trustworthiness standard in Utah

2025In particular, the court noted that “a demonstrably wrong statement may indicate that a confession is false,” and the court offered this illustrative example: “[I]f a man spontaneously confesses that he fondled a child, but the evidence demonstrates he was never in physical proximity with the child, his confession is likely untrustworthy because the facts related in the confession are inconsistent with otherwise known or established facts.” Id. ¶27 Several years later, in In re D.D., 2021 UT App 100 , 500 P.3d 868 , we applied the trustworthiness standard in a case involving a juvenile who con

2021See infra ¶¶ 29–33. 20200223-CA 10 2021 UT App 100 In re D.D. an adjudication because “[t]he State ha[d] not yet had the opportunity to present its corroborating evidence to establish the trustworthiness of [D.D.’s] confessions.” But the court also ruled that, before any confessions could be admitted into evidence, the State would first have to “present evidence regarding the trustworthiness of [D.D.’s] alleged confessions,” and the court would have to determine that each confession met the trustworthiness standard by a preponderance of the evidence.

2023The ALJ explained that he considered the credibility of Demill’s admission under the trustworthiness standard adopted by State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10 , ¶¶ 51–52, 67 P.3d 477 , and ultimately determined that Demill’s admission was credible. 4 ¶9 The ALJ next considered whether Demill’s admitted conduct violated Utah law.

2023The ALJ explained that he considered the credibility of Demill’s admission under the trustworthiness standard adopted by State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10 , ¶¶ 51–52, 67 P.3d 477 , and ultimately determined that Demill’s admission was credible. 4 ¶9 The ALJ next considered whether Demill’s admitted conduct violated Utah law.

2021See, e.g., State v. Dern, 362 P.3d 566, 583 (Kan. 2015) (stating that a “determination of trustworthiness will depend on the totality of the circumstances and may include a consideration” of several “nonexclusive factors,” including close variants of the factors identified in Mauchley, as well as “the number of times the confession was made and the consistency or lack thereof between different versions of the confession”); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973) (“The sheer number of independent confessions provided additional corroboration for each.”).

2021See, e.g., State v. Dern, 362 P.3d 566, 583 (Kan. 2015) (stating that a “determination of trustworthiness will depend on the totality of the circumstances and may include a consideration” of several “nonexclusive factors,” including close variants of the factors identified in Mauchley, as well as “the number of times the confession was made and the consistency or lack thereof between different versions of the confession”); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973) (“The sheer number of independent confessions provided additional corroboration for each.”).

2003United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639, 642 (D.C.Cir.1999); United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 737 (1st Cir.1994); State v. George, 109 NH. 531, 257 A2d 19, 21 (1969). 11 20 The State is urging us to abandon the orthodox corpus delicti rule and to replace it with the trustworthiness standard.

2003We note that this same gatekeeping function is required by other jurisdictions that have adopted the trustworthiness standard, see United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639, 642 (D.C.Cir.1999); United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 737 (1st Cir.1994); State v. Harris, 215 Conn. 189 , 575 A.2d 223, 225 (1990); State v. George, 109 N.H. 531 , 257 A.2d 19, 21 (1969), and is akin to a trial court's responsibilities when making a determination about the voluntariness of a confession.

2003Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law § 8-23 (1996) (discussing holding in State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 982-84 (Utah 1989), "that although the part of the letter written by the defendant that included a confession to a killing [was] admissible against him in a criminal prosecution, the judge abused his discretion in admitting the rest of the letter, that primarily showed lack of remorse after the kill-mg”). 160 Although the trial court must determine as a matter of law whether a confession is sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted into evidence, this does not "preclude[ ] the jury fr

2003We note that this same gatekeeping function is required by other jurisdictions that have adopted the trustworthiness standard, see United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639, 642 (D.C.Cir.1999); United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 737 (1st Cir.1994); State v. Harris, 215 Conn. 189 , 575 A.2d 223, 225 (1990); State v. George, 109 N.H. 531 , 257 A.2d 19, 21 (1969), and is akin to a trial court's responsibilities when making a determination about the voluntariness of a confession.

