family purpose doctrine in Georgia

1996In Dixon , the Supreme Court held that a father who provided his child a car could be responsible under the family purpose doctrine, even though the child had disobeyed his father and let a friend drive, because at the time of the accident the child was in the car and “retain[ed] control, authority, and direction over it. . . .” Id. at 277 .

1991The family purpose doctrine states that “when an automobile is maintained by the owner for the use and convenience of his family, such owner is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having authority to drive the car while it is being used for a family purpose.” Phillips v. Dixon, 236 Ga. 271, 272 ( 223 SE2d 678 ) (1976); Quan v. Johnson, 190 Ga. App. 510 ( 379 SE2d 426 ) (1989).

1976Moreover, in Georgia, the family-purpose doctrine was originally conceived as a part of our case law in the landmark decision of Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275 ( 87 SE 10 ) (1915).

1976Moreover, in Georgia, the family-purpose doctrine was originally conceived as a part of our case law in the landmark decision of Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275 ( 87 SE 10 ) (1915).

1989We do not agree with appellants’ contention that a material fact question remains as to whether the Stallingses are liable under the family purpose doctrine because we find that principle inapplicable here. “[T]here are . . . four requirements for the application of the family purpose doctrine: (i) the owner must have given permission to a family member to drive the vehicle, (ii) the owner must have relinquished control of the vehicle to the family member, (iii) the family member must be in the vehicle, and (iv) the vehicle must be engaged in a family purpose.” Quattlebaum v. Wallace, 156 Ga.

1989We do not agree with appellants’ contention that a material fact question remains as to whether the Stallingses are liable under the family purpose doctrine because we find that principle inapplicable here. “[T]here are . . . four requirements for the application of the family purpose doctrine: (i) the owner must have given permission to a family member to drive the vehicle, (ii) the owner must have relinquished control of the vehicle to the family member, (iii) the family member must be in the vehicle, and (iv) the vehicle must be engaged in a family purpose.” Quattlebaum v. Wallace, 156 Ga.

1997Shank v. Phillips, 193 Ga. App. 393, 394 ( 388 SE2d 5 ); Murch v. Brown, 166 Ga. App. 538, 539 ( 304 SE2d 750 ).

1988See in this regard Murch v. Brown, 166 Ga. App. 538, 539 , supra; Keith v. Carter, 172 Ga. App. 588, 589 , supra; *663 and Buice v. White, 172 Ga. App. 634, 635 (2), supra. In Buice we stated: “ ‘The rules applicable to the family purpose doctrine are as follows: “To come within the application of the doctrine, the defendant must own the automobile, or at least have some recognized property interest in it or supply it, and he must have made it available for family use, rather than for use in his business.” ’ Finnocchio v. Lunsford, 129 Ga. App. 694 (2) ( 201 SE2d 1 ).

1988Ferguson v. Gurley, 218 Ga. 276 ( 127 SE2d 462 ).’ Finnocchio v. Lunsford, 129 Ga. App. 695 , supra. How do we determine whether a defendant has provided the automobile for the ‘pleasure, comfort or convenience’ of a family member? ‘ “In order to qualify as a provider under the family purpose doctrine one must be the principal mover, one who intends to provide for another or others the particular thing, the automobile, and takes steps on his own responsibility to see the consummation of the transaction, and contributes substantially of his own means toward that end without expectation of reimb

1988Ferguson v. Gurley, 218 Ga. 276 ( 127 SE2d 462 ).’ Finnocchio v. Lunsford, 129 Ga. App. 695 , supra. How do we determine whether a defendant has provided the automobile for the ‘pleasure, comfort or convenience’ of a family member? ‘ “In order to qualify as a provider under the family purpose doctrine one must be the principal mover, one who intends to provide for another or others the particular thing, the automobile, and takes steps on his own responsibility to see the consummation of the transaction, and contributes substantially of his own means toward that end without expectation of reimb

1988See in this regard Murch v. Brown, 166 Ga. App. 538, 539 , supra; Keith v. Carter, 172 Ga. App. 588, 589 , supra; *663 and Buice v. White, 172 Ga. App. 634, 635 (2), supra. In Buice we stated: “ ‘The rules applicable to the family purpose doctrine are as follows: “To come within the application of the doctrine, the defendant must own the automobile, or at least have some recognized property interest in it or supply it, and he must have made it available for family use, rather than for use in his business.” ’ Finnocchio v. Lunsford, 129 Ga. App. 694 (2) ( 201 SE2d 1 ).

