family purpose doctrine in Tennessee

2016Contribution may still be viable in the following limited circumstances: .... [C]ases in which joint and several liability continues to apply under doctrines such as the family purpose doctrine, cases in which tortfeasors act in concert or collectively with one another, cases in which the doctrine of respondeat superior permits vicarious liability due to an agency-type relationship, or in the “appropriate” products liability case, see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Block, 924 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn. 1996); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1996); Owens v. Truckstops of Amer., 915 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. 1

2011Vehicle Maintained, for the Pleasure or Comfort of Family The family purpose doctrine applies only if the vehicle is “maintain[ed] ... for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort for [the] family.” Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 447 .

1999Contribution may still be viable in the following limited circumstances:’ 1. cases in which prior to McIntyre the cause of action arose, the suit was filed and the parties had made irrevocable litigation decisions based on pre- McIntyre law, see Owens v. Truckstops of America, 915 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn.1996); Bervoets v. Harde Ralls Pontiac-Olds, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn.1994); 2. cases in which joint and several liability continues to apply under doctrines such as the family purpose doctrine, cases in which tortfeasors act in concert or collectively with one another, cases in which the doctrine

1999Contribution may still be viable in the following limited circumstances:’ 1. cases in which prior to McIntyre the cause of action arose, the suit was filed and the parties had made irrevocable litigation decisions based on pre- McIntyre law, see Owens v. Truckstops of America, 915 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn.1996); Bervoets v. Harde Ralls Pontiac-Olds, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn.1994); 2. cases in which joint and several liability continues to apply under doctrines such as the family purpose doctrine, cases in which tortfeasors act in concert or collectively with one another, cases in which the doctrine

2007As a consequence we will not discuss the family purpose doctrine, which is distinct from the concept of negligent entrustment and rests on the presumption that if a family member operates an automobile that is owned and used for family purposes, the family member is the servant of the owner of the automobile and is engaged upon his business at the time the negligence occurred.” See Stephens v. Jones, 710 S.W .2d 38, 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984)(citing Scates v. Sandefer, 163 Tenn. 558 , 44 S.W .2d 310 (1931)); see also Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 447 (Tenn. 1996). -5- Accordingly, we affirm t

2001Based upon these facts, the supreme court held that the father was not liable under the family purpose doctrine because the vehicle “was not being operated in the business of the father nor for the pleasure and comfort of himself or family, but solely in behalf of the feed company, and in strict compliance with the contract made between the parties.” Scates, 44 S.W.2d at 311 .

2016Contribution may still be viable in the following limited circumstances: .... [C]ases in which joint and several liability continues to apply under doctrines such as the family purpose doctrine, cases in which tortfeasors act in concert or collectively with one another, cases in which the doctrine of respondeat superior permits vicarious liability due to an agency-type relationship, or in the “appropriate” products liability case, see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Block, 924 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn. 1996); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1996); Owens v. Truckstops of Amer., 915 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. 1

1999Contribution may still be viable in the following limited circumstances:’ 1. cases in which prior to McIntyre the cause of action arose, the suit was filed and the parties had made irrevocable litigation decisions based on pre- McIntyre law, see Owens v. Truckstops of America, 915 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn.1996); Bervoets v. Harde Ralls Pontiac-Olds, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn.1994); 2. cases in which joint and several liability continues to apply under doctrines such as the family purpose doctrine, cases in which tortfeasors act in concert or collectively with one another, cases in which the doctrine

2009Next, Father claims that “to hold [him] liable for the acts of his son would violate the purpose behind the family purpose doctrine, which is to hold the person with the most control and influence over a family responsible for his or her child’s actions.” We recognize that “[o]ne of the grounds upon which the family purpose doctrine is based is the fact that the child is subject to parental control.” Gray v. Amos, 869 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Adkins, 82 S.W.2d at 867 ).

1997See Gary v. Amos, 869 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tenn.App.1993) (noting that the family purpose doctrine requires that the owner purchase and maintain the vehicle for family use, with the family members having general permission to use the vehicle).

