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5 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Raineygreen2 sentences2023The federal courts have also identified four non-exclusive factors to help courts determine trustworthiness: “(1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the special skill or expertise of the investigating official; (3) whether a hearing was held and the level at which it was conducted; and (4) possible motivation problems.” Id. at 97; see Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 167 n.11. ¶166 The district court employed the foregoing presumption and four factors to analyze the Report.16 The court determined that “the first three Barry factors weigh 16 We also review a district court’s trustworthiness an 2002As long as the conclusion is based on a factual investigation and satisfies the Rule’s trustworthiness requirement, it should be admissible along with other portions of the report.” Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153,170 , 109 S.Ct. 439, 450 , 102 L.Ed.2d 445, 463 (1988)(discussing admissibility of investigators’ opinions and conclusions). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mauchleygreen2 sentences2019The trustworthiness standard “requires corroboration of the confession itself rather than corroboration that a crime was committed.” Mauchley, 67 P.3d at 488 . ¶ 27 Having adopted a new corroboration rule, the court turned to the issue of retroactivity. 2013Compare Brown, 617 F.3d at 860 (noting that "corroboration goes to sufficiency"), and Dalhouse, 534 F.3d at 806 (stating that the trustworthiness standard "does not affect the admissibility of a confession, at least not in this circuit") (emphasis in original), with Landsdown v. United States, 348 F.2d 405, 409 (5th Cir.1965) (requiring corroboration before the confession can be "admiftted] into evidence against the accused"), and Mauchley, ¶¶ 58-60, 67 P.3d at 490 (treating the trustworthiness standard as a rule governing the admissibility of confessions); see also McCormick on Evidence § 145 | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Versaint, Cherubingreen1 sentence2023See United States v. Versaint, 849 F.2d 827 , 831–32 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Under [Fed. | 1 | 1 |
Barry v. TRUSTEES OF INTERN. ASS'Ngreen1 sentence2023The federal courts have also identified four non-exclusive factors to help courts determine trustworthiness: “(1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the special skill or expertise of the investigating official; (3) whether a hearing was held and the level at which it was conducted; and (4) possible motivation problems.” Id. at 97; see Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 167 n.11. ¶166 The district court employed the foregoing presumption and four factors to analyze the Report.16 The court determined that “the first three Barry factors weigh 16 We also review a district court’s trustworthiness an | 1 | 1 |
Proctor v. Cockrellgreen1 sentence2019See Proctor v. Cockrell, 283 F.3d 726, 735 (5th Cir. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
People v. LaRosagreen2 sentences2019But they argue that the court’s retroactivity ruling prohibits application of the new trustworthiness standard only to trials, not to conduct, that occurred before the change in the rule. 2“Retroactive” and “retrospective” can have different meanings when referring to application of civil statutes, but frequently courts use the terms interchangeably, see Ficarra v. Dep’t of Regulatory Agencies, 849 P.2d 6, 11 (Colo. 1993), as the supreme court appeared to do in People v. LaRosa, 2013 CO 2, ¶¶ 44, 45 . 13 ¶ 29 In determining whether a statute or rule operates “retrospectively” so as to raise ex 2019But they argue that the court’s retroactivity ruling prohibits application of the new trustworthiness standard only to trials, not to conduct, that occurred before the change in the rule. 2“Retroactive” and “retrospective” can have different meanings when referring to application of civil statutes, but frequently courts use the terms interchangeably, see Ficarra v. Dep’t of Regulatory Agencies, 849 P.2d 6, 11 (Colo. 1993), as the supreme court appeared to do in People v. LaRosa, 2013 CO 2, ¶¶ 44, 45 . 13 ¶ 29 In determining whether a statute or rule operates “retrospectively” so as to raise ex | 1 | 1 |
Ficarra v. Department of Regulatory Agencies, Division of Insurancegreen2 sentences2019But they argue that the court’s retroactivity ruling prohibits application of the new trustworthiness standard only to trials, not to conduct, that occurred before the change in the rule. 2“Retroactive” and “retrospective” can have different meanings when referring to application of civil statutes, but frequently courts use the terms interchangeably, see Ficarra v. Dep’t of Regulatory Agencies, 849 P.2d 6, 11 (Colo. 1993), as the supreme court appeared to do in People v. LaRosa, 2013 CO 2, ¶¶ 44, 45 . 13 ¶ 29 In determining whether a statute or rule operates “retrospectively” so as to raise ex 2019But they argue that the court’s retroactivity ruling prohibits application of the new trustworthiness standard only to trials, not to conduct, that occurred before the change in the rule. 2“Retroactive” and “retrospective” can have different meanings when referring to application of civil statutes, but frequently courts use the terms interchangeably, see Ficarra v. Dep’t of Regulatory Agencies, 849 P.2d 6, 11 (Colo. 1993), as the supreme court appeared to do in People v. LaRosa, 2013 CO 2, ¶¶ 44, 45 . 13 ¶ 29 In determining whether a statute or rule operates “retrospectively” so as to raise ex | 1 | 1 |
