family purpose doctrine in West Virginia

1981Similarly in Platt v. Gould, 26 Ariz.App. 315 , 548 P.2d 28 (1976), the family purpose doctrine was found not to apply where the daughter had reached majority, had moved from the family abode to her own home in another city, was employed and self-sufficient, and was driving the vehicle solely for her own purposes at the time of the accident.

1981Similarly in Platt v. Gould, 26 Ariz.App. 315 , 548 P.2d 28 (1976), the family purpose doctrine was found not to apply where the daughter had reached majority, had moved from the family abode to her own home in another city, was employed and self-sufficient, and was driving the vehicle solely for her own purposes at the time of the accident.

1981In Clemons v. Busby, 144 Ga.App. 207 , 240 S.E.2d 764 (1977), the Georgia court held the father was not liable under the family purpose doctrine where his son was emancipated, self-supporting, exercised exclusive control over the car, and did not reside in the family home.

1981In Clemons v. Busby, 144 Ga.App. 207 , 240 S.E.2d 764 (1977), the Georgia court held the father was not liable under the family purpose doctrine where his son was emancipated, self-supporting, exercised exclusive control over the car, and did not reside in the family home.

1981The court held the father was not liable under the family purpose doctrine, stating: “[I]t is our opinion that when a child leaves the family circle and establishes a home of his own he ceases to be a member of the family within the meaning of the family purpose doctrine, and when he uses his parents’ automobile with their consent and for his own pleasure he is a borrower of it and not an agent.” 221 P.2d at 469 .

1981The court held the father was not liable under the family purpose doctrine, stating: *888 "[I]t is our opinion that when a child leaves the family circle and establishes a home of his own he ceases to be a member of the family within the meaning of the family purpose doctrine, and when he uses his parents' automobile with their consent and for his own pleasure he is a borrower of it and not an agent." 221 P.2d at 469 .

1985In Bell v. West, 168 W.Va. 391 , 284 S.E.2d 885 (1981), this Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Ozie West from the action by refusing to extend liability to the father under the family purpose doctrine because of the attenuated connection between Kenny and Ozie West.

1985In Bell v. West, 168 W.Va. 391 , 284 S.E.2d 885 (1981), this Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Ozie West from the action by refusing to extend liability to the father under the family purpose doctrine because of the attenuated connection between Kenny and Ozie West.

1996Pt. 3, Lee v. Comer, 159 W.Va. 585 , 224 S.E.2d 721 (1976), we explained the family purpose doctrine is grounded on principles of agency or those of master and servant. 152 W.Va. at 336 , 162 S.E.2d at 925 .

1996Pt. 3, Lee v. Comer, 159 W.Va. 585 , 224 S.E.2d 721 (1976), we explained the family purpose doctrine is grounded on principles of agency or those of master and servant. 152 W.Va. at 336 , 162 S.E.2d at 925 .

1950Va. 710 , 111 S. E. 828 ; Aggleson v. Kendall, 92 W.

1935Va. 710 , 111 S. E. 828 ; Aggleson v. Kendall, 92 W.

2022Va. 569 , 425 S.E.2d 245 (1992) (“Where a valid named driver exclusion is present in an insured’s insurance policy pursuant to West Virginia Code § 33–6–31(a) (1982) and where a third party personal injury claim arises against the insured under a family purpose doctrine theory of liability from an automobile accident where the named excluded driver was operating the vehicle without the insured’s consent, the insured’s insurer need only provide the minimum mandatory liability coverage set forth in West Virginia Code § 17D–4–2 (1991).” (emphasis added)). 7 See Syl.

1992However, at issue is whether the family purpose doctrine will prevail over an unambiguous contractual agreement which contains a valid named driver exclusion. 6 The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia addressed this issue in McKenzie v. Federal Mutual Insurance Co., 393 F.Supp. 295 (S.D.W.Va.1975).

1992A wrongful death action was subsequently brought against the plaintiff alleging that the plaintiff was liable under the family purpose doctrine. 393 F.Supp. at 296-97 .

1992The Plaintiffs contend that this Court’s decision in Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 185 W.Va. 606 , 408 S.E.2d 358 (1991), involving liability insurance contracts, is applicable to the present case and that neither Erie nor State Farm should escape liability. 2 West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(a) (1982) 3 specifically provides that: No policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance, or of property damage liability insurance, covering liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle, shall be issued or delivered in this State to the owner of su

1992The Plaintiffs contend that this Court’s decision in Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 185 W.Va. 606 , 408 S.E.2d 358 (1991), involving liability insurance contracts, is applicable to the present case and that neither Erie nor State Farm should escape liability. 2 West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(a) (1982) 3 specifically provides that: No policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance, or of property damage liability insurance, covering liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle, shall be issued or delivered in this State to the owner of su

1992In syllabus point 4 of State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Youler, 183 W.Va. 556 , 396 S.E.2d 737 (1990) we held, in pertinent part: “W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b), as amended, on uninsured and under-insured motorist coverage, contemplates recovery, up to coverage limits, from one’s own insurer, of full compensation for damages not compensated by a negligent tort-feasor who at the time of the accident was an owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle.” Thus, the Plaintiffs can recover under their underinsurance coverage for damages in excess of the amounts provided by Erie.

1992In syllabus point 4 of State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Youler, 183 W.Va. 556 , 396 S.E.2d 737 (1990) we held, in pertinent part: “W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b), as amended, on uninsured and under-insured motorist coverage, contemplates recovery, up to coverage limits, from one’s own insurer, of full compensation for damages not compensated by a negligent tort-feasor who at the time of the accident was an owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle.” Thus, the Plaintiffs can recover under their underinsurance coverage for damages in excess of the amounts provided by Erie.

1982While courts in other jurisdictions have split on whether a driver’s contributory negligence bars recovery by the owner, e.g., Mertz v. Weibe, 180 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1970) (owner may recover); Pinaglia v. Beaulieu, 28 Conn. Supp. 90 , 250 A.2d 522 (1969) (owner may recover); Ustjanauskas v. Guiliano, 26 Conn. Supp. 387 , 225 A.2d 202 (1966) (owner may not recover); Russell v. Hamlett, 261 N.C. 603 , 135 S.E.2d 547 (1964) (owner may not recover), we find that the better-reasoned approach has been articulated by courts that have limited the family purpose doctrine to its traditional use as a plain

1982While courts in other jurisdictions have split on whether a driver’s contributory negligence bars recovery by the owner, e.g., Mertz v. Weibe, 180 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1970) (owner may recover); Pinaglia v. Beaulieu, 28 Conn. Supp. 90 , 250 A.2d 522 (1969) (owner may recover); Ustjanauskas v. Guiliano, 26 Conn. Supp. 387 , 225 A.2d 202 (1966) (owner may not recover); Russell v. Hamlett, 261 N.C. 603 , 135 S.E.2d 547 (1964) (owner may not recover), we find that the better-reasoned approach has been articulated by courts that have limited the family purpose doctrine to its traditional use as a plain

1982While courts in other jurisdictions have split on whether a driver’s contributory negligence bars recovery by the owner, e.g., Mertz v. Weibe, 180 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1970) (owner may recover); Pinaglia v. Beaulieu, 28 Conn. Supp. 90 , 250 A.2d 522 (1969) (owner may recover); Ustjanauskas v. Guiliano, 26 Conn. Supp. 387 , 225 A.2d 202 (1966) (owner may not recover); Russell v. Hamlett, 261 N.C. 603 , 135 S.E.2d 547 (1964) (owner may not recover), we find that the better-reasoned approach has been articulated by courts that have limited the family purpose doctrine to its traditional use as a plain

1982While courts in other jurisdictions have split on whether a driver’s contributory negligence bars recovery by the owner, e.g., Mertz v. Weibe, 180 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1970) (owner may recover); Pinaglia v. Beaulieu, 28 Conn. Supp. 90 , 250 A.2d 522 (1969) (owner may recover); Ustjanauskas v. Guiliano, 26 Conn. Supp. 387 , 225 A.2d 202 (1966) (owner may not recover); Russell v. Hamlett, 261 N.C. 603 , 135 S.E.2d 547 (1964) (owner may not recover), we find that the better-reasoned approach has been articulated by courts that have limited the family purpose doctrine to its traditional use as a plain

1982We reject any attempt to use the doctrine as a defense technique to impute a family member’s contributory negligence to the family car owner or a member of the family who as plaintiff is seeking to recover personal or property damages arising when a defendant’s automobile collides with a plaintiffs family purpose car. 458 P.2d at 619 . *89 In Wenisch v. Hoffmeister, 168 Ind. App. 247 , 342 N.E.2d 665 (1976), a case factually similar to the one before us, an Indiana Court of Appeals permitted the father-owner to bring a suit after an accident in which his son had been contributorily negligent.

1982While courts in other jurisdictions have split on whether a driver’s contributory negligence bars recovery by the owner, e.g., Mertz v. Weibe, 180 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1970) (owner may recover); Pinaglia v. Beaulieu, 28 Conn. Supp. 90 , 250 A.2d 522 (1969) (owner may recover); Ustjanauskas v. Guiliano, 26 Conn. Supp. 387 , 225 A.2d 202 (1966) (owner may not recover); Russell v. Hamlett, 261 N.C. 603 , 135 S.E.2d 547 (1964) (owner may not recover), we find that the better-reasoned approach has been articulated by courts that have limited the family purpose doctrine to its traditional use as a plain

1982We reject any attempt to use the doctrine as a defense technique to impute a family member’s contributory negligence to the family car owner or a member of the family who as plaintiff is seeking to recover personal or property damages arising when a defendant’s automobile collides with a plaintiffs family purpose car. 458 P.2d at 619 . *89 In Wenisch v. Hoffmeister, 168 Ind. App. 247 , 342 N.E.2d 665 (1976), a case factually similar to the one before us, an Indiana Court of Appeals permitted the father-owner to bring a suit after an accident in which his son had been contributorily negligent.