1988See in this regard Murch v. Brown, 166 Ga. App. 538, 539 , supra; Keith v. Carter, 172 Ga. App. 588, 589 , supra; *663 and Buice v. White, 172 Ga. App. 634, 635 (2), supra. In Buice we stated: “ ‘The rules applicable to the family purpose doctrine are as follows: “To come within the application of the doctrine, the defendant must own the automobile, or at least have some recognized property interest in it or supply it, and he must have made it available for family use, rather than for use in his business.” ’ Finnocchio v. Lunsford, 129 Ga. App. 694 (2) ( 201 SE2d 1 ).

2022“The family purpose doctrine states that when an automobile is maintained by the owner for the use and convenience of his family, such owner is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having authority to drive the car while it is being used for a family purpose.” Bailey v. Butler, 199 Ga. App. 753, 754 ( 406 SE2d 97 ) (1991) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022“The family purpose doctrine states that when an automobile is maintained by the owner for the use and convenience of his family, such owner is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having authority to drive the car while it is being used for a family purpose.” Bailey v. Butler, 199 Ga. App. 753, 754 ( 406 SE2d 97 ) (1991) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019Likewise, in Walston , 213 Ga. App. 441 , 444 S.E.2d 855 , we held that the family purpose doctrine was inapplicable where the father was listed as a joint owner on the car title and co-signed the loan for the car, but his son was financially responsible for the vehicle and was the sole driver, and the father "did not attempt to exercise authority or control over the vehicle." Id. at 442 , 444 S.E.2d 855 .

2019Likewise, in Walston , 213 Ga. App. 441 , 444 S.E.2d 855 , we held that the family purpose doctrine was inapplicable where the father was listed as a joint owner on the car title and co-signed the loan for the car, but his son was financially responsible for the vehicle and was the sole driver, and the father "did not attempt to exercise authority or control over the vehicle." Id. at 442 , 444 S.E.2d 855 .

1962"In the jurisdictions which apply the family purpose doctrine to its fullest extent, it is held to impose liability on the father or head of the family who has supplied the vehicle, *280 notwithstanding it is being used at the time of injury by a member of the family exclusively for his own individual use or pleasure [citing, among others, Hubert v. Harpe, 181 Ga. 168 ( 182 SE 167 ) and Hexter v. Burgess, 52 Ga. App. 819 ( 184 SE 769 )] . . ." 60 CJS 1073, Motor Vehicles, § 433.

1962"In the jurisdictions which apply the family purpose doctrine to its fullest extent, it is held to impose liability on the father or head of the family who has supplied the vehicle, *280 notwithstanding it is being used at the time of injury by a member of the family exclusively for his own individual use or pleasure [citing, among others, Hubert v. Harpe, 181 Ga. 168 ( 182 SE 167 ) and Hexter v. Burgess, 52 Ga. App. 819 ( 184 SE 769 )] . . ." 60 CJS 1073, Motor Vehicles, § 433.

2020Moreover, in Keith v. Carter, 172 Ga. App. 588, 588 ( 323 SE2d 886 ) (1984), this Court considered the issue of ownership in the context of the family purpose doctrine in a case where a father had purchased a vehicle for his son as a gift, but retained title in his name because the son was a minor at the time of purchase.

2020Moreover, in Keith v. Carter, 172 Ga. App. 588, 588 ( 323 SE2d 886 ) (1984), this Court considered the issue of ownership in the context of the family purpose doctrine in a case where a father had purchased a vehicle for his son as a gift, but retained title in his name because the son was a minor at the time of purchase.

1987It has been often noted that the family purpose doctrine is “ ‘based squarely upon the relation of master and servant or principal and agent’ . . . , the child to whom a parent furnished a car for his *818 pleasure and convenience being deemed to occupy the position of a servant or agent of the parent.” Pritchett v. Williams, 115 Ga. App. 8, 9 ( 153 SE2d 639 ) (1967); Evans v. Caldwell, 184 Ga. 203, 204 ( 190 SE 582 ) (1937).

1987It has been often noted that the family purpose doctrine is “ ‘based squarely upon the relation of master and servant or principal and agent’ . . . , the child to whom a parent furnished a car for his *818 pleasure and convenience being deemed to occupy the position of a servant or agent of the parent.” Pritchett v. Williams, 115 Ga. App. 8, 9 ( 153 SE2d 639 ) (1967); Evans v. Caldwell, 184 Ga. 203, 204 ( 190 SE 582 ) (1937).

2019Id. at 389-390 , 221 S.E.2d 482 .

2019Id. at 389-390 , 221 S.E.2d 482 .

