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9 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Trenklergreen2 sentences2000In United States v Shaw, 69 F3d 1249, 1253 (CA 4, 1995), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the trustworthiness requirement contained in FRE 804(b)(5) “serves as a surrogate for the declarant’s in-court cross-examination” and that, therefore, a statement’s trustworthiness “is satisfied if the court can conclude that cross-examination would be of ‘marginal utility.’ ” In United States v Trenkler, 61 F3d 45, 58 (CA 1, 1995), the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the trustworthiness requirement of FRE 803(24) “is largely fact driven, and its focus will vary depending o 1998In United States v Shaw, 69 F3d 1249, 1253 (CA 4, 1995), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the trustworthiness requirement contained in FRE 804(b)(5) “serves as a surrogate for the declar-ant’s in-court cross-examination” and that, therefore, a statement’s trustworthiness “is satisfied if the court *468 can conclude that cross-examination would be of ‘marginal utility.’ ” In United States v Trenkler, 61 F3d 45, 58 (CA 1, 1995), the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the trustworthiness requirement of FRE 803(24) is largely fact driven, and its focus will vary depend | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Horace Shawgreen2 sentences2000In United States v Shaw, 69 F3d 1249, 1253 (CA 4, 1995), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the trustworthiness requirement contained in FRE 804(b)(5) “serves as a surrogate for the declarant’s in-court cross-examination” and that, therefore, a statement’s trustworthiness “is satisfied if the court can conclude that cross-examination would be of ‘marginal utility.’ ” In United States v Trenkler, 61 F3d 45, 58 (CA 1, 1995), the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the trustworthiness requirement of FRE 803(24) “is largely fact driven, and its focus will vary depending o 1998In United States v Shaw, 69 F3d 1249, 1253 (CA 4, 1995), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the trustworthiness requirement contained in FRE 804(b)(5) “serves as a surrogate for the declar-ant’s in-court cross-examination” and that, therefore, a statement’s trustworthiness “is satisfied if the court *468 can conclude that cross-examination would be of ‘marginal utility.’ ” In United States v Trenkler, 61 F3d 45, 58 (CA 1, 1995), the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the trustworthiness requirement of FRE 803(24) is largely fact driven, and its focus will vary depend | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Becky Lynn Barrettgreen2 sentences2000Id. 1998See FRE 803(24); FRE 804(b)(5). *467 In United States v Barrett, 8 F3d 1296, 1300 (CA 8, 1993), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the issue whether hearsay evidence of a child’s statements concerning her mother’s abuse were sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible under FRE 803(24): In order to comply with the Sixth Amendment, hearsay statements offered into evidence must bear “adequate ‘indi-cia of reliability.’ ” This reliability requirement is fulfilled when the hearsay statement either “ ‘falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception’ ” or occurs under circumstances with “ ‘ | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Duenaz
green
2 sentences2021“Although the prosecution initiated the examination and it may have been at least in part to investigate an alleged sexual assault, this factor is not dispositive.” People v Duenaz, 306 Mich App 85, 96 ; 854 NW2d 531 (2014). 2021“Although the prosecution initiated the examination and it may have been at least in part to investigate an alleged sexual assault, this factor is not dispositive.” People v Duenaz, 306 Mich App 85, 96 ; 854 NW2d 531 (2014). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Meeboer
green
2 sentences2021Factors that may be part of a trustworthiness analysis include: (1) the age and maturity of the declarant, (2) the manner in which the statements are elicited (leading questions may undermine the trustworthiness of a statement), (3) the manner in which the statements are phrased (childlike terminology may be evidence of genuineness), (4) use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, (5) who initiated the examination (prosecutorial initiation may indicate that the examination was not intended for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment), (6) the timing of the examination in relat 2021Factors that may be part of a trustworthiness analysis include: (1) the age and maturity of the declarant, (2) the manner in which the statements are elicited (leading questions may undermine the trustworthiness of a statement), (3) the manner in which the statements are phrased (childlike terminology may be evidence of genuineness), (4) use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, (5) who initiated the examination (prosecutorial initiation may indicate that the examination was not intended for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment), (6) the timing of the examination in relat | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. LaLone
green
2 sentences2023Factors that may be part of a trustworthiness analysis include: (1) the age and maturity of the declarant, (2) the manner in which the statements are elicited (leading questions may undermine the trustworthiness of a statement), (3) the manner in which the statements are phrased (childlike terminology may be evidence of genuineness), (4) use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, (5) who initiated the examination (prosecutorial initiation may indicate that the examination was not intended for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment), (6) the timing of the examination in relat 2023Factors that may be part of a trustworthiness analysis include: (1) the age and maturity of the declarant, (2) the manner in which the statements are elicited (leading questions may undermine the trustworthiness of a statement), (3) the manner in which the statements are phrased (childlike terminology may be evidence of genuineness), (4) use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, (5) who initiated the examination (prosecutorial initiation may indicate that the examination was not intended for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment), (6) the timing of the examination in relat | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Mitcham v. City of Detroit