2003We note that this same gatekeeping function is required by other jurisdictions that have adopted the trustworthiness standard, see United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639, 642 (D.C.Cir.1999); United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 737 (1st Cir.1994); State v. Harris, 215 Conn. 189 , 575 A.2d 223, 225 (1990); State v. George, 109 N.H. 531 , 257 A.2d 19, 21 (1969), and is akin to a trial court's responsibilities when making a determination about the voluntariness of a confession.

2003United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639, 642 (D.C.Cir.1999); United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 737 (1st Cir.1994); State v. George, 109 NH. 531, 257 A2d 19, 21 (1969). 11 20 The State is urging us to abandon the orthodox corpus delicti rule and to replace it with the trustworthiness standard.

2003Id. {61 In summary, we adopt the trustworthiness standard in place of the corpus delicti rule.

2003Finally, in United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639, 642 (D.C.Cic.1999), the court stated that the corroboration rule is "something of a hybrid rule having elements both of admissibility and sufficiency." See also State v. Ray, 130 Wash.2d 673 , 926 P.2d 904, 908 (1996) (Talmadge, J., concurring) (arguing that the corpus delicti rule should be abandoned, contrary to the majority decision, but that it should be abandoned only prospectively due to the Ex Post Facto Clause). 178 Hence, we conclude the trustworthiness standard pertains not just to the admissibility, but also to the sufficiency of

2003See Carmell, 529 U.S. at 545 n. 23, 120 S.Ct. 1620 . 166 Here, our challenge is to determine whether the trustworthiness standard altered an admissibility rule or a sufficiency of the evidence rule.

2003See Carmell, 529 U.S. at 545 n. 23, 120 S.Ct. 1620 . 166 Here, our challenge is to determine whether the trustworthiness standard altered an admissibility rule or a sufficiency of the evidence rule.

2003"Those asking us to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion" due to "the doctrine of stare decisis." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted).

2003State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶¶ 51, 56-57 , 63 P.3d 650 . 7 .

2003State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶¶ 51, 56-57 , 63 P.3d 650 . 7 .

2003United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639, 642 (D.C.Cir.1999); United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 737 (1st Cir.1994); State v. George, 109 NH. 531, 257 A2d 19, 21 (1969). 11 20 The State is urging us to abandon the orthodox corpus delicti rule and to replace it with the trustworthiness standard.

2003We note that this same gatekeeping function is required by other jurisdictions that have adopted the trustworthiness standard, see United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639, 642 (D.C.Cir.1999); United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 737 (1st Cir.1994); State v. Harris, 215 Conn. 189 , 575 A.2d 223, 225 (1990); State v. George, 109 N.H. 531 , 257 A.2d 19, 21 (1969), and is akin to a trial court's responsibilities when making a determination about the voluntariness of a confession.

2001Webster's alternative argument-that the trial court erred in concluding his wife's hearsay statements conform with the trustworthiness requirement of Rule 804(b)(5)-is likely to resurface on remand. 4 While we express no opinion on the ultimate determination made by the trial court regarding the trustworthiness of Webster's wife's statements, we do conclude that the inquiry and analysis by the trial court on this issue were insufficient. 125 Rule 804(b)(5) states, with our emphasis, that the following types of hearsay statements not falling within other exceptions may nonetheless be admitted:

2001Webster's alternative argument-that the trial court erred in concluding his wife's hearsay statements conform with the trustworthiness requirement of Rule 804(b)(5)-is likely to resurface on remand. 4 While we express no opinion on the ultimate determination made by the trial court regarding the trustworthiness of Webster's wife's statements, we do conclude that the inquiry and analysis by the trial court on this issue were insufficient. 125 Rule 804(b)(5) states, with our emphasis, that the following types of hearsay statements not falling within other exceptions may nonetheless be admitted: