for-cause challenge in California

2024“Unlike a for-cause challenge under Witherspoon[ v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 ] and [Wainwright v. ]Witt [(1985) 469 U.S. 412 ], the issue here is not whether a juror held views that would impair his or her ability to follow the law. 36 PEOPLE v. NADEY Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

2024“Unlike a for-cause challenge under Witherspoon[ v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 ] and [Wainwright v. ]Witt [(1985) 469 U.S. 412 ], the issue here is not whether a juror held views that would impair his or her ability to follow the law. 36 PEOPLE v. NADEY Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

2017(E.g., People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686 , 742, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485 , 115 P.3d 1145 ; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046 , 1087, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 774 P.2d 659 .) "But we have never reversed a case based on Bittaker 's dictum. [Citation.] We therefore reject the Bittaker dictum in our own cases that cite it, and now conclude that it has no applicability in a determination whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a denial of a for-cause challenge." ( People v. Black , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 919, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 363 , 320 P.3d 800 .) Any uncertainty dicta in other *146 cases might

2017(E.g., People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686 , 742, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485 , 115 P.3d 1145 ; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046 , 1087, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 774 P.2d 659 .) "But we have never reversed a case based on Bittaker 's dictum. [Citation.] We therefore reject the Bittaker dictum in our own cases that cite it, and now conclude that it has no applicability in a determination whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a denial of a for-cause challenge." ( People v. Black , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 919, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 363 , 320 P.3d 800 .) Any uncertainty dicta in other *146 cases might

2026Defendant contends that Juror No. 2 should have been excused based on People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 418 (Boyette), where we held the court erred in denying a for-cause challenge.

2014(People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 44 ; Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 114 ; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 419 ; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 683 .) ― ‗So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean‘ ‖ a constitutional violation occurred.

2014(Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1087 ; see, e.g., People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 742 [citing Bittaker dictum to note that a defendant may establish prejudice if he can show he was ―deprived of a peremptory challenge‖ that he would have used to excuse a juror who participated in the case]; see also People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 495 [quoting Blair‘s citation to Bittaker‘s dictum]; People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 905, fn. 18 [same].) 3 We conclude that Yeoman sets forth the correct standard for a defendant to demonstrate prejudice after properly preserving a claim that t

2014(Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1087 ; see, e.g., People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 742 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485 , 115 P.3d 1145 ] [citing Bittaker dictum to note that a defendant may establish prejudice if he can show he was “deprived of a peremptory challenge” that he would have used to excuse a juror who participated in the case]; see also People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 495 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 181 P.3d 947 ] [quoting Blair’s citation to Bittaker’s dictum]; People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 905, fn. 18 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 162 P.3d 528 ] [same].) 3 We conclude that Yeoman

2001Under both the federal and state Constitutions, a sentencing jury in a capital case must be impartial. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 666-667 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ; see also Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 726-728 , 112 S.Ct. 2222 , 119 L.Ed.2d 492 .) A prospective juror whose views about capital punishment, either for or against, would "`"prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror"'" is not impartial and therefore may be challenged for cause. ( People v. Williams, supra, at p. 667 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ,

2001Under both the federal and state Constitutions, a sentencing jury in a capital case must be impartial. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 666-667 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ; see also Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 726-728 , 112 S.Ct. 2222 , 119 L.Ed.2d 492 .) A prospective juror whose views about capital punishment, either for or against, would "`"prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror"'" is not impartial and therefore may be challenged for cause. ( People v. Williams, supra, at p. 667 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ,

2001Under both the federal and state Constitutions, a sentencing jury in a capital case must be impartial. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 666-667 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ; see also Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 726-728 , 112 S.Ct. 2222 , 119 L.Ed.2d 492 .) A prospective juror whose views about capital punishment, either for or against, would "`"prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror"'" is not impartial and therefore may be challenged for cause. ( People v. Williams, supra, at p. 667 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ,

2001Under both the federal and state Constitutions, a sentencing jury in a capital case must be impartial. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 666-667 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ; see also Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 726-728 , 112 S.Ct. 2222 , 119 L.Ed.2d 492 .) A prospective juror whose views about capital punishment, either for or against, would "`"prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror"'" is not impartial and therefore may be challenged for cause. ( People v. Williams, supra, at p. 667 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ,

2019(Id. at pp. 313–314 [citing Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81 ].) In Ross v. Oklahoma, at page 89, the court noted that under Oklahoma law, ‘a defendant who disagrees with the trial court’s ruling on a for-cause challenge must, in order to preserve the 69 PEOPLE v. RHOADES Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. claim that the ruling deprived him of a fair trial, exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the juror.

2014(Id. at pp. 88-91.) Over a century ago, we stated that the right to exercise peremptory challenges was ―absolute,‖ such that when a defendant is compelled to exhaust the allotment of peremptory challenges because of the erroneous denial of a for-cause challenge and is thereby ―obliged afterward to accept an objectionable juror, without power to use a peremptory challenge upon him, . . . the error [is] prejudicial.‖ (People v. Helm (1907) 152 Cal. 532, 535 .) However, our understanding of the purpose of peremptory challenges has since evolved, in accordance with the high court‘s observations in

2025(People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 61 ; Kimbley v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1169 .) Here, Shakir did not expressly state his dissatisfaction with the jury below.

1999(Kimbley v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1169 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 148 ].) He argues his failure to do so is justified because there were more “pro-State” prospects waiting in the venire and if he challenged State employees in the box he might have ended up with a more biased jury.