Landgraf v. USI Film Productsgreen1 sentence2019Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Browngreen2 sentences2013But see Brown, 617 F.3d at 861 (questioning whether the trustworthiness standard should be treated as a "quaint, though now irrelevant, reminder of the Court's pre-Miranda days"); United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639 , 641 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1999) ("[P]ost-Miranda, the need for the rule, especially insofar as it protects against involuntary confessions, is even more questionable."). . 2013Compare Brown, 617 F.3d at 860 (noting that "corroboration goes to sufficiency"), and Dalhouse, 534 F.3d at 806 (stating that the trustworthiness standard "does not affect the admissibility of a confession, at least not in this circuit") (emphasis in original), with Landsdown v. United States, 348 F.2d 405, 409 (5th Cir.1965) (requiring corroboration before the confession can be "admiftted] into evidence against the accused"), and Mauchley, ¶¶ 58-60, 67 P.3d at 490 (treating the trustworthiness standard as a rule governing the admissibility of confessions); see also McCormick on Evidence § 145 | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013McCormick on Evidence § 145, at 595; see also People v. Jones, 17 Cal.4th 279 , 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793 , 949 P.2d 890, 902-03 (1998). 18 Due in part to its "extremely limited function," Smith, 348 U.S. at 153 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , the rule has been subject to widespread criticism. 5 This criticism has led federal courts and a growing number of state jurisdictions to abandon the corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard. 2013McCormick on Evidence § 145, at 595; see also People v. Jones, 17 Cal.4th 279 , 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793 , 949 P.2d 890, 902-03 (1998). 18 Due in part to its "extremely limited function," Smith, 348 U.S. at 153 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , the rule has been subject to widespread criticism. 5 This criticism has led federal courts and a growing number of state jurisdictions to abandon the corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Raul Lopez-Alvarezgreen1 sentence2013See, eg., Brown, 617 F.3d at 863 (explaining that, under Smith, if "a defendant admits that he drove a car that had an illegal sawed-off shotgun in its trunk, it is sufficient for the independent corroborating evidence to show that he drove that particular car'"); Bryce, 208 F.3d at 355 (dividing trustworthiness issues ""into two categories" depending on whether a confession is inherently reliable so as to be "self-corroborating"); United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 591-92 (9th Cir.1992) (announcing a "two-pronged" corroboration requirement that includes a "modern corpus delicti rul | 1 | 1 |
Robert Henry Landsdown v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013Compare Brown, 617 F.3d at 860 (noting that "corroboration goes to sufficiency"), and Dalhouse, 534 F.3d at 806 (stating that the trustworthiness standard "does not affect the admissibility of a confession, at least not in this circuit") (emphasis in original), with Landsdown v. United States, 348 F.2d 405, 409 (5th Cir.1965) (requiring corroboration before the confession can be "admiftted] into evidence against the accused"), and Mauchley, ¶¶ 58-60, 67 P.3d at 490 (treating the trustworthiness standard as a rule governing the admissibility of confessions); see also McCormick on Evidence § 145 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2013McCormick on Evidence § 145, at 595; see also People v. Jones, 17 Cal.4th 279 , 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793 , 949 P.2d 890, 902-03 (1998). 18 Due in part to its "extremely limited function," Smith, 348 U.S. at 153 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , the rule has been subject to widespread criticism. 5 This criticism has led federal courts and a growing number of state jurisdictions to abandon the corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard. 2013McCormick on Evidence § 145, at 595; see also People v. Jones, 17 Cal.4th 279 , 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793 , 949 P.2d 890, 902-03 (1998). 18 Due in part to its "extremely limited function," Smith, 348 U.S. at 153 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , the rule has been subject to widespread criticism. 5 This criticism has led federal courts and a growing number of state jurisdictions to abandon the corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dalhousegreen2 sentences2013See United States v. Dalhouse, 534 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that Miranda seeks to protect defendants from coercive police tactics, whereas the trustworthiness standard seeks to protect defendants from false confessions given voluntarily); McMahan, 548 NW.2d at 206 (Boyle, J., dissenting). 2013Compare Brown, 617 F.3d at 860 (noting that "corroboration goes to sufficiency"), and Dalhouse, 534 F.3d at 806 (stating that the trustworthiness standard "does not affect the admissibility of a confession, at least not in this circuit") (emphasis in original), with Landsdown v. United States, 348 F.2d 405, 409 (5th Cir.1965) (requiring corroboration before the confession can be "admiftted] into evidence against the accused"), and Mauchley, ¶¶ 58-60, 67 P.3d at 490 (treating the trustworthiness standard as a rule governing the admissibility of confessions); see also McCormick on Evidence § 145 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ewan Bryce, Also Known as Ian, Darren Johnson, Also Known as D-Nice, Also Known as Dgreen1 sentence2013See, eg., Brown, 617 F.3d at 863 (explaining that, under Smith, if "a defendant admits that he drove a car that had an illegal sawed-off shotgun in its trunk, it is sufficient for the independent corroborating evidence to show that he drove that particular car'"); Bryce, 208 F.3d at 355 (dividing trustworthiness issues ""into two categories" depending on whether a confession is inherently reliable so as to be "self-corroborating"); United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 591-92 (9th Cir.1992) (announcing a "two-pronged" corroboration requirement that includes a "modern corpus delicti rul | 1 | 1 |
