Kennedy factors in District of Columbia

9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (15)

Case	Followed	Cited
United States v. Tashiri Wayne Williamsgreen ca9 · 2006 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007As the court explained in United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir.2006): Although the [Seibert] plurality would consider all two-stage interrogations eligible for a Seibert inquiry [into the objective facts surrounding the delayed advice of rights], Justice Kennedy’s opinion narrowed the Seibert exception to those cases involving deliberate use of the two-step procedure to weaken Miranda’s protections. 2007See United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157-58 (9th Cir.2006) ("Although the plurality would consider all two-stage interrogations eligible for a Seibert inquiry, Justice Kennedy's opinion narrowed the Seibert exception to those cases involving deliberate use of the two-step procedure to weaken Miranda’s protections.”); United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 532-33 (3d Cir.2006) (applying Justice Kennedy’s test in finding that law enforcement officials had not performed a deliberate two-step interrogation); United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 308-09 (4th Cir.2005) ("In Seibert, Justi	1	2
Hudson v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1997 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 2 sentences 2013See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 , 118 S.Ct. 488 . . 2013See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 , 118 S.Ct. 488 . .	1	1
United States v. Harleygreen ca3 · 2009 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 1 sentence 2013Our review is confined to the present burden...United States v. Harley, 315 Fed.Appx. 437, 439, 440-42 (3rd Cir.2009) (applying Hudson/Kennedy factors to claim that present obligation to give DNA samples will enable government "to extract more and more personal, private information as science advances over time”). .	1	1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF—APPELLEE v. ERIBERTO MELESIO BRIONES, DEFENDANT—APPELLANTgreen ca8 · 2004 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 1 sentence 2007See United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157-58 (9th Cir.2006) ("Although the plurality would consider all two-stage interrogations eligible for a Seibert inquiry, Justice Kennedy's opinion narrowed the Seibert exception to those cases involving deliberate use of the two-step procedure to weaken Miranda’s protections.”); United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 532-33 (3d Cir.2006) (applying Justice Kennedy’s test in finding that law enforcement officials had not performed a deliberate two-step interrogation); United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 308-09 (4th Cir.2005) ("In Seibert, Justi	1	1
United States v. Eric Kevin Mashburngreen ca4 · 2005 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 1 sentence 2007See United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157-58 (9th Cir.2006) ("Although the plurality would consider all two-stage interrogations eligible for a Seibert inquiry, Justice Kennedy's opinion narrowed the Seibert exception to those cases involving deliberate use of the two-step procedure to weaken Miranda’s protections.”); United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 532-33 (3d Cir.2006) (applying Justice Kennedy’s test in finding that law enforcement officials had not performed a deliberate two-step interrogation); United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 308-09 (4th Cir.2005) ("In Seibert, Justi	1	1
United States v. Long Tong Kiamgreen ca3 · 2006 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 1 sentence 2007See United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157-58 (9th Cir.2006) ("Although the plurality would consider all two-stage interrogations eligible for a Seibert inquiry, Justice Kennedy's opinion narrowed the Seibert exception to those cases involving deliberate use of the two-step procedure to weaken Miranda’s protections.”); United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 532-33 (3d Cir.2006) (applying Justice Kennedy’s test in finding that law enforcement officials had not performed a deliberate two-step interrogation); United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 308-09 (4th Cir.2005) ("In Seibert, Justi	1	1
United States v. Johnny Carter, Micheal Bearamgreen ca2 · 2007 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 1 sentence 2007Indeed, the United States Court *1052 of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently joined what it said are “all of our sister circuits that have decided the issue” in concluding that “Seibert ... carved out an exception to Elstad for cases in which”— per Justice Kennedy’s analysis — “a deliberate, two-step strategy was used ... to obtain the postwarning confession.” United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 535 (2d Cir.2007) (emphasis added). 7 We align ourselves with this conclusion as well.	1	1
