14 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Conley v. Texas Division of United Daughters of the Confederacygreen2 sentences2010“The chief distinction between a resolution and a law seems to be that the former is used whenever the legislative body passing it wishes to merely express an opinion as to some given matter or thing, and 4 is only to have a temporary effect on such particular thing; while by the latter it is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general.” Conley v. Tex. Div. of United Daughters of the Confederacy, 164 S.W. 24, 26 (Tex. Civ. 2010"The chief distinction between a resolution and a law seems to be that the former is used whenever the legislative body passing it wishes to merely express an opinion as to some given matter or thing, and is only to have a temporary effect on such particular thing; while by the latter it is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general." Conley v. Tex. Div. of United Daughters of the Confederacy , 164 S.W. 24, 26 (Tex. Civ. | 2 | 2 |
Blackwell v. Harris Countygreen2 sentences2009In Blackwell v. Horris County, 909 S.W.2d 135, 139 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. denied), the court described the test for distinguishing between an individual acting in a public versus a private capacity: If he is engaged in the performance of a public duty such as the enforcement of general laws, his [private or temporary] employer incurs no vicarious responsibility for his acts, even though the employer directed him to perform the duty. 2009In Blackwell v. Harris County, 909 S.W.2d 135, 139 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. denied), the court described the test for distinguishing between an individual acting in a public versus a private capacity: If he is engaged in the performance of a public duty such as the enforcement of general laws, his [private or temporary] employer incurs no vicarious responsibility for his acts, even though the employer directed him to perform the duty. | 2 | 2 |
McCarter v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See McCarter, 837 S.W.2d at 119 (to show a trial court abused its discretion in limiting a party’s voir dire examination, the party must show that (1) counsel did not attempt to prolong voir dire; and (2) counsel was prohibited from asking proper voir dire questions). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kelly
green
2 sentences2009Claiming it to be consistent with the above described standard of review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recently restated the standard in State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. 2009Claiming it to be consistent with the above described standard of review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recently restated the standard in State v. Kelly , 204 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Ingram v. Deere
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Fox v. Thoreson
green
2 sentences2015The same was true in Fox v. Thoreson, 398 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1966), in which the Court described the rule as a “sound rule of interpretation” and then applied it to construe a lease as a matter of law. 2015Id. at 92 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lilly v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2001In Lilly v. Virginia, the Court described the test used to determine whether hearsay violates the Confrontation Clause. 527 U.S. 116, 124-25 , 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1894 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999). 2001In Lilly v. Virginia, the Court described the test used to determine whether hearsay violates the Confrontation Clause. 527 U.S. 116, 124-25 , 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1894 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
City of Hutchins v. Prasifka
green
2 sentences2000In City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.1970), the court described that exception in the following language: “[t]here is authority for the proposition that a municipality may be estopped in those cases where justice requires its application, and there is no interference with the exercise of its governmental functions.” Id. at 836 . 2000In City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.1970), the court described that exception in the following language: “[t]here is authority for the proposition that a municipality may be estopped in those cases where justice requires its application, and there is no interference with the exercise of its governmental functions.” Id. at 836 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Krause v. City of El Paso
green
2 sentences2000An early application of this principle occurred in Krause v. City of El Paso, 101 Tex. 211 , 106 S.W. 121 (1907). 2000An early application of this principle occurred in Krause v. City of El Paso, 101 Tex. 211 , 106 S.W. 121 (1907). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Dupree v. Piggly Wiggly Shop Rite Foods, Inc.
green
1 sentence1990Id. at 888 ; see Annotation, Liability of One Contracting for Private Police or Security Service for Acts of Personnel Supplied, 38 A.L.R.3d 1332 , 1339 (1971). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Combs v. State
green
1 sentence1988In Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), this Court described the standard and wrote: “... | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Rowland v. City of Tyler
green
1 sentence1978In Spence the court declared that “To permit one to invoke the exercise of a jurisdiction within the general powers of a court and then to reverse its orders upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction would be to allow one to trifle with the courts.” (Emphasis added) The court described this principle as “ . . . one of estoppel in the interest of a sound administration of the laws whereby the regularity or even validity of an act procured by one himself cannot be raised — not that the act is valid, for it may not be, and estoppel does not make valid the thing complained of, but merely closes | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Long v. Long
green
1 sentence1978In Spence the court declared that “To permit one to invoke the exercise of a jurisdiction within the general powers of a court and then to reverse its orders upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction would be to allow one to trifle with the courts.” (Emphasis added) The court described this principle as “ . . . one of estoppel in the interest of a sound administration of the laws whereby the regularity or even validity of an act procured by one himself cannot be raised — not that the act is valid, for it may not be, and estoppel does not make valid the thing complained of, but merely closes | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Jett v. Sides
green
1 sentence1978Fort Worth 1963, no writ); Jett v. Sides, 367 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Civ.App. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.