (Fla.2002) (holding that when the record does not show a reasonable basis to assert a for-cause challenge, a claim by the defendant that more information would have been forthcoming had counsel properly followed up with further questioning is mere conjecture and thus is not a legally sufficient claim for postconviction relief); see also Green v. State, 975 So.2d 1090, 1105 (Fla.2008) (following Reaves); cf. Davis v. State, 928 So.2d 1089, 1118 (Fla.2005) (holding that allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to “follow up” with certain jurors

2009See Reaves v. State, 826 So.2d 932, 939 (Fla.2002) (holding that when the record does not show a reasonable basis to assert a for-cause challenge, a claim by the defendant that more information would have been forthcoming had counsel properly followed up with further questioning is mere conjecture and thus is not a legally sufficient claim for postconviction relief); see also Green v. State, 975 So.2d 1090, 1105 (Fla.2008) (following Reaves); cf. Davis v. State, 928 So.2d 1089, 1118 (Fla.2005) (holding that allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to “follow up” with certain jurors

2009See Reaves v. State, 826 So.2d 932, 939 (Fla.2002) (holding that when the record does not show a reasonable basis to assert a for-cause challenge, a claim by the defendant that more information would have been forthcoming had counsel properly followed up with further questioning is mere conjecture and thus is not a legally sufficient claim for postconviction relief); see also Green v. State, 975 So.2d 1090, 1105 (Fla.2008) (following Reaves); cf. Davis v. State, 928 So.2d 1089, 1118 (Fla.2005) (holding that allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to “follow up” with certain jurors

2009See Reaves v. State, 826 So.2d 932, 939 (Fla.2002) (holding that when the record does not show a reasonable basis to assert a for-cause challenge, a claim by the defendant that more information would have been forthcoming had counsel properly followed up with further questioning is mere conjecture and thus is not a legally sufficient claim for postconviction relief); see also Green v. State, 975 So.2d 1090, 1105 (Fla.2008) (following Reaves); cf. Davis v. State, 928 So.2d 1089, 1118 (Fla.2005) (holding that allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to “follow up” with certain jurors

2009See Reaves v. State, 826 So.2d 932, 939 (Fla.2002) (holding that when the record does not show a reasonable basis to assert a for-cause challenge, a claim by the defendant that more information would have been forthcoming had counsel properly followed up with further questioning is mere conjecture and thus is not a legally sufficient claim for postconviction relief); see also Green v. State, 975 So.2d 1090, 1105 (Fla.2008) (following Reaves); cf. Davis v. State, 928 So.2d 1089, 1118 (Fla.2005) (holding that allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to “follow up” with certain jurors

2002See Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, 973 (Fla.2001). "`The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court.'" Street v. State, 592 So.2d 369, 371 (Fla. 4th DCA) (on clarification) (quoting Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1984)).

2002See Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, 973 (Fla.2001). "`The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court.'" Street v. State, 592 So.2d 369, 371 (Fla. 4th DCA) (on clarification) (quoting Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1984)).

2002See Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, 973 (Fla.2001). "`The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court.'" Street v. State, 592 So.2d 369, 371 (Fla. 4th DCA) (on clarification) (quoting Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1984)).

2001See Martinez v. Hertz Corp., 696 So.2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)(holding that complete exchange between trial court, juror, and counsel revealed that trial court did not. abuse its discretion in denying the challenge for cause).

1999Those responses were "not reflective of a final, neutral, and detached determination to sit as a fair and impartial juror." Price v. State, 538 So.2d 486, 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); see also Brown v. State, 728 So.2d 758, 759 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (holding that prospective juror's response of "Yeah, I think so" when asked whether he would be able to follow trial court's instructions was equivocal, and raised reasonable doubt as to whether he could serve as fair and impartial juror); Coggins v. State, 677 So.2d 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

1999Those responses were "not reflective of a final, neutral, and detached determination to sit as a fair and impartial juror." Price v. State, 538 So.2d 486, 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); see also Brown v. State, 728 So.2d 758, 759 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (holding that prospective juror's response of "Yeah, I think so" when asked whether he would be able to follow trial court's instructions was equivocal, and raised reasonable doubt as to whether he could serve as fair and impartial juror); Coggins v. State, 677 So.2d 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).