19 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1980–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Crockfordgreen2 sentences2018As this Court described the requirement in Commonwealth v. Crockford, [] 660 A.2d 1326, 1329 ([Pa. Super.] 1995), actual notice is “a judicially created element, designed to protect a defendant’s due process rights.” . . . 2014As this Court described the requirement in Commonwealth v. Crockford, 443 Pa.Super. 23 , 660 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1995), actual notice is “a judicially created element, designed to protect a defendant’s due process rights.” The Supreme Court’s decision in Kane is particularly relevant to the instant case. | 2 | 2 |
Salley v. Option One Mortgage Corp.green2 sentences2013See Salley v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 119 (Pa. 2007), where the court described the doctrine of unconscionability as a statutory and a common law defense to the enforcement of an allegedly unfair contract or contractual provision. 2012See Salley v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 592 Pa. 323, 331 , 925 A.2d 115, 119 (2007), where the court described the doctrine of unconscionability as a statutory and a common law defense to the enforcement of an allegedly unfair contract or contractual provision. | 2 | 2 |
Moore v. Mooregreen2 sentences2018See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provision of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”). -3- J-A08023-18 In Moore v. Moore, 921 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2007), this Court described the doctrine of consentable lines in detail: The establishment of a boundary line by acquiescence for the statutory period of twenty-one years has long been recognized in Pennsylvania to quiet title and discourage vexatious litigation. 2015In Moore v. Moore, 921 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2007), this Court described the doctrine of consentable lines in detail: “The establishment of a boundary line by acquiescence for the statutory period of twenty-one years has long been recognized in Pennsylvania” to quiet title and discourage vexatious litigation. - 10 - J-A12018-15 Zeglin v. Gahagen, 571 Pa. 321 , 812 A.2d 558, 561 (2002); see also Corbin [v. Cowan], 716 A.2d [614,] 617 [(Pa. Super. 1998)]. | 1 | 2 |
Wolf v. Department of Highwaysgreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Wolf v. Department of Highways, 220 A.2d 868, 871 (Pa. 1966).9 8 In Lehigh-Northampton Airport Authority, this Court described the test for such a claim a follows: Where a property is designated for formal condemnation pursuant to a planned, prospective public improvement, adverse interim consequences caused to the property by the prospect of condemnation will not constitute a de facto taking unless those interim consequences are that the owner is deprived of the use and enjoyment of the property, or is subjected to the loss of the property before formal condemnation can provide com | 1 | 1 |
Lehigh-Northampton Airport Authority v. WBF Associates, L.P.green1 sentence2020If there has been such an interim deprivation of use, or exposure to loss, then the principle of de facto taking becomes applicable to accelerate the time when the governmental authority must make compensation. 728 A.2d at 988 (internal citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Zeglin v. Gahagengreen2 sentences2015In Moore v. Moore, 921 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2007), this Court described the doctrine of consentable lines in detail: “The establishment of a boundary line by acquiescence for the statutory period of twenty-one years has long been recognized in Pennsylvania” to quiet title and discourage vexatious litigation. - 10 - J-A12018-15 Zeglin v. Gahagen, 571 Pa. 321 , 812 A.2d 558, 561 (2002); see also Corbin [v. Cowan], 716 A.2d [614,] 617 [(Pa. Super. 1998)]. 2015In Moore v. Moore, 921 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2007), this Court described the doctrine of consentable lines in detail: “The establishment of a boundary line by acquiescence for the statutory period of twenty-one years has long been recognized in Pennsylvania” to quiet title and discourage vexatious litigation. - 10 - J-A12018-15 Zeglin v. Gahagen, 571 Pa. 321 , 812 A.2d 558, 561 (2002); see also Corbin [v. Cowan], 716 A.2d [614,] 617 [(Pa. Super. 1998)]. | 1 | 1 |
Pappas v. Asbelgreen2 sentences2010Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered.” Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa. 407, 418 , 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001). (internal citations omitted) This court applied the described standard of review when reviewing the case at hand, and found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, such that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate. 2010Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered.” Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa. 407, 418 , 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001). (internal citations omitted) This court applied the described standard of review when reviewing the case at hand, and found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, such that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate. | 1 | 1 |