2011Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that the family purpose doctrine applied, stating that “a driver can be operating a vehicle for a family purpose ‘even if the driver is only using the automobile for his own pleasure or convenience.’ ” Id. at 831 (quoting Thurmon v. Sellers, 62 S.W.3d 145, 156 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001)); see also Calhoun v. Eaves, 114 Ga.App. 756 , 152 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1966) (noting that while it is essential that the vehicle be furnished by the head of the family for a family purpose, “[t]he vehicle may be furnished ... for the use of less than all members of the family”).

2009Father points out that in Thurmon v. Sellers, 62 S.W.3d 145, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), the court generally described the family purpose doctrine as “a court-created legal fiction by which the owner of an automobile is held vicariously liable when the car is negligently driven by a member of the immediate household.” (emphasis added).

2010In Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn.1996), our Supreme Court stated: The family purpose doctrine has been in effect in Tennessee for nearly eighty years, King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217 , 204 S.W. 296 (1918), and according to at least one court, has been “firmly established in this state.” Stephens v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tenn.App.1984).

2003The family purpose doctrine, which is “firmly established in this state,” Stephens v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984), has been described by our Supreme Court as follows: [T]he head of a household who maintains a motor vehicle for the general use and convenience of the family is liable for the negligence of any member of the family driving the vehicle, provided the driver received express or implied consent.

2011In Alexander v. Kendrick, 134 Ga.App. 249 , 213 S.E.2d 911, 913 (1975), the father was subject to liability under the family purpose doctrine as the head of the household where he and the mother were divorced and his daughter, who lived with the mother, was involved in an accident while driving a car owned by the father.

2011In Alexander v. Kendrick, 134 Ga.App. 249 , 213 S.E.2d 911, 913 (1975), the father was subject to liability under the family purpose doctrine as the head of the household where he and the mother were divorced and his daughter, who lived with the mother, was involved in an accident while driving a car owned by the father.

2011See, e.g., Droussiotis v. Damron, 958 S.W.2d 127 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997); Gray v. Amos, 869 S.W.2d 925 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993); Redding v. Barker, 33 Tenn.App. 132 , 230 S.W.2d 202 (1950).

2000See Droussiotis v. Damron, 958 S.W.2d 127, 131-32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Gray v. Amos, 869 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

2011In Boles v. Russell, 36 Tenn.App. 159 , 252 S.W.2d 801 (1952), although the father owned the automobile that his son was driving when an accident occurred, the court found that the family purpose doctrine did not apply, noting that the trier of fact “could look behind the title in determining the question of the right of control....

2011In Boles v. Russell, 36 Tenn.App. 159 , 252 S.W.2d 801 (1952), although the father owned the automobile that his son was driving when an accident occurred, the court found that the family purpose doctrine did not apply, noting that the trier of fact “could look behind the title in determining the question of the right of control....

2015See id.

2011This doctrine imposes vicarious liability on a head of the household for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a family member provided that the head of the household maintains the vehicle “for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort for his or her family,” and “the family purpose driver [was] using the motor vehicle at the time of the injury ‘in furtherance of that purpose with the permission, either express or implied of the [head of the household] owner.’ ” Strine v. Walton, 323 S.W.3d 480, 489 (Tenn.Ct.App.2010) (quoting Redding v. Barker, 33 Tenn.App. 132 , 230 S.W.2d 202, 20

2015Therefore, “our standard of review is de novo with a presumption of correctness extending only to the lower court‟s findings of fact.” Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 305 (Tenn. 2005).

2011Therefore, “our standard of review is de novo with a presumption of correctness extending only to the lower court’s findings of fact.” Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 305 (Tenn.2005).

2010To the extent that the doctrine of vicarious liability can be considered a species of joint and several liability, 6 we have held *220 that the adoption of comparative fault in McIntyre v. Balentine did not undermine the continuing viability of various vicarious liability doctrines, including the family purpose doctrine, Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 447-48 (Tenn.1996), “respon-deat superior, or similar circumstance where liability is vicarious due to an agency-type relationship between the active, or actual wrongdoer and the one who is vicariously responsible.” Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2

2004Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 311-12 (Tenn.1998).

