described requirement in Michigan

2015In Swain, 288 Mich App at 638 , this Court described the standard as requiring a defendant to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty.

2014In Swain, 288 Mich App at 638 , this Court described the standard as requiring a defendant to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty.

2020Id.

2016APPLICABILITY OF THE WDCA This Court described the standard of review in worker’s compensation cases in Moore v Prestige Painting, 277 Mich App 437, 447 ; 745 NW2d 816 (2007): The [M]CAC must review the magistrate’s decision under the “substantial evidence” standard, and we review the [M]CAC’s findings of fact under the “any evidence” standard.

2016The seven factors quoted earlier as outlined in Grimm were adopted from Vicencio, 211 Mich App at 507 .3 In Vicencio, this Court described the factors a circuit court “should consider 2 In an unpublished opinion, this Court found application of the Grimm factors improper when a tax appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

2016Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691 , -7- 702-704; 614 NW2d 607 (2000).

2016Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691 , -7- 702-704; 614 NW2d 607 (2000).

2016APPLICABILITY OF THE WDCA This Court described the standard of review in worker’s compensation cases in Moore v Prestige Painting, 277 Mich App 437, 447 ; 745 NW2d 816 (2007): The [M]CAC must review the magistrate’s decision under the “substantial evidence” standard, and we review the [M]CAC’s findings of fact under the “any evidence” standard.

2015This Court described the factors to be considered in Freed v Salas, 286 Mich App 300, 334 ; 780 NW2d 844 (2009): (1) whether the verdict was the result of improper methods, prejudice, passion, partiality, sympathy, corruption, or mistake of law or fact; (2) whether the verdict was within the limits of what reasonable minds would deem just compensation for the injury sustained; and (3) whether the amount actually awarded is comparable with awards in similar cases both within the state and in other jurisdictions.

2015This Court described the factors to be considered in Freed v Salas, 286 Mich App 300, 334 ; 780 NW2d 844 (2009): (1) whether the verdict was the result of improper methods, prejudice, passion, partiality, sympathy, corruption, or mistake of law or fact; (2) whether the verdict was within the limits of what reasonable minds would deem just compensation for the injury sustained; and (3) whether the amount actually awarded is comparable with awards in similar cases both within the state and in other jurisdictions.

2008STANDARD of review In Wexford Med Group v City of Cadillac, 474 Mich 192, 201 ; 713 NW2d 734 (2006), this Court described the standard of review for MTT decisions as follows: The standard of review for Tax Tribunal cases is multifaceted.

2008STANDARD of review In Wexford Med Group v City of Cadillac, 474 Mich 192, 201 ; 713 NW2d 734 (2006), this Court described the standard of review for MTT decisions as follows: The standard of review for Tax Tribunal cases is multifaceted.

2006This Court described the doctrine of equitable subrogation in its recent decision in Washington Mut Bank, FA v ShoreBank Corp: Subrogation comes in two forms described by the Supreme Court in French v Grand Beach Co [ 239 Mich 575, 580-581 ; 215 NW 13 (1927)] as follows: “The doctrine of subrogation rests upon the equitable principle that one who, in order to protect a security held by him, is compelled to pay a debt for which another is primarily liable, is entitled to be substituted in the place of and to be vested with the rights of the person to whom such payment is made, without agreement

2006This Court described the doctrine of equitable subrogation in its recent decision in Washington Mut Bank, FA v ShoreBank Corp: Subrogation comes in two forms described by the Supreme Court in French v Grand Beach Co [ 239 Mich 575, 580-581 ; 215 NW 13 (1927)] as follows: “The doctrine of subrogation rests upon the equitable principle that one who, in order to protect a security held by him, is compelled to pay a debt for which another is primarily liable, is entitled to be substituted in the place of and to be vested with the rights of the person to whom such payment is made, without agreement

2000As set forth in Clayton , the question is whether, and in what circumstances, an employee alleging that his union breached its duty of fair representation in processing his grievance, and that his employer breached the collective-bargaining agreement, must also attempt to exhaust the internal union appeals procedures established by his union’s constitution before he may maintain his suit under § 301. [Id. at 682.] The Court described the test as follows: As we stated in NLRB v Marine Workers, [ 391 US 418, 426 , and n 8; 88 S Ct 1717 ; 20 L Ed 2d 706 (1968)], courts have discretion to decide w

2000As set forth in Clayton , the question is whether, and in what circumstances, an employee alleging that his union breached its duty of fair representation in processing his grievance, and that his employer breached the collective-bargaining agreement, must also attempt to exhaust the internal union appeals procedures established by his union’s constitution before he may maintain his suit under § 301. [Id. at 682.] The Court described the test as follows: As we stated in NLRB v Marine Workers, [ 391 US 418, 426 , and n 8; 88 S Ct 1717 ; 20 L Ed 2d 706 (1968)], courts have discretion to decide w

1988He must take him before the court as soon as he reasonably can._ As the majority notes, in People v Hamilton, 359 Mich 410 ; 102 NW2d 738 (1960), this Court became the first state to adopt the rule of exclusion for violations of the prompt-arraignment statute which the United States Supreme Court promulgated in McNabb v United States, 318 US 332 ; 63 S Ct 608 ; 87 L Ed 819 (1943), and refined in Mallory v United States, 354 US 449 ; 77 S Ct 1356 ; 1 L Ed 2d 1479 (1957).