Zotis Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industrygreen2 sentences2009Moreover, this Court has held in experience record transfer cases like this, that it is “the ability to control the business, not actual control, [that] is determinative.... ” Zotis Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor and Indus., 160 Pa.Cmwlth. 568 , 635 A.2d 698, 700 (1993). 2009Moreover, this Court has held in experience record transfer cases like this, that it is “the ability to control the business, not actual control, [that] is determinative.... ” Zotis Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor and Indus., 160 Pa.Cmwlth. 568 , 635 A.2d 698, 700 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Tarvergreen2 sentences1994In Commonwealth v. Tarver, this court described the analysis to be used in a double jeopardy context for determining whether two charges constitute “the same offense”: The following test for determining when two charges constitute the “same offense” was first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S.Ct. 180, 182 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932): The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether eac 1994In Commonwealth v. Tarver, this court described the analysis to be used in a double jeopardy context for determining whether two charges constitute “the same offense”: The following test for determining when two charges constitute the “same offense” was first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S.Ct. 180, 182 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932): The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether eac | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Leckey v. Lower Southampton Township Zoning Hearing Board
green
2 sentences2018Conditions must be reasonable and must [ have ] support in the record warranting the imposition of such conditions; otherwise, the imposition of conditions constitutes an abuse of discretion. [ 16 ] Sabatine v. Zoning Hearing B [ d. ] of Washington T [ wp. ] , 651 A.2d 649 , 655 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). '[T]he Board is not required to support the imposition of conditions; rather, the opposite is true- property owners are required to show that the imposition of conditions was an abuse of discretion .' Leckey v. Lower Southampton T [ wp. ] Zoning Hearing B [ d. ], 864 A.2d 593 , 596 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004 2018Id. at 596 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Moorehead v. Civil Service Commission
green
1 sentence2018To be precise, the trial court described its standard of review as "limited to determining whether the adjudication 'violates constitutional rights, is not in accordance with the law, [or] violates the procedural provision[s] of the local agency law, or the commission's findings are not supported by substantial evidence.' " Trial Court Rule 1925(a) 9 Op. at 2 (quoting Moorehead v. Civil Service Commission of Allegheny County , 769 A.2d 1233 , 1237-38 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re: Adopt. of M.R.D. and T.M.D. Appeal of: M.C.
green
1 sentence2018The Court described the inquiry as follows: “Mother and Grandfather may show cause to waive the relinquishment requirement only if they can establish that permitting Grandfather to adopt Children while Mother retains her parental rights will promote a new family unit or that it is otherwise unnecessary to require Mother to relinquish her parental rights under the circumstances of this case.” In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1128 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sabatine v. Zoning Hearing Board of Washington Township
green
1 sentence2018Conditions must be reasonable and must [ have ] support in the record warranting the imposition of such conditions; otherwise, the imposition of conditions constitutes an abuse of discretion. [ 16 ] Sabatine v. Zoning Hearing B [ d. ] of Washington T [ wp. ] , 651 A.2d 649 , 655 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). '[T]he Board is not required to support the imposition of conditions; rather, the opposite is true- property owners are required to show that the imposition of conditions was an abuse of discretion .' Leckey v. Lower Southampton T [ wp. ] Zoning Hearing B [ d. ], 864 A.2d 593 , 596 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004 | 1 | 2018–2018 |
University City Housing Co. v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2009Bd. of Review, 114 Pa.Cmwlth. 607 , 539 A.2d 489 (1988), this Court described factors to be considered in determining whether a person exercises control in a corporation, including: the percentage of stock owned by claimant; whether claimant is an officer; the characterization given the employment relationship by laypersons; and, claimant’s title. 2009Bd. of Review, 114 Pa.Cmwlth. 607 , 539 A.2d 489 (1988), this Court described factors to be considered in determining whether a person exercises control in a corporation, including: the percentage of stock owned by claimant; whether claimant is an officer; the characterization given the employment relationship by laypersons; and, claimant’s title. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Mehring v. Zoning Hearing Board of Manchester Township
neutral
1 sentence2008Id. at 596 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2000Id. at 92-93 , 106 S.Ct. at 1721 . 2000Id. at 92-93 , 106 S.Ct. at 1721 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Electric Co.