2003See Driver v. Smith, 47 Tenn.App. 505 , 339 S.W.2d 135 (1959).

2000In Driver v. Smith, 339 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959), this Court held that the family purpose doctrine was applicable even though the owners of the vehicle required their daughter to obtain special permission each time she used the vehicle.

1993In order to impose liability under the family purpose doctrine, the family member must have been utilizing the vehicle at the time of the injury “in furtherance of that purpose with the permission, either expressed or implied, of the owner.” Redding, 230 S.W.2d at 205 ; see also Stephens v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 38 (Tenn.App.1984); Long v. Tomlin, 22 Tenn.App. 607 , 125 S.W.2d 171 (1938).

1959The plaintiff-in-error, Mr. Driver, relies most strongly upon the following statement taken from the opinion of *511 Judge Anderson in the case of Redding v. Barker, 1950, 33 Tenn. App. 132 , 230 S. W. (2d) 202 , 205: ‘ ‘ The family purpose doctrine does not apply where the members of the family must obtain special permission on each occasion of the vehicle’s use by them; nor does it apply where there is no evidence that the vehicle was maintained wholly or partly to serve the convenience of the family.

2011Id. at 868.

2009Next, Father claims that “to hold [him] liable for the acts of his son would violate the purpose behind the family purpose doctrine, which is to hold the person with the most control and influence over a family responsible for his or her child’s actions.” We recognize that “[o]ne of the grounds upon which the family purpose doctrine is based is the fact that the child is subject to parental control.” Gray v. Amos, 869 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Adkins, 82 S.W.2d at 867 ).

2011Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that the family purpose doctrine applied, stating that “a driver can be operating a vehicle for a family purpose ‘even if the driver is only using the automobile for his own pleasure or convenience.’ ” Id. at 831 (quoting Thurmon v. Sellers, 62 S.W.3d 145, 156 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001)); see also Calhoun v. Eaves, 114 Ga.App. 756 , 152 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1966) (noting that while it is essential that the vehicle be furnished by the head of the family for a family purpose, “[t]he vehicle may be furnished ... for the use of less than all members of the family”).

2009“The car must be driven with the permission of the owner, but this may be inferred from very general circumstances.” Gray v. Mitsky, 280 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Thurmon, 62 S.W.3d at 156 ). 7 Another requirement of the family purpose doctrine is that “the family purpose driver must have (continued...) -10- is inapplicable as a matter of law because he did not provide the Mercedes to Beau for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort to the family.

2009However, the court declined to extend that conclusion to the facts of the case before it where the alleged head of household was a non-parent who did not reside with the driver. -8- the parents have been divorced, with the non-custodial parent furnishing an automobile to the child, the family purpose doctrine is applicable.” 5 Id. (citing Esco v. Jackson, 185 Ga. App. 901 (1), 366 S.E.2d 309 (1988); Alexander v. Kendrick, 134 Ga. App. 249, 251 (4), 213 S.E.2d 911 (1975)).

2009However, the court declined to extend that conclusion to the facts of the case before it where the alleged head of household was a non-parent who did not reside with the driver. -8- the parents have been divorced, with the non-custodial parent furnishing an automobile to the child, the family purpose doctrine is applicable.” 5 Id. (citing Esco v. Jackson, 185 Ga. App. 901 (1), 366 S.E.2d 309 (1988); Alexander v. Kendrick, 134 Ga. App. 249, 251 (4), 213 S.E.2d 911 (1975)).

2009In Hill v. Smith, 222 S.W.2d 207, 207-208 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949), the Court applied the family purpose doctrine to hold a mother liable when her child was driving her car, even though the father was considered the head of the family.

2009The Court quoted the justifications for the family purpose doctrine expressed in King, emphasizing the statement that “If owners of automobiles are made to understand that they will be held liable for injury to the person and property occasioned by their negligent operation by infants or others who are financially irresponsible, they will doubtless exercise a greater degree of care in selecting those who are permitted to go upon the public streets with such dangerous instrumentalities.” Id. at 208- 209.