PEOPLE v McMAHANgreen1 sentence2013See United States v. Dalhouse, 534 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that Miranda seeks to protect defendants from coercive police tactics, whereas the trustworthiness standard seeks to protect defendants from false confessions given voluntarily); McMahan, 548 NW.2d at 206 (Boyle, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Browngreen2 sentences2013But see Brown, 617 F.3d at 861 (questioning whether the trustworthiness standard should be treated as a "quaint, though now irrelevant, reminder of the Court's pre-Miranda days"); United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639 , 641 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1999) ("[P]ost-Miranda, the need for the rule, especially insofar as it protects against involuntary confessions, is even more questionable."). . 2013Compare Brown, 617 F.3d at 860 (noting that "corroboration goes to sufficiency"), and Dalhouse, 534 F.3d at 806 (stating that the trustworthiness standard "does not affect the admissibility of a confession, at least not in this circuit") (emphasis in original), with Landsdown v. United States, 348 F.2d 405, 409 (5th Cir.1965) (requiring corroboration before the confession can be "admiftted] into evidence against the accused"), and Mauchley, ¶¶ 58-60, 67 P.3d at 490 (treating the trustworthiness standard as a rule governing the admissibility of confessions); see also McCormick on Evidence § 145 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bennett
green
2 sentences2013In the alternative, the People argue that any corroboration requirement, including the trustworthiness standard, conflicts with the sufficiency of the evidence test announced in People v. Bennett, 188 Colo. 125 , 515 P.2d 466 (1973), because it treats confessions as inherently unreliable and prohibits the trial court from considering confessions in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 2013In the alternative, the People argue that any corroboration requirement, including the trustworthiness standard, conflicts with the sufficiency of the evidence test announced in People v. Bennett, 188 Colo. 125 , 515 P.2d 466 (1973), because it treats confessions as inherently unreliable and prohibits the trial court from considering confessions in the light most favorable to the prosecution. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Dickerson, Mark A.
green
2 sentences2013But see Brown, 617 F.3d at 861 (questioning whether the trustworthiness standard should be treated as a "quaint, though now irrelevant, reminder of the Court's pre-Miranda days"); United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639 , 641 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1999) ("[P]ost-Miranda, the need for the rule, especially insofar as it protects against involuntary confessions, is even more questionable."). . 2013But see Brown, 617 F.3d at 861 (questioning whether the trustworthiness standard should be treated as a "quaint, though now irrelevant, reminder of the Court's pre-Miranda days"); United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639 , 641 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1999) ("[P]ost-Miranda, the need for the rule, especially insofar as it protects against involuntary confessions, is even more questionable."). . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Calderon
green
2 sentences2013Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 , 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954); United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 , 75 S.Ct. 186 , 99 L.Ed. 202 (1954). ¶ 20 In Opper, the Court rejected the corpus delicti rule and adopted, without extensive explanation, the "better rule" that "corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti." Opper, 348 U.S. at 93 , 75 S.Ct. 158 . 2013Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 , 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954); United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 , 75 S.Ct. 186 , 99 L.Ed. 202 (1954). ¶ 20 In Opper, the Court rejected the corpus delicti rule and adopted, without extensive explanation, the "better rule" that "corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti." Opper, 348 U.S. at 93 , 75 S.Ct. 158 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Opper v. United States
green
2 sentences2013Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 , 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954); United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 , 75 S.Ct. 186 , 99 L.Ed. 202 (1954). ¶ 20 In Opper, the Court rejected the corpus delicti rule and adopted, without extensive explanation, the "better rule" that "corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti." Opper, 348 U.S. at 93 , 75 S.Ct. 158 . 2013Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 , 75 S.Ct. 158 , 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954); United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 , 75 S.Ct. 186 , 99 L.Ed. 202 (1954). ¶ 20 In Opper, the Court rejected the corpus delicti rule and adopted, without extensive explanation, the "better rule" that "corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti." Opper, 348 U.S. at 93 , 75 S.Ct. 158 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Blecha v. People
green
1 sentence2000People v. Newton, supra. Finally, in Blecha v. People, 962 P.2d 931 (Colo.1998), the supreme court held that the admission of a codefendant's hearsay statement in a murder prosecution violated the defendant's right to confrontation and constituted constitutional error, but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Newton
green
1 sentence2000People v. Newton, supra. Finally, in Blecha v. People, 962 P.2d 931 (Colo.1998), the supreme court held that the admission of a codefendant's hearsay statement in a murder prosecution violated the defendant's right to confrontation and constituted constitutional error, but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.