family purpose doctrine in Arizona

2012THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE THE FAMILY PURPOSE DOCTRINE. ¶ 15 Alosi relies on Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz.App. 476, 480 , 441 P.2d 73, 77 (1968), for the elements of the family purpose doctrine: [T]here must be a family with sufficient unity so that there is a head of the family, the motor vehicle responsible for the injury must have been one `furnished' by the head of the family to a member of the family and this vehicle must have been used on the occasion in question by the family member with the implied or express consent o

2012THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE THE FAMILY PURPOSE DOCTRINE. ¶ 15 Alosi relies on Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz.App. 476, 480 , 441 P.2d 73, 77 (1968), for the elements of the family purpose doctrine: [T]here must be a family with sufficient unity so that there is a head of the family, the motor vehicle responsible for the injury must have been one `furnished' by the head of the family to a member of the family and this vehicle must have been used on the occasion in question by the family member with the implied or express consent o

2012Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 17 Analysis of the history and purpose of the family purpose doctrine leaves us unpersuaded that it has any application to these facts.

2012Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 17 Analysis of the history and purpose of the family purpose doctrine leaves us unpersuaded that it has any application to these facts.

2021The Family Purpose Doctrine Does Not Apply. ¶14 Capp also urges us to apply the family purpose doctrine, under which liability “arises (1) when there is a head of the family, (2) who maintains or furnishes a vehicle for the general use, pleasure, and convenience of the family, and (3) a family member uses the vehicle with the family’s head’s express or implied permission for a family purpose.” Young v. Beck, 227 Ariz. 1, 8, ¶ 28 (2011). ¶15 Capp concedes Welch “is not . . . the ‘head of the family’ at his father’s household,” and she presented no evidence to suggest the unidentified driver was

2021The Family Purpose Doctrine Does Not Apply. ¶14 Capp also urges us to apply the family purpose doctrine, under which liability “arises (1) when there is a head of the family, (2) who maintains or furnishes a vehicle for the general use, pleasure, and convenience of the family, and (3) a family member uses the vehicle with the family’s head’s express or implied permission for a family purpose.” Young v. Beck, 227 Ariz. 1, 8, ¶ 28 (2011). ¶15 Capp concedes Welch “is not . . . the ‘head of the family’ at his father’s household,” and she presented no evidence to suggest the unidentified driver was

2011See First-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Doggett, 316 S.W.2d 225, 230 (Ky.1958) (noting that when “the essential facts are not in dispute, the question really becomes one of the scope and extent of the family purpose doctrine as a rule of law, and therefore is a question of law for the court”).

2010See, e.g., Anderson v. Mason, 141 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) (“The fact that [a minor] had to get special permission before using the vehicle does not remove the vehicle from the general applicability of the family purpose doctrine.”); Phillips v. Dixon, 236 Ga. *413 271, 223 S.E.2d 678, 679, 682 (1976) (finding a parent liable under the family purpose doctrine notwithstanding that the parent had specifically instructed the child not to let a third party drive the car and the child disobeyed the instruction); First-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Doggett, 316 S.W.2d 225, 230 (Ky.Ct.App.1958)

2011OPINION PELANDER, Justice. ¶ 1 We adopted the family purpose doctrine nearly a century ago in Benton v. Regeser, 20 Ariz. 278 , 179 P. 966 (1919).

2011Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 274 , 872 P.2d 668, 678 (1994). ¶ 14 Our court of appeals has often noted that the family purpose doctrine departs from traditional agency law. 1 See Young, 224 Ariz. at 411 ¶ 12, 231 P.3d at 943 (“The doctrine has never purported to rely on a true agency relationship.”); Jacobson v. Superior Court (Steinhoff), 154 Ariz. 430, 431 , 743 P.2d 410, 411 (App.1987) (observing that the doctrine’s “insecure[ ]” grounding “in agency principles ... is the purest of fictions”); Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz.App. 476, 479 , 441 P.2d 73, 76 (App.1968) (noting “the agency for pleasure pre

2011Similarly, in Mortensen v. Knight, we noted that “the family purpose doctrine is the settled law of this jurisdiction” and that “[a]geney, not ownership, is the test of liability.” 81 Ariz. 325, 332, 333 , 305 P.2d 463, 468 (1956). ¶ 16 In view of this history and the express exception in § 12-2506(D)(2) for “agent or servant” relationships, we cannot conclude that the Legislature intended to abolish the family purpose doctrine when it amended UCATA in 1987, abolishing joint and several liability.

