8 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1945–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Missouri v. Seibertgreen2 sentences2018Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615, 621-22 (2004): Justice Kennedy’s test regarding whether a “question first” strategy was deliberately employed and whether curative measures were taken and the plurality’s five- factor test used to analyze the admissibility of a subsequent confession. 2009The second prong of Justice Kennedy’s test is whether sufficient curative measures were taken prior to the Defendant’s second confession “to ensure that a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would understand the import and effect of the Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). | 2 | 3 |
Hudson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010Because the Kennedy factors apply in various constitutional contexts, they are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive,” but they are “useful guideposts.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (quoting Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)). 2010Because the Kennedy factors apply in various constitutional contexts, they are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive,” but they are “useful guideposts.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (quoting Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)). | 1 | 2 |
State of Tennessee v. Jessie Dotsongreen1 sentence2018Dailey, 273 S.W.3d at 107-10 ; Northern, 262 S.W.3d at 760-63 . - 13 - In State v. Dotson, the defendant, after invoking his right to counsel, asked to speak with his mother. 450 S.W.3d 1, 53 (Tenn. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Urserygreen2 sentences2009The two-pronged Hudson/Kennedy analysis is analogous to the test for determining whether forfeiture constitutes criminal punishment that was set forth in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), and applied under Tennessee law by this Court in Stuart v. State Dep’t of Safety, 963 S.W.2d 28, 32-34 (Tenn.1998). . 2009The two-pronged Hudson/Kennedy analysis is analogous to the test for determining whether forfeiture constitutes criminal punishment that was set forth in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), and applied under Tennessee law by this Court in Stuart v. State Dep’t of Safety, 963 S.W.2d 28, 32-34 (Tenn.1998). . | 1 | 1 |
Stuart v. STATE OF TENNESSEE DEPT. OF SAFETYgreen1 sentence2009The two-pronged Hudson/Kennedy analysis is analogous to the test for determining whether forfeiture constitutes criminal punishment that was set forth in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), and applied under Tennessee law by this Court in Stuart v. State Dep’t of Safety, 963 S.W.2d 28, 32-34 (Tenn.1998). . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tuckergreen2 sentences2001State v. Tucker, 728 S.W.2d 27, 81 (Tenn.Crim.App.1986). 2001State v. Tucker, 728 S.W.2d 27, 81 (Tenn.Crim.App.1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dailey
green
1 sentence2018Dailey, 273 S.W.3d at 107-10 ; Northern, 262 S.W.3d at 760-63 . - 13 - In State v. Dotson, the defendant, after invoking his right to counsel, asked to speak with his mother. 450 S.W.3d 1, 53 (Tenn. 2014). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State of Tennessee v. Marco M. Northern
green
1 sentence2018Dailey, 273 S.W.3d at 107-10 ; Northern, 262 S.W.3d at 760-63 . - 13 - In State v. Dotson, the defendant, after invoking his right to counsel, asked to speak with his mother. 450 S.W.3d 1, 53 (Tenn. 2014). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Smith v. Doe
green
2 sentences2010The Kennedy factors, which have been frequently analyzed in the context of sex offender laws, that are most relevant to our analysis include whether: “in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and traditions as punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 . 2010The Kennedy factors, which have been frequently analyzed in the context of sex offender laws, that are most relevant to our analysis include whether: “in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and traditions as punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch
green
2 sentences2009Our tax on unauthorized substances must be compared with the taxing statute that was at issue in Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 , 114 S.Ct. 1937 , 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). 2009Our tax on unauthorized substances must be compared with the taxing statute that was at issue in Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 , 114 S.Ct. 1937 , 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Marks v. United States
green
2 sentences2009In this case, we again determine that it is unnecessary to predict the eventual outcome of the competing Seibert approaches because we find that the Defendant’s postwarning confession is inadmissible under either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test.6 6 W ith respect to the multiple opinions generated by Seibert, we reiterate our observations in Northern: “W hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on t 2009In this case, we again determine that it is unnecessary to predict the eventual outcome of the competing Seibert approaches because we find that the Defendant’s postwarning confession is inadmissible under either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test.6 6 W ith respect to the multiple opinions generated by Seibert, we reiterate our observations in Northern: “W hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on t | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Gregg v. Georgia
green
2 sentences2009Ed.2d 260 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 , 169 n.15, 96 S. Ct. 2909 , 49 L. 2009Ed.2d 260 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 , 169 n.15, 96 S. Ct. 2909 , 49 L. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Ward
green
2 sentences2009However, “ ‘only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 , 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 ). 26 Our analysis does not end with our consideration of the Hudson/Kennedy factors. 2009However, “ ‘only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 , 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 ). 26 Our analysis does not end with our consideration of the Hudson/Kennedy factors. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 101, 118 S. Ct. at 494 ; Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169 , 83 S. Ct. at 568 . 2008Id. at 101, 118 S. Ct. at 494 ; Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169 , 83 S. Ct. at 568 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Thompson v. Lowell, Lawrence, & Haverhill Street Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1945Co., 170 Mass. 577 , 49 N. E. 913 , 40 L. 1945Co., 170 Mass. 577 , 49 N. E. 913 , 40 L. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Hartman v. Tennessee State Fair Ass'n
green
1 sentence1945The proof showed that this ticket seller had assured Miss Hartman of the safety of the “Ocean Wave.” Kennedy’s defense was that his sub-concessionary, Davis, was owner in charge of the operation and alone responsible for its condition. *229 Mr. Justice Williams recognizes an exception which under some conditions fixes liability for negligence in tbe operation of amusement apparatus upon tbe owner or lessor of an amusement park, bolding that be is “under tbe obligation of exercising reasonable care to bave and keep tbe premises and equipment reasonably safe for visitors.” [ 134 Tenn. 149 , 183 | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.