2017(E.g., People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686 , 742, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485 , 115 P.3d 1145 ; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046 , 1087, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 774 P.2d 659 .) "But we have never reversed a case based on Bittaker 's dictum. [Citation.] We therefore reject the Bittaker dictum in our own cases that cite it, and now conclude that it has no applicability in a determination whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a denial of a for-cause challenge." ( People v. Black , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 919, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 363 , 320 P.3d 800 .) Any uncertainty dicta in other *146 cases might

2017(E.g., People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686 , 742, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485 , 115 P.3d 1145 ; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046 , 1087, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 774 P.2d 659 .) "But we have never reversed a case based on Bittaker 's dictum. [Citation.] We therefore reject the Bittaker dictum in our own cases that cite it, and now conclude that it has no applicability in a determination whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a denial of a for-cause challenge." ( People v. Black , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 919, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 363 , 320 P.3d 800 .) Any uncertainty dicta in other *146 cases might

2013Because the exercise of peremptory challenges cannot remedy the harm caused by inadequate voir dire, we have never required, and do not now require, that counsel use all peremptory challenges to preserve for appeal issues regarding the adequacy of voir dire.” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 537-538 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 , 58 P.3d 931 ].) In addition, as discussed below, defense counsel made multiple requests to question the prospective jurors regarding their ability to properly consider the statutory mitigating factors.

2013Because the exercise of peremptory challenges cannot remedy the harm caused by inadequate voir dire, we have never required, and do not now require, that counsel use all peremptory challenges to preserve for appeal issues regarding the adequacy of voir dire.” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 537-538 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 , 58 P.3d 931 ].) In addition, as discussed below, defense counsel made multiple requests to question the prospective jurors regarding their ability to properly consider the statutory mitigating factors.

2013“A defendant’s failure to raise a for-cause challenge or to exhaust all peremptory challenges is relevant to the question whether he has preserved a claim on appeal that members of his jury were unacceptable to him.” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 606 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 87 , 229 P.3d 12 ].) But without an adequate voir dire, “the defense is denied information upon which to intelligently exercise both its challenges for cause and its peremptory challenges.

2013“A defendant’s failure to raise a for-cause challenge or to exhaust all peremptory challenges is relevant to the question whether he has preserved a claim on appeal that members of his jury were unacceptable to him.” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 606 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 87 , 229 P.3d 12 ].) But without an adequate voir dire, “the defense is denied information upon which to intelligently exercise both its challenges for cause and its peremptory challenges.

2021(Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 136 [justification need not support a challenge for cause].) This evidence supports the genuine nature of the prosecution’s explanation.

2021(See Rhoades, 41 PEOPLE v. BATTLE Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 435 [“ ‘Unlike a for-cause challenge . . . , the issue here is not whether a juror held views that would impair his or her ability to follow the law.

2019Even then, the error is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.’ The court found ‘nothing arbitrary or irrational about such a requirement, which subordinates the absolute freedom to use a peremptory challenge as one wishes to the goal of empanelling an impartial jury.’ (Id. at p. 90.) . . . [T]he California rule is similar to Oklahoma’s.” (Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 487 ; accord, People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 426 .) Martinez- Salazar casts no doubt on the continued validity of our rule requiri

2017(E.g., People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686 , 742, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485 , 115 P.3d 1145 ; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046 , 1087, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 774 P.2d 659 .) "But we have never reversed a case based on Bittaker 's dictum. [Citation.] We therefore reject the Bittaker dictum in our own cases that cite it, and now conclude that it has no applicability in a determination whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a denial of a for-cause challenge." ( People v. Black , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 919, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 363 , 320 P.3d 800 .) Any uncertainty dicta in other *146 cases might

2017(E.g., People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686 , 742, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485 , 115 P.3d 1145 ; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046 , 1087, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 774 P.2d 659 .) "But we have never reversed a case based on Bittaker 's dictum. [Citation.] We therefore reject the Bittaker dictum in our own cases that cite it, and now conclude that it has no applicability in a determination whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a denial of a for-cause challenge." ( People v. Black , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 919, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 363 , 320 P.3d 800 .) Any uncertainty dicta in other *146 cases might

2016(People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 529 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 133 P.3d 1076 ].) But no such deference is warranted when a trial court’s ruling on a for-cause challenge is based solely on the prospective jurors’ answers to a written questionnaire.

2016(People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 529 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 133 P.3d 1076 ].) But no such deference is warranted when a trial court’s ruling on a for-cause challenge is based solely on the prospective jurors’ answers to a written questionnaire.

2015(See People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 133 [analogous situation of a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror; “such a determination involves an assessment of a prospective juror’s demeanor and credibility that is ‘ “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province” ’ ”].) In these circumstances, the trial court was within its discretion not to remove Juror No. 7 from the jury.

2015Even if the conflicting questionnaire responses and the voir dire on the subject would not have justified a for-cause challenge, a prosecutor would reasonably want to avoid the risk that H.R. actually would, as he stated in the questionnaire, “never vote for the death of another person.” (See People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 470 [ 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 328 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 441 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 , 107 P.3d 790 ].) This risk was sufficient to dispel an inference of discrimination. c.

2015Even if the conflicting questionnaire responses and the voir dire on the subject would not have justified a for-cause challenge, a prosecutor would reasonably want to avoid the risk that H.R. actually would, as he stated in the questionnaire, “never vote for the death of another person.” (See People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 470 [ 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 328 P.3d 1 ]; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 441 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672 , 107 P.3d 790 ].) This risk was sufficient to dispel an inference of discrimination. c.