2011Similarly, in Mortensen v. Knight, we noted that “the family purpose doctrine is the settled law of this jurisdiction” and that “[a]geney, not ownership, is the test of liability.” 81 Ariz. 325, 332, 333 , 305 P.2d 463, 468 (1956). ¶ 16 In view of this history and the express exception in § 12-2506(D)(2) for “agent or servant” relationships, we cannot conclude that the Legislature intended to abolish the family purpose doctrine when it amended UCATA in 1987, abolishing joint and several liability.

2011Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 274 , 872 P.2d 668, 678 (1994). ¶ 14 Our court of appeals has often noted that the family purpose doctrine departs from traditional agency law. 1 See Young, 224 Ariz. at 411 ¶ 12, 231 P.3d at 943 (“The doctrine has never purported to rely on a true agency relationship.”); Jacobson v. Superior Court (Steinhoff), 154 Ariz. 430, 431 , 743 P.2d 410, 411 (App.1987) (observing that the doctrine’s “insecure[ ]” grounding “in agency principles ... is the purest of fictions”); Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz.App. 476, 479 , 441 P.2d 73, 76 (App.1968) (noting “the agency for pleasure pre

2011Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 274 , 872 P.2d 668, 678 (1994). ¶ 14 Our court of appeals has often noted that the family purpose doctrine departs from traditional agency law. 1 See Young, 224 Ariz. at 411 ¶ 12, 231 P.3d at 943 (“The doctrine has never purported to rely on a true agency relationship.”); Jacobson v. Superior Court (Steinhoff), 154 Ariz. 430, 431 , 743 P.2d 410, 411 (App.1987) (observing that the doctrine’s “insecure[ ]” grounding “in agency principles ... is the purest of fictions”); Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz.App. 476, 479 , 441 P.2d 73, 76 (App.1968) (noting “the agency for pleasure pre

2016See Young v. Beck, 227 Ariz. 1 , 5 ¶¶ 16-17, 251 P.3d 380, 384 (2011) (recognizing the family purpose doctrine as a “form of vicarious liability” that falls within the agen *9 cy exception in § 12—2506(D)(2)); Wiggs v. City of Phx., 198 Ariz. 367 , 371 ¶¶ 13-14, 10 P.3d 625, 629 (2000) (same regarding the common-law, non-delegable duty doctrine, which UCATA did not abolish). ¶ 17 In striking Cramer’s notice of nonparty at fault, the trial court did not address Arizona’s statutory requirements or related case law and erred in preventing the trier of fact from considering any potential fault of

2016See Young v. Beck, 227 Ariz. 1 , 5 ¶¶ 16-17, 251 P.3d 380, 384 (2011) (recognizing the family purpose doctrine as a “form of vicarious liability” that falls within the agen *9 cy exception in § 12—2506(D)(2)); Wiggs v. City of Phx., 198 Ariz. 367 , 371 ¶¶ 13-14, 10 P.3d 625, 629 (2000) (same regarding the common-law, non-delegable duty doctrine, which UCATA did not abolish). ¶ 17 In striking Cramer’s notice of nonparty at fault, the trial court did not address Arizona’s statutory requirements or related case law and erred in preventing the trier of fact from considering any potential fault of

2012Indeed, in Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 229 , 655 P.2d 342, 349 (1982) (in division), the supreme court held that "[t]he Arizona rule is that the community is liable for the intentional torts of either spouse if the tortious act was committed with the intent to benefit the community, regardless of whether in fact the community receives any benefit." ¶ 25 After Selby , the elements of the family purpose doctrine set forth in Young are not necessary to impose vicarious liability among spouses—there need be no "head" of a marital relationship to warrant liability, and the use of the term "fami

2012Indeed, in Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 229 , 655 P.2d 342, 349 (1982) (in division), the supreme court held that "[t]he Arizona rule is that the community is liable for the intentional torts of either spouse if the tortious act was committed with the intent to benefit the community, regardless of whether in fact the community receives any benefit." ¶ 25 After Selby , the elements of the family purpose doctrine set forth in Young are not necessary to impose vicarious liability among spouses—there need be no "head" of a marital relationship to warrant liability, and the use of the term "fami