green
2 sentences1999With regard to the dicta in City of Philadelphia I describing additional conditions under which a pre-existing contract may be impaired (including the requirement of a direct impact upon public welfare), the Court described such analysis as “unfortunate” and “clearly gratuitous.” Id. at 323 , 473 A.2d at 1002 . 1999With regard to the dicta in City of Philadelphia I describing additional conditions under which a pre-existing contract may be impaired (including the requirement of a direct impact upon public welfare), the Court described such analysis as “unfortunate” and “clearly gratuitous.” Id. at 323 , 473 A.2d at 1002 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Blockburger v. United States
green
2 sentences1994In Commonwealth v. Tarver, this court described the analysis to be used in a double jeopardy context for determining whether two charges constitute “the same offense”: The following test for determining when two charges constitute the “same offense” was first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S.Ct. 180, 182 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932): The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether eac 1994In Commonwealth v. Tarver, this court described the analysis to be used in a double jeopardy context for determining whether two charges constitute “the same offense”: The following test for determining when two charges constitute the “same offense” was first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S.Ct. 180, 182 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932): The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether eac | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Commonwealth v. Jarman
green
2 sentences1993Appellant also suggests that his conviction under section 3731(a)(4) is infirm under Commonwealth v. Jarman, 529 Pa. 92 , 601 A.2d 1229 (1992), and Commonwealth v. Modaffare, 529 Pa. 101 , 601 A.2d 1233 (1992), because the Commonwealth failed to produce expert testimony relating back his blood alcohol content to the time that he was driving, which was over two hours prior to when his intoxilyzer test was performed. 1993Appellant also suggests that his conviction under section 3731(a)(4) is infirm under Commonwealth v. Jarman, 529 Pa. 92 , 601 A.2d 1229 (1992), and Commonwealth v. Modaffare, 529 Pa. 101 , 601 A.2d 1233 (1992), because the Commonwealth failed to produce expert testimony relating back his blood alcohol content to the time that he was driving, which was over two hours prior to when his intoxilyzer test was performed. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Commonwealth v. Modaffare
green
2 sentences1993Appellant also suggests that his conviction under section 3731(a)(4) is infirm under Commonwealth v. Jarman, 529 Pa. 92 , 601 A.2d 1229 (1992), and Commonwealth v. Modaffare, 529 Pa. 101 , 601 A.2d 1233 (1992), because the Commonwealth failed to produce expert testimony relating back his blood alcohol content to the time that he was driving, which was over two hours prior to when his intoxilyzer test was performed. 1993Appellant also suggests that his conviction under section 3731(a)(4) is infirm under Commonwealth v. Jarman, 529 Pa. 92 , 601 A.2d 1229 (1992), and Commonwealth v. Modaffare, 529 Pa. 101 , 601 A.2d 1233 (1992), because the Commonwealth failed to produce expert testimony relating back his blood alcohol content to the time that he was driving, which was over two hours prior to when his intoxilyzer test was performed. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Pilkington v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp.
green
2 sentences1985In Pilkington v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corporation, 460 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind.App., 1984), another negligence case, the court described the standard of care required of companies transmitting electricity, stating that “the doctrine of strict liability is inapplicable to electric utilities.” 460 N.E.2d at 1005 . 1985In Pilkington v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corporation, 460 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind.App., 1984), another negligence case, the court described the standard of care required of companies transmitting electricity, stating that “the doctrine of strict liability is inapplicable to electric utilities.” 460 N.E.2d at 1005 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Brown v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1980This test was reaffirmed recently in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 , 97 S.Ct. 2221 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977) where by a 6-3 majority it was held to be double jeopardy to subject a defendant to successive prosecutions by state courts in Ohio upon charges of joyriding and auto theft, from a single episode, where every element of the former offense is contained in the latter. 2 (The Ohio courts do not have a rule similar to our Campana rule and only two Justices would have reversed on this basis). 1980This test was reaffirmed recently in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 , 97 S.Ct. 2221 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977) where by a 6-3 majority it was held to be double jeopardy to subject a defendant to successive prosecutions by state courts in Ohio upon charges of joyriding and auto theft, from a single episode, where every element of the former offense is contained in the latter. 2 (The Ohio courts do not have a rule similar to our Campana rule and only two Justices would have reversed on this basis). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.