2022Mirza relies on Yim v. Carr, 349 Ga. App. 892, 896-897 (1) (a) ( 827 SE2d 685 ) (2019), where we found that the parents were not liable under the family purpose doctrine as a matter of law.

2020Based on our review of the record, we find that genuine issues of material fact remain under the family purpose doctrine, at the very least, on the issues of ownership and whether “[Paul] had the right to exercise such authority and control that it may be concluded that an agency relationship existed between [Paul] and [Tatum,]” Yim, 349 Ga. App. at 895 (1), and thus the trial court erred in ruling that the doctrine applied to the Guzman car as a matter of law.

2022To apply the family purpose doctrine to a given situation, four criteria must be met: (1) the owner[1] of the vehicle must have given permission to a family member to drive the vehicle; (2) the vehicle’s owner must have relinquished control of the vehicle to the family member; (3) the 1 Although the word “owner” is used here, the Supreme Court has clarified that “owner” in this context means “one who owns an auto, controls its use, has some property interest in it, or supplies it.” Tolbert v. Murrell, 253 Ga. 566, 568 (2) ( 322 SE2d 487 ) (1984).

2022To apply the family purpose doctrine to a given situation, four criteria must be met: (1) the owner[1] of the vehicle must have given permission to a family member to drive the vehicle; (2) the vehicle’s owner must have relinquished control of the vehicle to the family member; (3) the 1 Although the word “owner” is used here, the Supreme Court has clarified that “owner” in this context means “one who owns an auto, controls its use, has some property interest in it, or supplies it.” Tolbert v. Murrell, 253 Ga. 566, 568 (2) ( 322 SE2d 487 ) (1984).

2000Jackson v. Reed, 229 Ga. App. 433, 435 ( 494 SE2d 52 ) (1997); Greene v. Jenkins, 224 Ga. App. 640, 641-644 ( 481 SE2d 617 ) (1997).

2000Jackson v. Reed, 229 Ga. App. 433, 435 ( 494 SE2d 52 ) (1997); Greene v. Jenkins, 224 Ga. App. 640, 641-644 ( 481 SE2d 617 ) (1997).

1997The four conditions prescribe the parameters of the family purpose doctrine and when the test is to be applied, but the actual test is authority and control.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Wingard v. Brinson, 212 Ga. App. 640, 641 (1) ( 442 SE2d 485 ) (1994).

1997The four conditions prescribe the parameters of the family purpose doctrine and when the test is to be applied, but the actual test is authority and control.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Wingard v. Brinson, 212 Ga. App. 640, 641 (1) ( 442 SE2d 485 ) (1994).

1996See Young, supra. Decided November 19, 1996 Reconsideration denied December 4, 1996 Oliver, Maner & Gray, Inman G.

1995See Walston, supra; Bailey v. Butler, 199 Ga. App. 753 ( 406 SE2d 97 ) (1991); Keith v. Carter, 172 Ga. App. 588 ( 323 SE2d 886 ) (1984); compare Whitley v. Ditta, 209 Ga. App. 553, 555 (3) ( 434 SE2d 108 ) (1993); Murch, supra; Young v. Wooldridge, 187 Ga. App. 661, 663 (1) ( 371 SE2d 100 ) (1988).

1994(Cits.)’ [Cit.]” Finley v. Berman, 190 Ga. App. 692, 693 ( 379 SE2d 640 ).

1994(Cits.)’ [Cit.]” Finley v. Berman, 190 Ga. App. 692, 693 ( 379 SE2d 640 ).

2022However, “[t]he Justices [were] in disagreement as to the processes of reasoning by which [they] reach[ed] the ultimate conclusion.” Id. 5 In 1915, our Supreme Court adopted the family purpose doctrine, which states that a parent may be liable for the negligent actions of a child, where the child is driving a family-owned automobile for the comfort and pleasure of the family.

2022In Calhoun, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to address the applicability of the family purpose doctrine in light of its conclusion that the parent could not be held liable for the child’s bicycle accident. 197 Ga. at 703 .

1994This renders the family purpose doctrine inapplicable to impose vicarious liability on the owner of the vehicle. “[A] mere loan of the car by the [owner] to [a sibling who was not a family member of the same immediate household within the meaning of the family purpose doctrine] was in principle the same as if [s]he had loaned it to a friend to go on a mission solely for the benefit of the friend and would . . . make the [sibling] a mere bailee [for whose negligence the owner-bailor] would not be liable.” Raley v. Hatcher, 61 Ga. App. 846 (2) ( 7 SE2d 777 ). 2.