2011Rather, “[w]e will overturn long-standing precedent only for a compelling reason.” State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147 , 159 ¶ 52, 140 P.3d 930, 942 (2006); see also White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 113 , 358 P.2d 712, 714 (1961) (noting our prior case law “should be adhered to unless the reasons of the prior decisions have ceased to exist or the prior decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong”). ¶ 23 Whatever the original soundness of the family purpose doctrine’s use of agency principles, “it is now usually recognized that the doctrine represents a social policy generated in response to t

2011Rather, “[w]e will overturn long-standing precedent only for a compelling reason.” State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147 , 159 ¶ 52, 140 P.3d 930, 942 (2006); see also White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 113 , 358 P.2d 712, 714 (1961) (noting our prior case law “should be adhered to unless the reasons of the prior decisions have ceased to exist or the prior decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong”). ¶ 23 Whatever the original soundness of the family purpose doctrine’s use of agency principles, “it is now usually recognized that the doctrine represents a social policy generated in response to t

2011See, e.g., People v. Badke, 21 Misc.3d 471, 865 N.Y.S.2d 488 , 494 (Suffolk County Ct.2008) (“The loss of life resulting from inexperienced teen drivers is a national problem of epidemic proportions.”). ¶ 25 The Becks also describe the doctrine as an “anachronism” that a “great majority” of jurisdictions have rejected.

2011See, e.g., Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629 , 176 P. 131, 131 (1918) (punishing defendant/parent under family purpose doctrine is not justified because a car is "not a dangerous instrumentality which the defendant let loose in the community”); Jones v. Knapp, 104 Vt. 5 , 156 A. 399, 401 (1931) (refusing to apply doctrine because such liability must depend on "settled common-law principles of master and servant or principal and agent”); Sare v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55 , 214 P.2d 486, 494 (1950) (declining to adopt doctrine because of its divergence from "clearly established” agency rules and noting tha

2011See, e.g., Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629 , 176 P. 131, 131 (1918) (punishing defendant/parent under family purpose doctrine is not justified because a car is "not a dangerous instrumentality which the defendant let loose in the community”); Jones v. Knapp, 104 Vt. 5 , 156 A. 399, 401 (1931) (refusing to apply doctrine because such liability must depend on "settled common-law principles of master and servant or principal and agent”); Sare v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55 , 214 P.2d 486, 494 (1950) (declining to adopt doctrine because of its divergence from "clearly established” agency rules and noting tha

2011See State v. Lara, 171 Ariz. 282, 285 , 830 P.2d 803, 806 (1992).

2011See State v. Lara, 171 Ariz. 282, 285 , 830 P.2d 803, 806 (1992).

2011Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284 , 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991); see also Pleak v. Entrada Prop.

2011Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284 , 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991); see also Pleak v. Entrada Prop.

2011The Becks contend the doctrine lacks a viable legal basis or public policy justification, is “grossly unfair to any parent [of] a young driver,” and functions as “solely a penalty against wealthy parents.” ¶ 22 “Just as the common law is court-made law based on the circumstances and conditions of the time, so can the common law be changed by the court when conditions and circumstances change.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 9 , 17 n. 21, 730 P.2d 186 , 194 n. 21 (1986) (quoting Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 449 , 646 P.2d 878, 880 (1982)); see also Estate of DeSela v. Presc

2011The Becks contend the doctrine lacks a viable legal basis or public policy justification, is “grossly unfair to any parent [of] a young driver,” and functions as “solely a penalty against wealthy parents.” ¶ 22 “Just as the common law is court-made law based on the circumstances and conditions of the time, so can the common law be changed by the court when conditions and circumstances change.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 9 , 17 n. 21, 730 P.2d 186 , 194 n. 21 (1986) (quoting Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 449 , 646 P.2d 878, 880 (1982)); see also Estate of DeSela v. Presc

2011See, e.g., Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629 , 176 P. 131, 131 (1918) (punishing defendant/parent under family purpose doctrine is not justified because a car is "not a dangerous instrumentality which the defendant let loose in the community”); Jones v. Knapp, 104 Vt. 5 , 156 A. 399, 401 (1931) (refusing to apply doctrine because such liability must depend on "settled common-law principles of master and servant or principal and agent”); Sare v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55 , 214 P.2d 486, 494 (1950) (declining to adopt doctrine because of its divergence from "clearly established” agency rules and noting tha

