described standard in Indiana

2010There we stated: Undue influence is "the exercise of sufficient control over [a] person to destroy his free agency and constrain him to do what he would not have done if such control had not been exercised." In re Knepper, 856 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), reh'g granted on other grounds, 861 N.E.2d 717 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied.

2010This court described the presumption applicable to undue influence claims in Carlson v. Warren, 878 N.E.2d 844 (Ind.Ct.App.2007).

2009In Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 , 69 S.Ct. 1274 , 93 L.Ed. 1672 (1949), the Court described the factors which determine whether a particular type of activity is agricultural and concluded that, "The question is whether the activity in the particular case is carried on as part of the agricultural function or is separately organized as an independent productive activity." Id. at 761, 69 S.Ct. 1274 .

2009In Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 , 69 S.Ct. 1274 , 93 L.Ed. 1672 (1949), the Court described the factors which determine whether a particular type of activity is agricultural and concluded that, "The question is whether the activity in the particular case is carried on as part of the agricultural function or is separately organized as an independent productive activity." Id. at 761, 69 S.Ct. 1274 .

2005Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 , 27 S.Ct. 350 , 51 L.Ed. 5538 (1907).

2005Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 , 27 S.Ct. 350 , 51 L.Ed. 5538 (1907).

2005Thereafter, the court described the doctrine of *1212 primary jurisdiction as "an invention of the United States Supreme Court to deal with the problem that arises when the courts and an agency both have claims to jurisdiction of an issue in a case that has come before a court." Id. (citing Tex. & Pac.

1992Sendak, 151 Ind.App. at 377-78 , 279 N.E.2d at 844 .

1992Sendak, 151 Ind.App. at 377-78 , 279 N.E.2d at 844 .

1989Sixty years ago, this Court described the standard as "the value of the child’s services from the time of death until he would have attained his majority, taken in connection with his prospects in life, less the cost of his support and maintenance during that period, including such as board, clothing, schooling and medical attention.” Thompson v. Town of Fort Branch (1931) 204 Ind. 152, 154 , 178 N.E. 440, 444 (quoting City of Elwood v. Addison (1901), 26 Ind.App. 28 , 59 N.E. 47 ).

1989Sixty years ago, this Court described the standard as "the value of the child’s services from the time of death until he would have attained his majority, taken in connection with his prospects in life, less the cost of his support and maintenance during that period, including such as board, clothing, schooling and medical attention.” Thompson v. Town of Fort Branch (1931) 204 Ind. 152, 154 , 178 N.E. 440, 444 (quoting City of Elwood v. Addison (1901), 26 Ind.App. 28 , 59 N.E. 47 ).

1989Id. at 734 .

1983Further, Brill’s statements were “influenced by suggestiveness and [were] the product of her imagination.” Record at 56-57. 3 .In Pearson v. State, (1982) Ind., 441 N.E.2d 468, 473 , the supreme court made the following statement: “In every case, the trier of fact must be presented with sufficient evidence to be able to judge the reliability of the witness’s perception of the events before the hypnosis session, the manner in which the hypnosis procedure was conducted, and the degree to which the witness’s statements were changed by the hypnosis statement.” Arguably, the unavailability of evide