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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Riggins v. Nevadagreen1 sentence2023(See Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 845 [confrontation means “ ‘compelling [the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief’ ”].) But in this case, there was no arguable hindrance in 5 The surgeon’s testimony was very brief, describing the victim’s injuries and the operation performed; and defendant declined to cross-examine him. 6 As discussed next, other constitutional provisions require the jury’s ability to observe the defendant’s demeano | 1 | 1 |
Maryland v. Craiggreen1 sentence2023(See Craig, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 845 [confrontation means “ ‘compelling [the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief’ ”].) But in this case, there was no arguable hindrance in 5 The surgeon’s testimony was very brief, describing the victim’s injuries and the operation performed; and defendant declined to cross-examine him. 6 As discussed next, other constitutional provisions require the jury’s ability to observe the defendant’s demeano | 1 | 1 |
Stone v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015Once the defense of former jeopardy has been raised by special plea, it is generally “an issue of fact … which the jury alone possesse[s] the power to pass upon.” (People v. Bennett (1896) 114 Cal. 56, 59 .) Consequently, when a defendant asserts former jeopardy as a defense at trial, “he is entitled to a resolution by the jury of any material issues of fact raised by the claim….” (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 509, fn. 1 [describing the holding of People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589 (Greer)].) This rule is enshrined in two adjacent provisions of the Penal Code: sections 1041 2015Once the defense of former jeopardy has been raised by special plea, it is generally “an issue of fact … which the jury alone possesse[s] the power to pass upon.” (People v. Bennett (1896) 114 Cal. 56, 59 .) Consequently, when a defendant asserts former jeopardy as a defense at trial, “he is entitled to a resolution by the jury of any material issues of fact raised by the claim….” (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 509, fn. 1 [describing the holding of People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589 (Greer)].) This rule is enshrined in two adjacent provisions of the Penal Code: sections 1041 | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double 2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double | 1 | 1 |
People v. Valenzuela-Gonzalesgreen2 sentences2003Batts had been represented by yet another attorney at his first trial. [7] Counsel may have been referring to People v. Valenzuela-Gonzales (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 728, 736-742 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 114 , in which the court held that the Kennedy rule should be the sole test applicable under the double jeopardy clause of California Constitution article I, section 15. [8] Although in so moving, and in subsequent concluding remarks on the motion, counsel Payne referred to the state and federal "confrontation clause," when read in context counsel's statements clearly were intended to refer to the double j 2003Batts had been represented by yet another attorney at his first trial. [7] Counsel may have been referring to People v. Valenzuela-Gonzales (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 728, 736-742 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 114 , in which the court held that the Kennedy rule should be the sole test applicable under the double jeopardy clause of California Constitution article I, section 15. [8] Although in so moving, and in subsequent concluding remarks on the motion, counsel Payne referred to the state and federal "confrontation clause," when read in context counsel's statements clearly were intended to refer to the double j | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Krebs
green
2 sentences2021(Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 309 .) The Attorney General contends Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion represents 17 the holding of the court because it provides the narrowest grounds for supporting the judgment. 2021(Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 309 .) The Attorney General contends Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion represents 17 the holding of the court because it provides the narrowest grounds for supporting the judgment. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Hudson v. United States
green
2 sentences2015(Hudson, supra, 522 U.S. at p. 100 .) Gonzalez posits two of the Kennedy factors, four and five, respectively, are applicable to his case and should be given great weight: whether the civil penalty promotes the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence — and whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime. ( Hudson, supra, 522 U.S. at pp. 99-100.) Gonzalez is immediately faced with *1116 a huge hurdle. 2015(Hudson, supra, 522 U.S. at p. 100 .) Gonzalez posits two of the Kennedy factors, four and five, respectively, are applicable to his case and should be given great weight: whether the civil penalty promotes the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence — and whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime. ( Hudson, supra, 522 U.S. at pp. 99-100.) Gonzalez is immediately faced with *1116 a huge hurdle. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Batts
green