1994This renders the family purpose doctrine inapplicable to impose vicarious liability on the owner of the vehicle. “[A] mere loan of the car by the [owner] to [a sibling who was not a family member of the same immediate household within the meaning of the family purpose doctrine] was in principle the same as if [s]he had loaned it to a friend to go on a mission solely for the benefit of the friend and would . . . make the [sibling] a mere bailee [for whose negligence the owner-bailor] would not be liable.” Raley v. Hatcher, 61 Ga. App. 846 (2) ( 7 SE2d 777 ). 2.

1989The car is not being used by a trespasser without the knowledge and consent of the owner, as was condemned in Frankel [v. Cone, 214 Ga. 733 ( 107 SE2d 819 ) (1959)]. 4 In Georgia, the application of the family-purpose doctrine to boats is accomplished by OCGA § 51-1-21 (b), which provides as follows: The owner of a watercraft shall be liable for any tort caused by the operation of the watercraft, in the same manner and to the same degree as the owner of an automobile is liable for torts caused by its operation.

1989The car is not being used by a trespasser without the knowledge and consent of the owner, as was condemned in Frankel [v. Cone, 214 Ga. 733 ( 107 SE2d 819 ) (1959)]. 4 In Georgia, the application of the family-purpose doctrine to boats is accomplished by OCGA § 51-1-21 (b), which provides as follows: The owner of a watercraft shall be liable for any tort caused by the operation of the watercraft, in the same manner and to the same degree as the owner of an automobile is liable for torts caused by its operation.

1962See Grahl v. McMath, 59 Ga. App. 247 ( 200 SE 342 ); Hirsh v. Andrews, 81 Ga. App. 655 , supra; Marques v. Ross, 105 Ga. App. 133 , supra. In Hirsh v. Andrews, 81 Ga. App. 655, 658 , supra, the essential elements of the family-purpose doctrine were held to be: ". . . (1) the making available an automobile for family use, and (2) liability arising when the automobile so furnished is used within the scope of the purposes for which it was made available." With the above principles of law firmly in mind we must apply them to the facts in the instant case.

1962See Grahl v. McMath, 59 Ga. App. 247 ( 200 SE 342 ); Hirsh v. Andrews, 81 Ga. App. 655 , supra; Marques v. Ross, 105 Ga. App. 133 , supra. In Hirsh v. Andrews, 81 Ga. App. 655, 658 , supra, the essential elements of the family-purpose doctrine were held to be: ". . . (1) the making available an automobile for family use, and (2) liability arising when the automobile so furnished is used within the scope of the purposes for which it was made available." With the above principles of law firmly in mind we must apply them to the facts in the instant case.

2020Therefore, the family purpose doctrine “came into being, not through statute, but by judicial construction and interpretation,”8 to supply the requirement of agency9 in order to impose liability on a parent for damages to a third party caused by a child. 8 Harper v. Brown, 122 Ga. App. 316, 322 ( 176 SE2d 621 ) (1970) (Evans, J., dissenting).

2020Therefore, the family purpose doctrine “came into being, not through statute, but by judicial construction and interpretation,”8 to supply the requirement of agency9 in order to impose liability on a parent for damages to a third party caused by a child. 8 Harper v. Brown, 122 Ga. App. 316, 322 ( 176 SE2d 621 ) (1970) (Evans, J., dissenting).

2003Johnson, for appellee. 1 Wakefield, who owned the vehicle driven by Cardin, was sued under the family purpose doctrine. 2 181 Ga. App. 887 ( 354 SE2d 434 ) (1987). 3 185 Ga. App. 453 ( 364 SE2d 588 ) (1987). 4 Bellamy, supra. 5 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 888 (1). 6 (Citation omitted.) Id. 7 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976), p. 2336. 8 (Citations omitted.) Alexander v. Holmes, 85 Ga. App. 124, 128 (5) ( 68 SE2d 242 ) (1951). 9 Kilpatrick, supra at 455 (1) (refusal to give a Bellamy charge held reversible error). 10 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McDonald

2003Johnson, for appellee. 1 Wakefield, who owned the vehicle driven by Cardin, was sued under the family purpose doctrine. 2 181 Ga. App. 887 ( 354 SE2d 434 ) (1987). 3 185 Ga. App. 453 ( 364 SE2d 588 ) (1987). 4 Bellamy, supra. 5 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 888 (1). 6 (Citation omitted.) Id. 7 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976), p. 2336. 8 (Citations omitted.) Alexander v. Holmes, 85 Ga. App. 124, 128 (5) ( 68 SE2d 242 ) (1951). 9 Kilpatrick, supra at 455 (1) (refusal to give a Bellamy charge held reversible error). 10 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McDonald