11 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lylegreen2 sentences2016See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 403 (Iowa 2014) (“The youth of this state will be 8We distilled five factors from Miller in Ragland, where we said the following: In Miller, the Court described the factors that the sentencing court must consider at the hearing, including: (1) the “chronological age” of the youth and the features of youth, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the “family and home environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the youth’s] participation in th 2016See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 403 (Iowa 2014) (“The youth of this state will be 8We distilled five factors from Miller in Ragland, where we said the following: In Miller, the Court described the factors that the sentencing court must consider at the hearing, including: (1) the “chronological age” of the youth and the features of youth, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the “family and home environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the youth’s] participation in th | 2 | 2 |
Snouffer & Ford v. City of Tiptongreen2 sentences2006In Snouffer & Ford v. City of Tipton, this court described the doctrine of judicial estoppel against inconsistent positions this way: “A party who has, with knowledge of the facts, assumed a particular position in judicial proceedings is estopped to assume a position inconsistent therewith to the prejudice of the adverse party.” 150 Iowa 73, 84-85 , 129 N.W. 345, 350 (1911). 2006In Snouffer & Ford v. City of Tipton, this court described the doctrine of judicial estoppel against inconsistent positions this way: “A party who has, with knowledge of the facts, assumed a particular position in judicial proceedings is estopped to assume a position inconsistent therewith to the prejudice of the adverse party.” 150 Iowa 73, 84-85 , 129 N.W. 345, 350 (1911). | 2 | 2 |
Jacob Lee Schmidt v. State of Iowagreen1 sentence2026And the court described this standard as “demanding.” Id. at 793; see also Dewberry v. State, 941 N.W.2d 1 , 5 (Iowa 2019) (elaborating that under Schmidt’s “demanding standard,” an applicant must show that he is “factually and actually innocent”). | 1 | 1 |
State of Iowa v. Denem Anthony Nullgreen1 sentence2015At the same time, in State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 76, we held under the Iowa Constitution that the Miller ruling applies to a mandatory sentence of 52.5 years before parole eligibility. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2016We distilled five factors from Miller in Ragland, where we said the following: In Miller, the Court described the factors that the sentencing court must consider at the hearing, including: (1) the "chronological age” of the youth and the features of youth, including "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the "family and home environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the youth’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected [the youth]”; (4) 2016We distilled five factors from Miller in Ragland, where we said the following: In Miller, the Court described the factors that the sentencing court must consider at the hearing, including: (1) the "chronological age” of the youth and the features of youth, including "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the "family and home environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the youth’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected [the youth]”; (4) | 6 | 2013–2016 |
State of Iowa v. Jeffrey K. Ragland
green
2 sentences2016We distilled five factors from Miller in Ragland, where we said the following: In Miller, the Court described the factors that the sentencing court must consider at the hearing, including: (1) the "chronological age” of the youth and the features of youth, including "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the "family and home environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the youth’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected [the youth]”; (4) 2015We also summarized five factors that a court must consider at the individualized hearing required by Miller : In Miller , the Court described the factors that the sentencing court must consider at the hearing, including: (1) the “chronological age” of the youth and the features of youth, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the “family and home environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the youth’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may | 3 | 2015–2016 |
Hill v. Lockhart
green
2 sentences2006Id. 2006Id. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Montgomery v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2016I acknowledge that one sentence in Montgomery focuses more narrowly on rehabilitability of the offender: "The [Miller] Court recognized that a sentencer might encounter the rare juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is impossible and life without parole is justified.” 577 U.S. at -, 136 S.Ct. at 733 , 193 L.Ed.2d at 619 . 2016I acknowledge that one sentence in Montgomery focuses more narrowly on rehabilitability of the offender: "The [Miller] Court recognized that a sentencer might encounter the rare juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is impossible and life without parole is justified.” 577 U.S. at -, 136 S.Ct. at 733 , 193 L.Ed.2d at 619 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.