for-cause challenge in Utah

2025The court has a “duty to ensure a fair trial,” and “once a for-cause challenge is raised, a trial court has an obligation . . . to be lenient in granting challenges for cause.” State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ¶ 19 , 131 P.3d 202 . ¶19 In addition to showing that the district court “committed legal error by failing to excuse for cause” Juror 14 and Juror 26, Taylor also must show that this “failure to strike the prospective jurors prejudiced [him].” Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 24 ; see also State v. 20220712-CA 10 2025 UT App 14 State v. Taylor Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (“To prevail on a claim o

2010See State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶¶ 38-40 , 24 P.3d 948 (stating that failure to challenge a juror constitutes waiver).

2008ANALYSIS 110 Voir dire serves two distinct and important purposes: first, "to allow counsel to uncover biases of individual jurors sufficient to support a for-cause challenge" and second, "to gather information enabling counsel to intelligently use peremptory challenges." Id.

1995Voir dire of a jury panel serves two purposes: “1) to allow counsel to uncover biases of individual jurors sufficient to support a for-cause challenge and 2) to gather information enabling counsel to intelligently use peremptory challenges.” Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah App.1993).

1999Worthen made clear that the fairness of a trial may indeed depend upon the right of counsel to ask voir dire questions designed to discover and explore biases that would affect a juror’s decision (even if such biases do not support a for- cause challenge): “All that is necessary for a voir dire'question to be appropriate is that it allow ‘defense counsel to exercise his peremptory challenges more intelligently.’” Id. (quoting State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984)).

1993State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984)).

1999Worthen made clear that the fairness of a trial may indeed depend upon the right of counsel to ask voir dire questions designed to discover and explore biases that would affect a juror’s decision (even if such biases do not support a for- cause challenge): “All that is necessary for a voir dire'question to be appropriate is that it allow ‘defense counsel to exercise his peremptory challenges more intelligently.’” Id. (quoting State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984)).

1993State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984)).

2025The court has a “duty to ensure a fair trial,” and “once a for-cause challenge is raised, a trial court has an obligation . . . to be lenient in granting challenges for cause.” State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ¶ 19 , 131 P.3d 202 . ¶19 In addition to showing that the district court “committed legal error by failing to excuse for cause” Juror 14 and Juror 26, Taylor also must show that this “failure to strike the prospective jurors prejudiced [him].” Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 24 ; see also State v. 20220712-CA 10 2025 UT App 14 State v. Taylor Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (“To prevail on a claim o

1999Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that (1) the prosecutor was not guilty of misconduct in arguing that the jury should consider evidence that Saunders abused B.C. in 1991 in the context of the 1992 charges; (2) the trial court did not err in refusing to allow defense counsel to question prospective jurors on voir dire concerning any specialized knowledge they might have concerning sexual abuse of children; (3) jury instruction 26 did not constitute plain error; and (4) State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), which held that defendants must prove actual prejudice w

2026See generally State v. Williams, 2025 UT App 118, ¶ 31 , 576 P.3d 1142 (concluding that counsel’s participation “in three bench conferences during jury selection” and “a for-cause challenge to a different potential juror” showed “active[] participat[ion] in the jury selection process”), cert. denied, 581 P.3d 554 (Utah 2025). ¶27 Nor can we say that these jurors expressed such “strong or unequivocal” bias “that no plausible countervailing subjective preference could justify” Counsel’s decision not to challenge them.

2025Thus, Counsel actively participated in the jury selection process. ¶32 Second, while Juror 6 did refer to Sheriff as “a friend,” nothing we can discern from the transcript demonstrates that this comment was an expression of “bias so strong or unequivocal that no plausible countervailing subjective preference could justify failure to remove that juror.” Id.