1988He must take him before the court as soon as he reasonably can._ As the majority notes, in People v Hamilton, 359 Mich 410 ; 102 NW2d 738 (1960), this Court became the first state to adopt the rule of exclusion for violations of the prompt-arraignment statute which the United States Supreme Court promulgated in McNabb v United States, 318 US 332 ; 63 S Ct 608 ; 87 L Ed 819 (1943), and refined in Mallory v United States, 354 US 449 ; 77 S Ct 1356 ; 1 L Ed 2d 1479 (1957).

1988He must take him before the court as soon as he reasonably can._ As the majority notes, in People v Hamilton, 359 Mich 410 ; 102 NW2d 738 (1960), this Court became the first state to adopt the rule of exclusion for violations of the prompt-arraignment statute which the United States Supreme Court promulgated in McNabb v United States, 318 US 332 ; 63 S Ct 608 ; 87 L Ed 819 (1943), and refined in Mallory v United States, 354 US 449 ; 77 S Ct 1356 ; 1 L Ed 2d 1479 (1957).

1988He must take him before the court as soon as he reasonably can._ As the majority notes, in People v Hamilton, 359 Mich 410 ; 102 NW2d 738 (1960), this Court became the first state to adopt the rule of exclusion for violations of the prompt-arraignment statute which the United States Supreme Court promulgated in McNabb v United States, 318 US 332 ; 63 S Ct 608 ; 87 L Ed 819 (1943), and refined in Mallory v United States, 354 US 449 ; 77 S Ct 1356 ; 1 L Ed 2d 1479 (1957).

1988He must take him before the court as soon as he reasonably can._ As the majority notes, in People v Hamilton, 359 Mich 410 ; 102 NW2d 738 (1960), this Court became the first state to adopt the rule of exclusion for violations of the prompt-arraignment statute which the United States Supreme Court promulgated in McNabb v United States, 318 US 332 ; 63 S Ct 608 ; 87 L Ed 819 (1943), and refined in Mallory v United States, 354 US 449 ; 77 S Ct 1356 ; 1 L Ed 2d 1479 (1957).

1988He must take him before the court as soon as he reasonably can._ As the majority notes, in People v Hamilton, 359 Mich 410 ; 102 NW2d 738 (1960), this Court became the first state to adopt the rule of exclusion for violations of the prompt-arraignment statute which the United States Supreme Court promulgated in McNabb v United States, 318 US 332 ; 63 S Ct 608 ; 87 L Ed 819 (1943), and refined in Mallory v United States, 354 US 449 ; 77 S Ct 1356 ; 1 L Ed 2d 1479 (1957).

1988It codifies a venerable common-law rule which has existed in England for centuries 3 and which is enforced by most of the fifty states. 4 In Oxford v Berry, 204 Mich 197, 212-213 ; 170 NW 83 (1918), this Court described the requirement of prompt arraignment as an "elementary” principle of common law: It is elementary that, even in criminal cases, when the officer has made the arrest it is his duty, as soon as possible, to bring the party before the court according to the import of the warrant; and if the officer be guilty of unnecessary delay in so doing, it is a breach of his duty; and his du

1988It codifies a venerable common-law rule which has existed in England for centuries 3 and which is enforced by most of the fifty states. 4 In Oxford v Berry, 204 Mich 197, 212-213 ; 170 NW 83 (1918), this Court described the requirement of prompt arraignment as an "elementary” principle of common law: It is elementary that, even in criminal cases, when the officer has made the arrest it is his duty, as soon as possible, to bring the party before the court according to the import of the warrant; and if the officer be guilty of unnecessary delay in so doing, it is a breach of his duty; and his du

1983In Taft v J L Hudson Co, 37 Mich App 692, 698 ; 195 NW2d 296 (1972), lv den 387 Mich 772 (1972), this Court described the standard of review for a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as follows: "In Michigan a court reviewing a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict must view all the evidence and testimony adduced at the trial in the light most favorable to the person against whom the motion was made.

1983In Taft v J L Hudson Co, 37 Mich App 692, 698 ; 195 NW2d 296 (1972), lv den 387 Mich 772 (1972), this Court described the standard of review for a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as follows: "In Michigan a court reviewing a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict must view all the evidence and testimony adduced at the trial in the light most favorable to the person against whom the motion was made.

1981In Young, supra, 367 , however, a majority of the Court described the rule applied in Fountain as a new rule established by the Fountain decision.