2011See, e.g., Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629 , 176 P. 131, 131 (1918) (punishing defendant/parent under family purpose doctrine is not justified because a car is "not a dangerous instrumentality which the defendant let loose in the community”); Jones v. Knapp, 104 Vt. 5 , 156 A. 399, 401 (1931) (refusing to apply doctrine because such liability must depend on "settled common-law principles of master and servant or principal and agent”); Sare v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55 , 214 P.2d 486, 494 (1950) (declining to adopt doctrine because of its divergence from "clearly established” agency rules and noting tha

2011Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 274 , 872 P.2d 668, 678 (1994). ¶ 14 Our court of appeals has often noted that the family purpose doctrine departs from traditional agency law. 1 See Young, 224 Ariz. at 411 ¶ 12, 231 P.3d at 943 (“The doctrine has never purported to rely on a true agency relationship.”); Jacobson v. Superior Court (Steinhoff), 154 Ariz. 430, 431 , 743 P.2d 410, 411 (App.1987) (observing that the doctrine’s “insecure[ ]” grounding “in agency principles ... is the purest of fictions”); Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz.App. 476, 479 , 441 P.2d 73, 76 (App.1968) (noting “the agency for pleasure pre

2011Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 274 , 872 P.2d 668, 678 (1994). ¶ 14 Our court of appeals has often noted that the family purpose doctrine departs from traditional agency law. 1 See Young, 224 Ariz. at 411 ¶ 12, 231 P.3d at 943 (“The doctrine has never purported to rely on a true agency relationship.”); Jacobson v. Superior Court (Steinhoff), 154 Ariz. 430, 431 , 743 P.2d 410, 411 (App.1987) (observing that the doctrine’s “insecure[ ]” grounding “in agency principles ... is the purest of fictions”); Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz.App. 476, 479 , 441 P.2d 73, 76 (App.1968) (noting “the agency for pleasure pre

2011Rather, “[w]e will overturn long-standing precedent only for a compelling reason.” State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147 , 159 ¶ 52, 140 P.3d 930, 942 (2006); see also White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 113 , 358 P.2d 712, 714 (1961) (noting our prior case law “should be adhered to unless the reasons of the prior decisions have ceased to exist or the prior decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong”). ¶ 23 Whatever the original soundness of the family purpose doctrine’s use of agency principles, “it is now usually recognized that the doctrine represents a social policy generated in response to t

2011Rather, “[w]e will overturn long-standing precedent only for a compelling reason.” State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147 , 159 ¶ 52, 140 P.3d 930, 942 (2006); see also White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 113 , 358 P.2d 712, 714 (1961) (noting our prior case law “should be adhered to unless the reasons of the prior decisions have ceased to exist or the prior decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong”). ¶ 23 Whatever the original soundness of the family purpose doctrine’s use of agency principles, “it is now usually recognized that the doctrine represents a social policy generated in response to t

2011See, e.g., Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629 , 176 P. 131, 131 (1918) (punishing defendant/parent under family purpose doctrine is not justified because a car is "not a dangerous instrumentality which the defendant let loose in the community”); Jones v. Knapp, 104 Vt. 5 , 156 A. 399, 401 (1931) (refusing to apply doctrine because such liability must depend on "settled common-law principles of master and servant or principal and agent”); Sare v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55 , 214 P.2d 486, 494 (1950) (declining to adopt doctrine because of its divergence from "clearly established” agency rules and noting tha

2011See, e.g., Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629 , 176 P. 131, 131 (1918) (punishing defendant/parent under family purpose doctrine is not justified because a car is "not a dangerous instrumentality which the defendant let loose in the community”); Jones v. Knapp, 104 Vt. 5 , 156 A. 399, 401 (1931) (refusing to apply doctrine because such liability must depend on "settled common-law principles of master and servant or principal and agent”); Sare v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55 , 214 P.2d 486, 494 (1950) (declining to adopt doctrine because of its divergence from "clearly established” agency rules and noting tha

2011The parties later entered into a “high-low” settlement, under which the Becks agreed to pay Young one of two specified damage amounts, depending on whether the summary judgment ruling was affirmed or reversed on appeal. ¶ 6 In the court of appeals, the Becks argued that the family purpose doctrine did not apply because Jason violated their restriction against “transporting of friends.” Young v. Beck, 224 Ariz. 408 , 411 ¶ 11, 231 P.3d 940, 943 (App.2010).