2 sentences2015(See Batts, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 695 .) In addition to the Kennedy standard, article I, section 15 of the California Constitution also “bars retrial following the grant of a defendant’s mistrial motion . . . when the prosecution, believing in view of events that unfold during an ongoing trial that the defendant is likely to secure an acquittal at that trial in the absence of misconduct, intentionally and knowingly commits misconduct in order to thwart such an acquittal . . . .” (Batts, supra, at pp. 695-696 .) 27 The plea of “once in jeopardy” embodies the defense that the defendant has alr 2015(See Batts, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 695 .) In addition to the Kennedy standard, article I, section 15 of the California Constitution also “bars retrial following the grant of a defendant’s mistrial motion . . . when the prosecution, believing in view of events that unfold during an ongoing trial that the defendant is likely to secure an acquittal at that trial in the absence of misconduct, intentionally and knowingly commits misconduct in order to thwart such an acquittal . . . .” (Batts, supra, at pp. 695-696 .) 27 The plea of “once in jeopardy” embodies the defense that the defendant has alr | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Race
green
1 sentence2025(See, e.g., People v. Race (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 211 , 219–220 [protective order issued under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) properly applied to a child where child was involved in domestic violence incident even where child not included in charges].) Without a copy of the order, we cannot properly evaluate Kennedy’s claim. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Camino
green
1 sentence2021(E.g., People v. Delgado (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1105 ; People v. Camino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1370 .) However, the People maintain defendant’s Seibert claim has been forfeited. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Delgado
green
1 sentence2021(E.g., People v. Delgado (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1105 ; People v. Camino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1370 .) However, the People maintain defendant’s Seibert claim has been forfeited. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Greer
green
2 sentences2015Once the defense of former jeopardy has been raised by special plea, it is generally “an issue of fact … which the jury alone possesse[s] the power to pass upon.” (People v. Bennett (1896) 114 Cal. 56, 59 .) Consequently, when a defendant asserts former jeopardy as a defense at trial, “he is entitled to a resolution by the jury of any material issues of fact raised by the claim….” (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 509, fn. 1 [describing the holding of People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589 (Greer)].) This rule is enshrined in two adjacent provisions of the Penal Code: sections 1041 2015Once the defense of former jeopardy has been raised by special plea, it is generally “an issue of fact … which the jury alone possesse[s] the power to pass upon.” (People v. Bennett (1896) 114 Cal. 56, 59 .) Consequently, when a defendant asserts former jeopardy as a defense at trial, “he is entitled to a resolution by the jury of any material issues of fact raised by the claim….” (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 509, fn. 1 [describing the holding of People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589 (Greer)].) This rule is enshrined in two adjacent provisions of the Penal Code: sections 1041 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Bennett
green
2 sentences2015Once the defense of former jeopardy has been raised by special plea, it is generally “an issue of fact … which the jury alone possesse[s] the power to pass upon.” (People v. Bennett (1896) 114 Cal. 56, 59 .) Consequently, when a defendant asserts former jeopardy as a defense at trial, “he is entitled to a resolution by the jury of any material issues of fact raised by the claim….” (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 509, fn. 1 [describing the holding of People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589 (Greer)].) This rule is enshrined in two adjacent provisions of the Penal Code: sections 1041 2015Once the defense of former jeopardy has been raised by special plea, it is generally “an issue of fact … which the jury alone possesse[s] the power to pass upon.” (People v. Bennett (1896) 114 Cal. 56, 59 .) Consequently, when a defendant asserts former jeopardy as a defense at trial, “he is entitled to a resolution by the jury of any material issues of fact raised by the claim….” (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 509, fn. 1 [describing the holding of People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589 (Greer)].) This rule is enshrined in two adjacent provisions of the Penal Code: sections 1041 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Roper v. Simmons
green
1 sentence2009While the gravity of petitioner’s offense is, as discussed ante, second only to the seriousness of first degree premeditated murder, we also must recognize the sentence is the harshest the state may impose on teenage offenders almost four years older than petitioner ( Roper, supra, 543 U.S. 551 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Bell
green
2 sentences2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double 2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Oregon v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double 2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. White
green
2 sentences2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double 2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Diaz
green
2 sentences2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double 2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double 2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Chapman
green
2 sentences2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double 2003B Sister state jurisdictions that have determined the proper interpretation of their own state Constitution's double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances have divided between following the narrow Kennedy test, and a broader, more expansive test. [19] We examine those two lines of cases below. 1 Based in large part upon its clarity and perceived ease of application, the narrow "intent-to-cause-mistrial" test set out by the majority in Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 , has been adopted by the high courts of six states as the appropriate test under the double | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.