2015Starr v. Hill, 353 S.W.3d 478, 481-82 (Tenn. 2011) (analyzing the family purpose doctrine within the context of the trial court‟s grant of summary judgment).

2015In considering whether the owner of a vehicle is a head of the driver‟s household under the family purpose doctrine, “appropriate factors to consider include whether there is a family relationship between the owner and the driver and whether the owner has a duty to support the driver.” Starr, 353 S.W.3d at 485-86 (“Our review of the common law in Tennessee and elsewhere reveals that the identification of a family member as a head of the household is primarily based on his or her family relationship and duty to support the driver rather than place of residency.”).

2015See Ali v. Fisher, 145 S.W.3d 557, 564 (Tenn. 2004) (holding that negligent entrustment does not create vicarious liability).

2011See, e.g., Griffin v. Pancoast, 257 N.C. 52 , 125 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1962) (noting that although “ownership presumptively indicates the right to control, ... one may in fact exercise control ... without in fact being the owner,” and that, under the family purpose doctrine, “[t]he test is not who owns the vehicle but control or the right to control”); Mortensen v. Knight, 81 Ariz. 325 , 305 P.2d 463, 468 (1956) (“[T]he family purpose doctrine ... rests not on the ownership of the vehicle but upon the control and use.”).

2011See, e.g., Griffin v. Pancoast, 257 N.C. 52 , 125 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1962) (noting that although “ownership presumptively indicates the right to control, ... one may in fact exercise control ... without in fact being the owner,” and that, under the family purpose doctrine, “[t]he test is not who owns the vehicle but control or the right to control”); Mortensen v. Knight, 81 Ariz. 325 , 305 P.2d 463, 468 (1956) (“[T]he family purpose doctrine ... rests not on the ownership of the vehicle but upon the control and use.”).

2011See, e.g., Griffin v. Pancoast, 257 N.C. 52 , 125 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1962) (noting that although “ownership presumptively indicates the right to control, ... one may in fact exercise control ... without in fact being the owner,” and that, under the family purpose doctrine, “[t]he test is not who owns the vehicle but control or the right to control”); Mortensen v. Knight, 81 Ariz. 325 , 305 P.2d 463, 468 (1956) (“[T]he family purpose doctrine ... rests not on the ownership of the vehicle but upon the control and use.”).

2011See, e.g., Griffin v. Pancoast, 257 N.C. 52 , 125 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1962) (noting that although “ownership presumptively indicates the right to control, ... one may in fact exercise control ... without in fact being the owner,” and that, under the family purpose doctrine, “[t]he test is not who owns the vehicle but control or the right to control”); Mortensen v. Knight, 81 Ariz. 325 , 305 P.2d 463, 468 (1956) (“[T]he family purpose doctrine ... rests not on the ownership of the vehicle but upon the control and use.”).

2011Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that the family purpose doctrine applied, stating that “a driver can be operating a vehicle for a family purpose ‘even if the driver is only using the automobile for his own pleasure or convenience.’ ” Id. at 831 (quoting Thurmon v. Sellers, 62 S.W.3d 145, 156 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001)); see also Calhoun v. Eaves, 114 Ga.App. 756 , 152 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1966) (noting that while it is essential that the vehicle be furnished by the head of the family for a family purpose, “[t]he vehicle may be furnished ... for the use of less than all members of the family”).

2011Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that the family purpose doctrine applied, stating that “a driver can be operating a vehicle for a family purpose ‘even if the driver is only using the automobile for his own pleasure or convenience.’ ” Id. at 831 (quoting Thurmon v. Sellers, 62 S.W.3d 145, 156 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001)); see also Calhoun v. Eaves, 114 Ga.App. 756 , 152 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1966) (noting that while it is essential that the vehicle be furnished by the head of the family for a family purpose, “[t]he vehicle may be furnished ... for the use of less than all members of the family”).