Kennedy rule in Pennsylvania

2022In Simons, this Court adopted the Kennedy rule, declaring that “double jeopardy will attach only to those mistrials which have been intentionally caused by prosecutorial misconduct.” Id. at 540 .

2022In Simons, this Court adopted the Kennedy rule, declaring that “double jeopardy will attach only to those mistrials which have been intentionally caused by prosecutorial misconduct.” Id. at 540 .

2020See Martorano, 559 Pa. at 537 , 741 A.2d at 1223 (noting that Smith “abandoned the Simons standard and returned to the pre-Kennedy rule”).

2020In Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992), this Court held that our state constitution bars retrial on double jeopardy grounds “not only when prosecutorial misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, but also when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.” We later clarified that the Smith standard also included intentional prosecutorial misconduct “designed to harass the defendant through successive prosecutions or otherwise deprive him of his constitutional righ

2014See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1018 (Alaska 2008) (concluding that six of the Kennedy factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (concluding that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24 (Me.2009) (concluding the first and second factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Doe v. Dep't of Pub.

2014See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1018 (Alaska 2008) (concluding that six of the Kennedy factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (concluding that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24 (Me.2009) (concluding the first and second factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Doe v. Dep't of Pub.

2025The Smith Court expressed uncertainty whether the Kennedy test would bar retrial, noting “it is possible that some courts would not view the prosecutorial misconduct in this case as rising to the level of subversion of constitutional rights.” Id. at 325 .

2025The Smith Court expressed uncertainty whether the Kennedy test would bar retrial, noting “it is possible that some courts would not view the prosecutorial misconduct in this case as rising to the level of subversion of constitutional rights.” Id. at 325 .

2025See Allen, 103 A.3d at 371 (noting that the inmate was not challenging the propriety of the sentence, but instead seeking “mandamus to compel [the] DOC to implement the sentencing order by awarding credit for time served”); Foxe v. Dep’t of Corr., 214 A.3d 308 , 315 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (holding that where an inmate “can demonstrate that [the inmate] is entitled to credit for at least some of the time he served . . . [the inmate] has established a clear right to relief”) (emphasis in original); Urch v. Dep’t of Corr.

2024See id. at 433 . -7- J-A14044-24 facts are correct.

2020See id. at 14 , 522 A.2d at 540 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Hogan, 482 Pa. 333 , 393 A.2d 1133 (1978)).

2020See id. at 14 , 522 A.2d at 540 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Hogan, 482 Pa. 333 , 393 A.2d 1133 (1978)).

2020See Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. Ct. Crim.

2020See Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. Ct. Crim.

2019Brief of Appellant, at 5. ____________________________________________ 3As the court granted relief with respect to breach of contract, it did not assess Kennedy’s claim for unjust enrichment, which he pleaded in the alternative. -4- J-A02030-19 Preliminarily, we examine which claims are preserved for our review. “[A]rguments not raised initially before the trial court in opposition to summary judgment cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Moranko v. Downs Racing LP, 118 A.3d 1111, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2015).

2018See N.T., Guilty Plea, 1/27/16, at 3-4; Written Guilty Plea Colloquy forms; Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 108 (Pa.Super. 2005) (en banc) (concluding guilty plea was not unknowing and involuntary where defendant signed written guilty plea colloquy form containing statements and information refuting claim).

2015See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 21 (wherein Snyder sets forth the respective language of both Ex Post Facto Clauses, but does - 11 - J-S24041-15 not assert that Pennsylvania’s clause provides greater protection); see also Perez, 97 A.3d at 760 (rejecting the appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of SORNA under the Pennsylvania Constitution where he did not argue that the state constitution provided greater protection than its federal counterpart).

2014See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1018 (Alaska 2008) (concluding that six of the Kennedy factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (concluding that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24 (Me.2009) (concluding the first and second factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Doe v. Dep't of Pub.

2014See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1018 (Alaska 2008) (concluding that six of the Kennedy factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (concluding that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24 (Me.2009) (concluding the first and second factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Doe v. Dep't of Pub.

2014See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1018 (Alaska 2008) (concluding that six of the Kennedy factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (concluding that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24 (Me.2009) (concluding the first and second factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Doe v. Dep't of Pub.

2014See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1018 (Alaska 2008) (concluding that six of the Kennedy factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (concluding that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24 (Me.2009) (concluding the first and second factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Doe v. Dep't of Pub.

2014In ádopting the Smith/Kennedy analysis, our Supreme Court explained that “only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform ... a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Abraham, 62 A.3d at 351 (citations omitted).

1985As was stated in the case upon which the Commonwealth primarily relies for its retroactivity argument: “Evenhanded decision making requires that similarly situated individuals on direct appeal be treated the same.” Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 503 Pa. 228, 232 , 469 A.2d 146, 148 (1983) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 494 Pa. 380, 385 , 431 A.2d 905, 908 (1981)).

1985As was stated in the case upon which the Commonwealth primarily relies for its retroactivity argument: “Evenhanded decision making requires that similarly situated individuals on direct appeal be treated the same.” Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 503 Pa. 228, 232 , 469 A.2d 146, 148 (1983) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 494 Pa. 380, 385 , 431 A.2d 905, 908 (1981)).

1985As was stated in the case upon which the Commonwealth primarily relies for its retroactivity argument: “Evenhanded decision making requires that similarly situated individuals on direct appeal be treated the same.” Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 503 Pa. 228, 232 , 469 A.2d 146, 148 (1983) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 494 Pa. 380, 385 , 431 A.2d 905, 908 (1981)).

1985As was stated in the case upon which the Commonwealth primarily relies for its retroactivity argument: “Evenhanded decision making requires that similarly situated individuals on direct appeal be treated the same.” Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 503 Pa. 228, 232 , 469 A.2d 146, 148 (1983) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 494 Pa. 380, 385 , 431 A.2d 905, 908 (1981)).