2025The court has a “duty to ensure a fair trial,” and “once a for-cause challenge is raised, a trial court has an obligation . . . to be lenient in granting challenges for cause.” State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ¶ 19 , 131 P.3d 202 . ¶19 In addition to showing that the district court “committed legal error by failing to excuse for cause” Juror 14 and Juror 26, Taylor also must show that this “failure to strike the prospective jurors prejudiced [him].” Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 24 ; see also State v. 20220712-CA 10 2025 UT App 14 State v. Taylor Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (“To prevail on a claim o

2025The court has a “duty to ensure a fair trial,” and “once a for-cause challenge is raised, a trial court has an obligation . . . to be lenient in granting challenges for cause.” State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ¶ 19 , 131 P.3d 202 . ¶19 In addition to showing that the district court “committed legal error by failing to excuse for cause” Juror 14 and Juror 26, Taylor also must show that this “failure to strike the prospective jurors prejudiced [him].” Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 24 ; see also State v. 20220712-CA 10 2025 UT App 14 State v. Taylor Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (“To prevail on a claim o

2025The court has a “duty to ensure a fair trial,” and “once a for-cause challenge is raised, a trial court has an obligation . . . to be lenient in granting challenges for cause.” State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ¶ 19 , 131 P.3d 202 . ¶19 In addition to showing that the district court “committed legal error by failing to excuse for cause” Juror 14 and Juror 26, Taylor also must show that this “failure to strike the prospective jurors prejudiced [him].” Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 24 ; see also State v. 20220712-CA 10 2025 UT App 14 State v. Taylor Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (“To prevail on a claim o

2025The court has a “duty to ensure a fair trial,” and “once a for-cause challenge is raised, a trial court has an obligation . . . to be lenient in granting challenges for cause.” State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ¶ 19 , 131 P.3d 202 . ¶19 In addition to showing that the district court “committed legal error by failing to excuse for cause” Juror 14 and Juror 26, Taylor also must show that this “failure to strike the prospective jurors prejudiced [him].” Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 24 ; see also State v. 20220712-CA 10 2025 UT App 14 State v. Taylor Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (“To prevail on a claim o

2025The court has a “duty to ensure a fair trial,” and “once a for-cause challenge is raised, a trial court has an obligation . . . to be lenient in granting challenges for cause.” State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ¶ 19 , 131 P.3d 202 . ¶19 In addition to showing that the district court “committed legal error by failing to excuse for cause” Juror 14 and Juror 26, Taylor also must show that this “failure to strike the prospective jurors prejudiced [him].” Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 24 ; see also State v. 20220712-CA 10 2025 UT App 14 State v. Taylor Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (“To prevail on a claim o

2008Under Utah law, "a trial judge should liberally allow questions designed to discover attitudes and biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though such questions go beyond that needed for challenges for cause." Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah Ct.App.1991), cert. denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)..

2006See id. at 1125 ; see also Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶¶ 18, 27 , 24 P.3d 948 .

2006See State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 509 (Utah 1997) (Stewart, A.C.J., concurring) (“[I]t is absolutely imperative that trial judges once and for all realize that for-cause challenges to jurors should be viewed liberally.”).

2001The court in Sanderson noted that "[in addition to a promise for a specified employment term or a for-cause requirement for termination, an employer can ... agree to use a certain procedure for firing employees or promise not to fire employees for a certain reason, thereby modifying the employee's at-will status." 844 P.2d at 8307 (emphasis added).

1999See Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 394 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (citing Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct.App.1993)).

1996Because peremptory challenges “do not have a constitutional status, they do not have a structural status.” United States v. Annigoni, 68 F.3d 279, 285 (9th Cir.1995).

1993State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App.1991), cert. denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 457 (Utah App.1989).

1993State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App.1991), cert. denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 457 (Utah App.1989).

1993State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App.1991), cert. denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 457 (Utah App.1989).

1993State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App.1991), cert. denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 457 (Utah App.1989).

1992See Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840 (Utah 1992); Brehany, 812 P.2d at 55 ; Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d 1096, 1097-98 (Utah 1989).

1992See Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840 (Utah 1992); Brehany, 812 P.2d at 55 ; Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d 1096, 1097-98 (Utah 1989).