Edwards v. United Statesgreen dc · 2007 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007In that case, we first held that applying Justice Kennedy's test "require[d] that Edwards’ statements be suppressed,” id. at 852 ; see id. at 848 ("the police obtained Edwards’ self-defense statement using a two-step interrogation process more akin to that employed in Seibert than the questioning at issue in Elstad"), but we nonetheless accepted the government's view that the Seibert plurality’s analysis of whether the Miranda warnings "could function ‘effectively’ ” despite an initial unwarned confession might be more forgiving — in terms of admissibility — than Justice Kennedy's requirement 2007In that case, we first held that applying Justice Kennedy's test "require[d] that Edwards’ statements be suppressed,” id. at 852 ; see id. at 848 ("the police obtained Edwards’ self-defense statement using a two-step interrogation process more akin to that employed in Seibert than the questioning at issue in Elstad"), but we nonetheless accepted the government's view that the Seibert plurality’s analysis of whether the Miranda warnings "could function ‘effectively’ ” despite an initial unwarned confession might be more forgiving — in terms of admissibility — than Justice Kennedy's requirement	1	1
Gray v. Washingtongreen dc · 1992 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995 2 sentences 1995See generally Gray v. Washington, 612 A.2d 839 (D.C.1992); Williams v. Board of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 , 112 S.Ct. 190 , 116 L.Ed.2d 151 (1991); Montgomery v. Jimmy’s Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc., 566 A.2d 1025 (D.C.1989). 1995See generally Gray v. Washington, 612 A.2d 839 (D.C.1992); Williams v. Board of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 , 112 S.Ct. 190 , 116 L.Ed.2d 151 (1991); Montgomery v. Jimmy's Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc., 566 A.2d 1025 (D.C. 1989).	1	1
Fletcher v. United Statesgreen dc · 1990 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991 2 sentences 1991Fletcher v. United States, 569 A.2d 597, 598 (D.C.1990). 1991Fletcher v. United States, 569 A.2d 597, 598 (D.C.1990).	1	1
United States v. William Curtis, IIIgreen ca3 · 1982 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991 2 sentences 1991See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 774 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 379 , 74 L.Ed.2d 512 (1982); cf. Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 307-09 (5th Cir.1982). 1991See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 774 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 379 , 74 L.Ed.2d 512 (1982); cf. Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 307-09 (5th Cir.1982).	1	1
Howie Ray Robinson v. Henry Wade, Winfield Scott, Richard Mays and Bill Shawgreen ca5 · 1982 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991 2 sentences 1991See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 774 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 379 , 74 L.Ed.2d 512 (1982); cf. Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 307-09 (5th Cir.1982). 1991See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 774 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 379 , 74 L.Ed.2d 512 (1982); cf. Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 307-09 (5th Cir.1982).	1	1
Sedco International, S.A. v. Corygreen scotus · 1982 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991 2 sentences 1991See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 774 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 379 , 74 L.Ed.2d 512 (1982); cf. Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 307-09 (5th Cir.1982). 1991See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 774 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 379 , 74 L.Ed.2d 512 (1982); cf. Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 307-09 (5th Cir.1982).	1	1
Dusanek v. O'Donnellgreen scotus · 1982 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991 2 sentences 1991See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 774 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 379 , 74 L.Ed.2d 512 (1982); cf. Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 307-09 (5th Cir.1982). 1991See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 774 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 379 , 74 L.Ed.2d 512 (1982); cf. Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 307-09 (5th Cir.1982).	1	1
Dean v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1982 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991 2 sentences 1991See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 774 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 379 , 74 L.Ed.2d 512 (1982); cf. Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 307-09 (5th Cir.1982). 1991See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 774 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 379 , 74 L.Ed.2d 512 (1982); cf. Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 307-09 (5th Cir.1982).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

