Kennedy factors (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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Kennedy factors in Ohio

7 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 1999–2026 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Glovergreen
ohio · 1988 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
2 sentences

2026Because a mistrial was not warranted, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kennedy’s motion. {¶ 62} Trial courts are granted great deference in determining whether to grant or deny a motion for mistrial “in recognition of the fact that the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the situation in his courtroom warrants the declaration of a mistrial.” State v. Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18, 19 (1988), citing State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188 (1981).

2026Because a mistrial was not warranted, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kennedy’s motion. {¶ 62} Trial courts are granted great deference in determining whether to grant or deny a motion for mistrial “in recognition of the fact that the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the situation in his courtroom warrants the declaration of a mistrial.” State v. Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18, 19 (1988), citing State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188 (1981).

11
State v. Sagegreen
ohio · 1987 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026“The granting or denial of a motion for mistrial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Treesh, 2001-Ohio-4, ¶ 73 , citing Crim.R. 33 and State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 182 (1987).

11
State v. Wilson, 22581 (2-6-2009)green
ohioctapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026“The fact that the evidence is subject to different interpretations does not render the conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Adams, 2014-Ohio-3432, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). {¶ 38} Given the overwhelming evidence presented at trial, we cannot conclude that the jury lost its way when it rejected Kennedy’s claim of self-defense.

11
State v. Adamsgreen
ohioctapp · 2014 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026“The fact that the evidence is subject to different interpretations does not render the conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Adams, 2014-Ohio-3432, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). {¶ 38} Given the overwhelming evidence presented at trial, we cannot conclude that the jury lost its way when it rejected Kennedy’s claim of self-defense.

11
State v. Torresgreen
ohio · 1981 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013See Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d at syllabus, 421 N.E.2d 1288 . {¶34} Kennedy claims prejudice arose from the joinder because the evidence of the multiple murders and assaults, when presented in a single trial, created an accumulation of evidence that allowed the state to portray him as a gun- toting, violent individual, and that allowed the jury to infer his guilt for the offenses on this improper portrayal, despite the state’s presentation of weak evidence. {¶35} To negate Kennedy’s claim of prejudice, the state contends that the evidence of each shooting was simple and direct, and that the jury co

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Treesh green
ohio · 2001
1 sentence

2026“The granting or denial of a motion for mistrial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Treesh, 2001-Ohio-4, ¶ 73 , citing Crim.R. 33 and State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 182 (1987).

12026–2026
State v. Widner green
ohio · 1981
2 sentences

2026Because a mistrial was not warranted, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kennedy’s motion. {¶ 62} Trial courts are granted great deference in determining whether to grant or deny a motion for mistrial “in recognition of the fact that the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the situation in his courtroom warrants the declaration of a mistrial.” State v. Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18, 19 (1988), citing State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188 (1981).

2026Because a mistrial was not warranted, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kennedy’s motion. {¶ 62} Trial courts are granted great deference in determining whether to grant or deny a motion for mistrial “in recognition of the fact that the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the situation in his courtroom warrants the declaration of a mistrial.” State v. Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18, 19 (1988), citing State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188 (1981).

12026–2026
In Matter of A. K., 21504 (4-27-2007) neutral
ohioctapp · 2007
1 sentence

2018Montgomery No. 21504, 2007-Ohio-2095, ¶ 21 . {¶ 24} That said, it was the province of the jury to determine whether Roberts’s testimony was credible.

12018–2018
State v. Woods green
ohioctapp · 2016
1 sentence

2017Clark No. 2015-CA-75, 2016-Ohio-1103, ¶ 12 . {¶ 15} Kennedy’s plea agreement with the State provided that she agreed “to total restitution of $19,110.19, with her share being $7,036.73.” The record reflects that Kennedy had a co-defendant, who presumably would be responsible for the balance. {¶ 16} During the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed restitution, as follows: -6- THE COURT: The Court has considered the Defendant’s present and future ability to pay financial sanctions.

12017–2017
Oregon v. Kennedy green
scotus · 1982
2 sentences

2015Oregon v. Kennedy (1982), 456 U.S. 667, 671 , 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 422 .

2015Oregon v. Kennedy (1982), 456 U.S. 667, 671 , 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 422 .

12015–2015
State v. Peterson, 06 Ma 70 (12-3-2007) neutral
ohioctapp · 2007
1 sentence

2013Mahoning No. 06-MA-70, 2007-Ohio-6917, at ¶ 8 , quoting Xie at 527 . {¶ 43} After reviewing the evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Kennedy's motion to withdraw his pleas of no contest.

12013–2013
United States v. Mayes green
ca11 · 1998
2 sentences

1999As the Eleventh Circuit noted in United States v. Mayes (C.A.11, 1998), 158 F.3d 1215 , 1223-1224: “Prison discipline cases do not fit neatly into the matrix of double jeopardy doctrine.

1999As the Eleventh Circuit noted in United States v. Mayes (C.A.11, 1998), 158 F.3d 1215 , 1223-1224: “Prison discipline cases do not fit neatly into the matrix of double jeopardy doctrine.

11999–1999
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez green
scotus · 1963
2 sentences

1999The Kennedy factors are: (1) “[wjhether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as punishment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment— retribution and deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” 372 U.S. at

1999The Kennedy factors are: (1) “[wjhether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as punishment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment— retribution and deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” 372 U.S. at

11999–1999

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.08 (4) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.14 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 68 (1984–2026) WV 22 (2012–2026) PA 19 (1985–2025) IL 16 (1984–2023) CA 11 (2003–2025) DC 9 (1981–2022) TN 8 (1945–2018) OH 7 (1999–2026) NC 6 (1958–2013) IN 6 (2001–2017) AL 6 (1983–2024) FL 6 (2001–2017) MI 6 (1986–2025) KS 5 (1997–2020) NJ 5 (1986–2026) MN 5 (2002–2024) MD 5 (2000–2016) CO 5 (2002–2018) IA 5 (2000–2015) AZ 4 (1993–2022) MS 4 (2006–2019) NE 4 (1988–2018) AR 4 (2009–2017) WA 4 (1984–1998) CT 4 (1994–2025) NV 3 (2017–2017) MA 3 (1995–1998) VA 3 (1996–2015) GA 3 (1998–2008) MT 3 (1992–2012) NY 3 (1997–2017) SD 2 (1998–2015) SC 2 (2009–2009) DE 2 (2016–2016) ME 2 (2012–2016) KY 2 (1999–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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