trustworthiness standard in Texas

2013See People v. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567, 573-74 (Colo.2013) (abandoning the corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard).

2013See People v. LaRosa , 293 P.3d 567, 573-74 (Colo. 2013) (abandoning the corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard).

2003The trustworthiness requirement is satisfied if cross-examination would be of only "marginal utility." Muttoni v. State , 25 S.W.3d 300, 307 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (citing Lilly , 527 U.S. at 134 ).

2003The trustworthiness requirement is satisfied if cross-examination would be of only “marginal utility.” Muttoni v. State, 25 S.W.3d 300, 307 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (citing Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 ).

2015See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453 , 466 N.E.2d 510, 513 (1984) (adopting the corpus delicti rule after the United States Supreme Court adopted a trustworthiness standard and stating that, although the “rule has been criticized, and diluted ... [,] it precludes the possibility of conviction of [a] crime based solely on statements made by a person suffering a mental or emotional disturbance or some other aberration”).

2015See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453 , 466 N.E.2d 510, 513 (1984) (adopting the corpus delicti rule after the United States Supreme Court adopted a trustworthiness standard and stating that, although the “rule has been criticized, and diluted ... [,] it precludes the possibility of conviction of [a] crime based solely on statements made by a person suffering a mental or emotional disturbance or some other aberration”).

2015The State fails to expound on its broad argument for 6 See, e.g., Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (holding that the conviction of an accused is not constitutionally sound unless “the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” by any rational trier of fact); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 471–72 (1966) (holding that, before the prosecution can argue that an accused waived any of his rights, he must be apprised of his rights and knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily waive those rights or the confession is involuntary); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 ,

2015The State fails to expound on its broad argument for 6 See, e.g., Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (holding that the conviction of an accused is not constitutionally sound unless “the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” by any rational trier of fact); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 471–72 (1966) (holding that, before the prosecution can argue that an accused waived any of his rights, he must be apprised of his rights and knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily waive those rights or the confession is involuntary); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 ,

2015However, the rule has also been criticized because it does not protect mentally infirm individuals who confess to a real crime when there is other corroborating evidence, it can result in the exclusion of reliable confessions, the perpetrator of a crime against a non-verbal person that suffers an intangible injury could not be convicted unless there is other corroborating evidence, and the rule is obsolete because of other developments in the law. 9 When the United States Supreme Court addressed this issue, it adopted a trustworthiness standard in lieu of the corpus de-licti rule, and that sta

2015However, the rule has also been criticized because it does not protect mentally infirm individuals who confess to a real crime when there is other corroborating evidence, it can result in the exclusion of reliable confessions, the perpetrator of a crime against a non-verbal person that suffers an intangible injury could not be convicted unless there is other corroborating evidence, and the rule is obsolete because of other developments in the law. 9 When the United States Supreme Court addressed this issue, it adopted a trustworthiness standard in lieu of the corpus de-licti rule, and that sta

2015However, the rule has also been criticized because it does not protect mentally infirm individuals who confess to a real crime when there is other corroborating evidence, it can result in the exclusion of reliable confessions, the perpetrator of a crime against a non-verbal person that suffers an intangible injury could not be convicted unless there is other corroborating evidence, and the rule is obsolete because of other developments in the law. 9 When the United States Supreme Court addressed this issue, it adopted a trustworthiness standard in lieu of the corpus de-licti rule, and that sta

2015However, the rule has also been criticized because it does not protect mentally infirm individuals who confess to a real crime when there is other corroborating evidence, it can result in the exclusion of reliable confessions, the perpetrator of a crime against a non-verbal person that suffers an intangible injury could not be convicted unless there is other corroborating evidence, and the rule is obsolete because of other developments in the law. 9 When the United States Supreme Court addressed this issue, it adopted a trustworthiness standard in lieu of the corpus de-licti rule, and that sta

2015However, the rule has also been criticized because it does not protect mentally infirm individuals who confess to a real crime when there is other corroborating evidence, it can result in the exclusion of reliable confessions, the perpetrator of a crime against a non-verbal person that suffers an intangible injury could not be convicted unless there is other corroborating evidence, and the rule is obsolete because of other developments in the law. 9 When the United States Supreme Court addressed this issue, it adopted a trustworthiness standard in lieu of the corpus de-licti rule, and that sta

2015However, the rule has also been criticized because it does not protect mentally infirm individuals who confess to a real crime when there is other corroborating evidence, it can result in the exclusion of reliable confessions, the perpetrator of a crime against a non-verbal person that suffers an intangible injury could not be convicted unless there is other corroborating evidence, and the rule is obsolete because of other developments in the law. 9 When the United States Supreme Court addressed this issue, it adopted a trustworthiness standard in lieu of the corpus de-licti rule, and that sta

2015See, e.g., Colorado v. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 9 Cf. Colorado v. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567, 574 (Colo. 2013) (listing criticisms leveled against the corpus delicti rule, including that the court was “troubled that the rule works to bar convictions in cases involving the most vulnerable victims, such as infants, young children, and the mentally infirm” and that “the rule operates disproportionately in cases where no tangible injury results, such as in cases involving inappropriate sexual contact, or where criminal agency is difficult or impossible to prove, such as in cases involving infanticide or child a

2015See, e.g., Colorado v. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 9 Cf. Colorado v. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567, 574 (Colo. 2013) (listing criticisms leveled against the corpus delicti rule, including that the court was “troubled that the rule works to bar convictions in cases involving the most vulnerable victims, such as infants, young children, and the mentally infirm” and that “the rule operates disproportionately in cases where no tangible injury results, such as in cases involving inappropriate sexual contact, or where criminal agency is difficult or impossible to prove, such as in cases involving infanticide or child a

2018Phea v. State, 767 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1989, pet. ref’d).

2015Gohring v. State, 967 S.W.2d 459, 452 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1998, no pet.).

2015See, e.g., Colorado v. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567, 575 (Colo.2013); Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 77-78 (Okla.Crim.App.1994); State v. Osborne, 335 S.C. 172 , 516 S.E.2d 201, 204-05 (1999).

2015See, e.g., Colorado v. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567, 575 (Colo.2013); Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 77-78 (Okla.Crim.App.1994); State v. Osborne, 335 S.C. 172 , 516 S.E.2d 201, 204-05 (1999).

2015See, e.g., Colorado v. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567, 575 (Colo.2013); Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 77-78 (Okla.Crim.App.1994); State v. Osborne, 335 S.C. 172 , 516 S.E.2d 201, 204-05 (1999).