green
2 sentences2019We decline to “discover and rationalize the basis for [defendant’s] claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Mitcham v City of Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203 ; 94 NW2d 388 (1959). 2019We decline to “discover and rationalize the basis for [defendant’s] claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Mitcham v City of Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203 ; 94 NW2d 388 (1959). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Reyes v. State
green
1 sentence2009The requirement, found in Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 , that the trial court find “good cause” before denying the right to confrontation plays an explicit role when a trial court performs a balancing test; however this does not mean that Morrissey’s good cause requirement is not addressed in the substantial trustworthiness test.... [T]he substantial trustworthiness test implicitly incorporates good cause into its calculus. [Reyes, supra at 441 .] Defendant urges this Court to adopt the balancing test set forth in Martin and Rondeau and reject the substantial trustworthiness test adopted by the | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
1 sentence2009The requirement, found in Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 , that the trial court find “good cause” before denying the right to confrontation plays an explicit role when a trial court performs a balancing test; however this does not mean that Morrissey’s good cause requirement is not addressed in the substantial trustworthiness test.... [T]he substantial trustworthiness test implicitly incorporates good cause into its calculus. [Reyes, supra at 441 .] Defendant urges this Court to adopt the balancing test set forth in Martin and Rondeau and reject the substantial trustworthiness test adopted by the | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences1996First, the trustworthiness requirement more directly protects the confessing defendant than does the coipus delicti rule articulated in People v Williams, supra, or People v Allen, 390 Mich 383 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 1996People v Williams, 422 Mich 381, 388 ; 373 NW2d 567 (1985); People v Allen, 390 Mich 383 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Allen
green
2 sentences1996First, the trustworthiness requirement more directly protects the confessing defendant than does the coipus delicti rule articulated in People v Williams, supra, or People v Allen, 390 Mich 383 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). 1996First, the trustworthiness requirement more directly protects the confessing defendant than does the coipus delicti rule articulated in People v Williams, supra, or People v Allen, 390 Mich 383 ; 212 NW2d 21 (1973). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
United States v. Calderon
green
2 sentences1996Thus, although the trustworthiness doctrine is like the corpus delicti rule in that it protects the situation where no crime has been committed, it is superior to the corpus delicti rule because it also protects a defendant who confesses falsely to an actual crime that someone else has committed. 11 Where there is an indication of unreliability, “the trial judge . . . should exercise great care in determining whether the statements of the accused were corroborated.” United States v Calderon, 348 US 160, 164 ; 75 S Ct 186 ; 99 L Ed 202 (1954). 1996Thus, although the trustworthiness doctrine is like the corpus delicti rule in that it protects the situation where no crime has been committed, it is superior to the corpus delicti rule because it also protects a defendant who confesses falsely to an actual crime that someone else has committed. 11 Where there is an indication of unreliability, “the trial judge . . . should exercise great care in determining whether the statements of the accused were corroborated.” United States v Calderon, 348 US 160, 164 ; 75 S Ct 186 ; 99 L Ed 202 (1954). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Central Fabricators, Inc v. Big Dutchman Division of US Industries, Inc
neutral
2 sentences1990We unanimously concluded in Central Fabricators v Big Dutchman, 398 Mich 352 ; 247 NW2d 804 (1976), that an interoffice memorandum of a purported telephone conversation was inadmissible under MCL 600.2146; MSA 27A.2146, 10 the statutory precursor of MRE 803(6). 1990We unanimously concluded in Central Fabricators v Big Dutchman, 398 Mich 352 ; 247 NW2d 804 (1976), that an interoffice memorandum of a purported telephone conversation was inadmissible under MCL 600.2146; MSA 27A.2146, 10 the statutory precursor of MRE 803(6). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Moncrief v. City of Detroit
green
2 sentences1990Plaintiff suffered prejudice inconsistent with substantial justice, and, therefore, reversal is required._ CONCLUSION As we noted in Moncrief v Detroit, 398 Mich 181 ; 247 NW2d 783 (1976), police reports will not usually qualify for admission into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 32 In the present case, we would hold that the four police reports were improperly admitted into evidence under MRE 803(6) because each exhibit lacked the trustworthiness that the rule requires as a condition of admissibility. 1990Plaintiff suffered prejudice inconsistent with substantial justice, and, therefore, reversal is required._ CONCLUSION As we noted in Moncrief v Detroit, 398 Mich 181 ; 247 NW2d 783 (1976), police reports will not usually qualify for admission into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 32 In the present case, we would hold that the four police reports were improperly admitted into evidence under MRE 803(6) because each exhibit lacked the trustworthiness that the rule requires as a condition of admissibility. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.