2011The parties later entered into a “high-low” settlement, under which the Becks agreed to pay Young one of two specified damage amounts, depending on whether the summary judgment ruling was affirmed or reversed on appeal. ¶ 6 In the court of appeals, the Becks argued that the family purpose doctrine did not apply because Jason violated their restriction against “transporting of friends.” Young v. Beck, 224 Ariz. 408 , 411 ¶ 11, 231 P.3d 940, 943 (App.2010).

2011We distinguished Wiggs, reasoning that in strict product liability actions, “the various participants in the chain of distribution are liable not for the actions of others, but rather for their own actions in distributing the defective product.” Id. at 226 ¶ 20, 172 P.3d at 414 . ¶ 19 In contrast, the family purpose doctrine imputes liability not because of the head of the family’s independent fault or *6 breach of a legal duty, but because of “the agency relationship that is deemed to exist between the head of the household and the driver of the family car.” Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 4

2010See Benton, 20 Ariz. 273, 179 P. 966 ; Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington plc, 202 Ariz. 481, 489, ¶ 32, 47 P.3d 1119, 1127 (App.2002) (recognizing that courts presume the legislature is aware of existing law when it passes legislation).

2010See Benton, 20 Ariz. 273, 179 P. 966 ; Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington plc, 202 Ariz. 481, 489, ¶ 32, 47 P.3d 1119, 1127 (App.2002) (recognizing that courts presume the legislature is aware of existing law when it passes legislation).

2010See, e.g., Anderson v. Mason, 141 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) (“The fact that [a minor] had to get special permission before using the vehicle does not remove the vehicle from the general applicability of the family purpose doctrine.”); Phillips v. Dixon, 236 Ga. *413 271, 223 S.E.2d 678, 679, 682 (1976) (finding a parent liable under the family purpose doctrine notwithstanding that the parent had specifically instructed the child not to let a third party drive the car and the child disobeyed the instruction); First-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Doggett, 316 S.W.2d 225, 230 (Ky.Ct.App.1958)

2010See, e.g., Anderson v. Mason, 141 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) (“The fact that [a minor] had to get special permission before using the vehicle does not remove the vehicle from the general applicability of the family purpose doctrine.”); Phillips v. Dixon, 236 Ga. *413 271, 223 S.E.2d 678, 679, 682 (1976) (finding a parent liable under the family purpose doctrine notwithstanding that the parent had specifically instructed the child not to let a third party drive the car and the child disobeyed the instruction); First-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Doggett, 316 S.W.2d 225, 230 (Ky.Ct.App.1958)

2010See Driver v. Smith, 47 Tenn.App. 505 , 339 S.W.2d 135, 143 (1959) (comparing minor’s disobedient act of driving the family car outside town limits to disobeying a parent’s restriction not to drive above the speed limit and noting that “if at the time of the accident it should be assumed that she was exceeding her authorized speed limit certainly it could not be contended that such disobedience relieved the father of liability”).

2010See, e.g., Anderson v. Mason, 141 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) (“The fact that [a minor] had to get special permission before using the vehicle does not remove the vehicle from the general applicability of the family purpose doctrine.”); Phillips v. Dixon, 236 Ga. *413 271, 223 S.E.2d 678, 679, 682 (1976) (finding a parent liable under the family purpose doctrine notwithstanding that the parent had specifically instructed the child not to let a third party drive the car and the child disobeyed the instruction); First-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Doggett, 316 S.W.2d 225, 230 (Ky.Ct.App.1958)

2010Even if we were inclined to do so, “as an intermediate appellate court we are precluded from examining whether the doctrine judicially created should be judicially abrogated.” Pesqueira, 7 Ariz.App. at 479 , 441 P.2d at 76 (recognizing that the doctrine “does not fit neatly into the broad mosaic of our law”); see also Lopez v. Ariz. Water Co., Inc., 23 Ariz.App. 99, 101 , 530 P.2d 1132, 1134 (1975) (court of appeals is bound by prior decisions of the supreme court).

2010Even if we were inclined to do so, “as an intermediate appellate court we are precluded from examining whether the doctrine judicially created should be judicially abrogated.” Pesqueira, 7 Ariz.App. at 479 , 441 P.2d at 76 (recognizing that the doctrine “does not fit neatly into the broad mosaic of our law”); see also Lopez v. Ariz. Water Co., Inc., 23 Ariz.App. 99, 101 , 530 P.2d 1132, 1134 (1975) (court of appeals is bound by prior decisions of the supreme court).