1982We reject any attempt to use the doctrine as a defense technique to impute a family member’s contributory negligence to the family car owner or a member of the family who as plaintiff is seeking to recover personal or property damages arising when a defendant’s automobile collides with a plaintiffs family purpose car. 458 P.2d at 619 . *89 In Wenisch v. Hoffmeister, 168 Ind. App. 247 , 342 N.E.2d 665 (1976), a case factually similar to the one before us, an Indiana Court of Appeals permitted the father-owner to bring a suit after an accident in which his son had been contributorily negligent.

1982While courts in other jurisdictions have split on whether a driver’s contributory negligence bars recovery by the owner, e.g., Mertz v. Weibe, 180 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1970) (owner may recover); Pinaglia v. Beaulieu, 28 Conn. Supp. 90 , 250 A.2d 522 (1969) (owner may recover); Ustjanauskas v. Guiliano, 26 Conn. Supp. 387 , 225 A.2d 202 (1966) (owner may not recover); Russell v. Hamlett, 261 N.C. 603 , 135 S.E.2d 547 (1964) (owner may not recover), we find that the better-reasoned approach has been articulated by courts that have limited the family purpose doctrine to its traditional use as a plain

1982While courts in other jurisdictions have split on whether a driver’s contributory negligence bars recovery by the owner, e.g., Mertz v. Weibe, 180 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1970) (owner may recover); Pinaglia v. Beaulieu, 28 Conn. Supp. 90 , 250 A.2d 522 (1969) (owner may recover); Ustjanauskas v. Guiliano, 26 Conn. Supp. 387 , 225 A.2d 202 (1966) (owner may not recover); Russell v. Hamlett, 261 N.C. 603 , 135 S.E.2d 547 (1964) (owner may not recover), we find that the better-reasoned approach has been articulated by courts that have limited the family purpose doctrine to its traditional use as a plain

1981The rule applicable here was set forth in Syllabus Point 1 of George v. Blosser, 157 W.Va. 811 , 204 S.E.2d 567 (1974): "A movant is entitled to summary judgment where the facts established show a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and show affirmatively that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances." Hanks v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 153 W.Va. 834 , 172 S.E.2d 816 (1970).

1981The rule applicable here was set forth in Syllabus Point 1 of George v. Blosser, 157 W.Va. 811 , 204 S.E.2d 567 (1974): "A movant is entitled to summary judgment where the facts established show a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and show affirmatively that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances." Hanks v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 153 W.Va. 834 , 172 S.E.2d 816 (1970).

1981See also, Bryan v. Schatz, 77 N.D. 9 , 39 N.W.2d 435 (1949); Montgomery v. Hyatt, 46 Wash.2d 468 , 282 P.2d 277 (1955); see generally, Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1966).

1981See also, Bryan v. Schatz, 77 N.D. 9 , 39 N.W.2d 435 (1949); Montgomery v. Hyatt, 46 Wash.2d 468 , 282 P.2d 277 (1955); see generally, Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1966).

1981In Wyant v. Phillips, 116 W.Va. 207 , 179 S.E. 303 (1935), the Court held a wife liable for the negligent operation of an automobile by her husband where she owned the car and he provided for its operation and maintenance.

1981In Wyant v. Phillips, 116 W.Va. 207 , 179 S.E. 303 (1935), the Court held a wife liable for the negligent operation of an automobile by her husband where she owned the car and he provided for its operation and maintenance.

1981The rule applicable here was set forth in Syllabus Point 1 of George v. Blosser, 157 W.Va. 811 , 204 S.E.2d 567 (1974): "A movant is entitled to summary judgment where the facts established show a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and show affirmatively that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances." Hanks v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 153 W.Va. 834 , 172 S.E.2d 816 (1970).

1981The rule applicable here was set forth in Syllabus Point 1 of George v. Blosser, 157 W.Va. 811 , 204 S.E.2d 567 (1974): "A movant is entitled to summary judgment where the facts established show a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and show affirmatively that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances." Hanks v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 153 W.Va. 834 , 172 S.E.2d 816 (1970).

1968Eagon v. Woolard, 122 W.

1940The case of Hackley v. Robey, 170 Va. 55 , 195 S. E. 689 , is a direct repudiation of the family purpose doctrine.

1940The case of Hackley v. Robey, 170 Va. 55 , 195 S. E. 689 , is a direct repudiation of the family purpose doctrine.

1935In Steele v. Age’s Administrator, 233 Ky. 714 , 26 S. W. (2d) 563 , the wife, as owner of a family purpose car, was held liable for its negligent operation by her son.

1935In Steele v. Age’s Administrator, 233 Ky. 714 , 26 S. W. (2d) 563 , the wife, as owner of a family purpose car, was held liable for its negligent operation by her son.