Case	Cited	Years
Ford v. United States green dc · 2007 1 sentence 2022Id.	1	2022–2022
Majerle Management Inc. v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission green dc · 2004 1 sentence 2018Comm'n , 866 A.2d 41 , 43, 46-48 (D.C. 2004) (observing that, absent unique circumstances, Kennedy rule would apply to petition challenging improperly filed and implemented rent ceiling adjustment).	1	2018–2018
Gunty v. Department of Employment Services green dc · 1987 2 sentences 1995Gunty, supra, 524 A.2d at 1198 . [7] In this instance, we observe that the Director of Equal Employment Opportunity has specialized expertise respecting equal rights issues, whereas the Special Assistant does not. [8] It is also worth noting that technological advancements relating to fire protection equipment have been made since the time Kennedy first initiated his case at the EEO in 1980. 1995Gunty, supra, 524 A.2d at 1198 . [7] In this instance, we observe that the Director of Equal Employment Opportunity has specialized expertise respecting equal rights issues, whereas the Special Assistant does not. [8] It is also worth noting that technological advancements relating to fire protection equipment have been made since the time Kennedy first initiated his case at the EEO in 1980.	1	1995–1995
Montgomery v. Jimmy's Tire & Auto Center, Inc. green dc · 1989 2 sentences 1995See generally Gray v. Washington, 612 A.2d 839 (D.C.1992); Williams v. Board of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 , 112 S.Ct. 190 , 116 L.Ed.2d 151 (1991); Montgomery v. Jimmy’s Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc., 566 A.2d 1025 (D.C.1989). 1995See generally Gray v. Washington, 612 A.2d 839 (D.C.1992); Williams v. Board of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 , 112 S.Ct. 190 , 116 L.Ed.2d 151 (1991); Montgomery v. Jimmy's Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc., 566 A.2d 1025 (D.C. 1989).	1	1995–1995
Williams v. Mount Jezreel Baptist Church green dc · 1991 2 sentences 1995See generally Gray v. Washington, 612 A.2d 839 (D.C.1992); Williams v. Board of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 , 112 S.Ct. 190 , 116 L.Ed.2d 151 (1991); Montgomery v. Jimmy’s Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc., 566 A.2d 1025 (D.C.1989). 1995See generally Gray v. Washington, 612 A.2d 839 (D.C.1992); Williams v. Board of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 , 112 S.Ct. 190 , 116 L.Ed.2d 151 (1991); Montgomery v. Jimmy's Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc., 566 A.2d 1025 (D.C. 1989).	1	1995–1995
Enright v. California State University green scotus · 1991 2 sentences 1995See generally Gray v. Washington, 612 A.2d 839 (D.C.1992); Williams v. Board of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 , 112 S.Ct. 190 , 116 L.Ed.2d 151 (1991); Montgomery v. Jimmy’s Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc., 566 A.2d 1025 (D.C.1989). 1995See generally Gray v. Washington, 612 A.2d 839 (D.C.1992); Williams v. Board of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 , 112 S.Ct. 190 , 116 L.Ed.2d 151 (1991); Montgomery v. Jimmy's Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc., 566 A.2d 1025 (D.C. 1989).	1	1995–1995
Burche v. Degussa Carbon Black Co. green scotus · 1991 2 sentences 1995See generally Gray v. Washington, 612 A.2d 839 (D.C.1992); Williams v. Board of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 , 112 S.Ct. 190 , 116 L.Ed.2d 151 (1991); Montgomery v. Jimmy’s Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc., 566 A.2d 1025 (D.C.1989). 1995See generally Gray v. Washington, 612 A.2d 839 (D.C.1992); Williams v. Board of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 , 112 S.Ct. 190 , 116 L.Ed.2d 151 (1991); Montgomery v. Jimmy's Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc., 566 A.2d 1025 (D.C. 1989).	1	1995–1995
United States v. Dinitz green scotus · 1976 2 sentences 1992Without addressing the standard set down in Kennedy , defendant relies on reasoning from United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606-07 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1078-80 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976) to support his Double Jeopardy claim. 1992Without addressing the standard set down in Kennedy , defendant relies on reasoning from United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606-07 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1078-80 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976) to support his Double Jeopardy claim.	1	1992–1992
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez green scotus · 1963 2 sentences 1981By definition, confinement to a mental institution is “an affirmative disability or restraint,” id. 372 U.S. at 168 , 83 S.Ct. at 567 , even more perhaps than imprisonment, see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 , 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263-64 , 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980), given the indefinite duration and the stigma. 1981By definition, confinement to a mental institution is “an affirmative disability or restraint,” id. 372 U.S. at 168 , 83 S.Ct. at 567 , even more perhaps than imprisonment, see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 , 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263-64 , 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980), given the indefinite duration and the stigma.	1	1981–1981
United States v. Daniel Jackson green cadc · 1977 2 sentences 1981In United States v. Jackson, supra , the court emphasized that the defendant had been acquitted by reason of insanity of first degree burglary and rape, in contrast with mere theft of small sums which would "not indicate excessive dangerousness." Id. at 387, 553 F.2d at 121 . [6] Although the foregoing discussion is sufficient to demonstrate the congressional purpose underlying D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301, I note briefly that the other Kennedy factors confirm the punitive intent. 1981In United States v. Jackson, supra , the court emphasized that the defendant had been acquitted by reason of insanity of first degree burglary and rape, in contrast with mere theft of small sums which would "not indicate excessive dangerousness." Id. at 387, 553 F.2d at 121 . [6] Although the foregoing discussion is sufficient to demonstrate the congressional purpose underlying D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301, I note briefly that the other Kennedy factors confirm the punitive intent.	1	1981–1981
Vitek v. Jones green scotus · 1980 2 sentences 1981By definition, confinement to a mental institution is “an affirmative disability or restraint,” id. 372 U.S. at 168 , 83 S.Ct. at 567 , even more perhaps than imprisonment, see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 , 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263-64 , 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980), given the indefinite duration and the stigma. 1981By definition, confinement to a mental institution is “an affirmative disability or restraint,” id. 372 U.S. at 168 , 83 S.Ct. at 567 , even more perhaps than imprisonment, see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 , 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263-64 , 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980), given the indefinite duration and the stigma.	1	1981–1981

Where else courts name it

TX 68 (1984–2026) WV 22 (2012–2026) PA 19 (1985–2025) IL 16 (1984–2023) CA 11 (2003–2025) DC 9 (1981–2022) TN 8 (1945–2018) OH 7 (1999–2026) NC 6 (1958–2013) IN 6 (2001–2017) AL 6 (1983–2024) FL 6 (2001–2017) MI 6 (1986–2025) KS 5 (1997–2020) NJ 5 (1986–2026) MN 5 (2002–2024) MD 5 (2000–2016) CO 5 (2002–2018) IA 5 (2000–2015) AZ 4 (1993–2022) MS 4 (2006–2019) NE 4 (1988–2018) AR 4 (2009–2017) WA 4 (1984–1998) CT 4 (1994–2025) NV 3 (2017–2017) MA 3 (1995–1998) VA 3 (1996–2015) GA 3 (1998–2008) MT 3 (1992–2012) NY 3 (1997–2017) SD 2 (1998–2015) SC 2 (2009–2009) DE 2 (2016–2016) ME 2 (2012–2016) KY 2 (1999–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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