family purpose doctrine in Kentucky

1999There are exceptions to the common law rule, e.g., where the permissive user was operating the vehicle as the agent or employee of the owner at the time of the accident, Hunt v. Whitlock’s Adm’r, 259 Ky. 286 , 82 S.W.2d 364 (1935); or where the vehicle was furnished to the operator pursuant to the family purpose doctrine, Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386 , 144 S.W. 52 (1912); or where the owner consented to its operation by another while retaining possession and control of the vehicle, e.g. as a passenger, McCulloch’s Adm’r v. Abell’s Adm’r, 272 Ky. 756 , 115 S.W.2d 386 (1938).

1999There are exceptions to the common law rule, e.g., where the permissive user was operating the vehicle as the agent or employee of the owner at the time of the accident, Hunt v. Whitlock’s Adm’r, 259 Ky. 286 , 82 S.W.2d 364 (1935); or where the vehicle was furnished to the operator pursuant to the family purpose doctrine, Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386 , 144 S.W. 52 (1912); or where the owner consented to its operation by another while retaining possession and control of the vehicle, e.g. as a passenger, McCulloch’s Adm’r v. Abell’s Adm’r, 272 Ky. 756 , 115 S.W.2d 386 (1938).

1975But where the parent is under no such moral or legal duty, and where the child is an adult and has assumed the station in life in which he relies upon his own abilities, the lending of a machine by the father to the son in order that the latter may take a pleasure trip of his own does not establish any relationship of principal and agent or master and servant, for in truth the adult son when so using the machine is not discharging any functions of the parent or carrying out any affair or business of the parent. * * * Although our decisions from time to time have acknowledged other rationales a

1975But where the parent is under no such moral or legal duty, and where the child is an adult and has assumed the station in life in which he relies upon his own abilities, the lending of a machine by the father to the son in order that the latter may take a pleasure trip of his own does not establish any relationship of principal and agent or master and servant, for in truth the adult son when so using the machine is not discharging any functions of the parent or carrying out any affair or business of the parent. * * * Although our decisions from time to time have acknowledged other rationales a

1975Taylor v. Rawls, Ky., 274 S.W.2d 50 (1954); Farmer v. Stidham, Ky., 439 S. W.2d 71 (1969).

1958In his memorandum opinion the trial judge pointed out that under the case of Taylor v. Rawls, Ky., 274 S.W.2d 50 , four factors must be established to recover under the family purpose doctrine.

1999There are exceptions to the common law rule, e.g., where the permissive user was operating the vehicle as the agent or employee of the owner at the time of the accident, Hunt v. Whitlock's Adm'r, 259 Ky. 286 , 82 S.W.2d 364 (1935); or where the vehicle was furnished to the operator pursuant to the family purpose doctrine, Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386 , 144 S.W. 52 (1912); or where the owner consented to its operation by another while retaining *9 possession and control of the vehicle, e.g. as a passenger, McCulloch's Adm'r v. Abell's Adm'r, 272 Ky. 756 , 115 S.W.2d 386 (1938).

1999There are exceptions to the common law rule, e.g., where the permissive user was operating the vehicle as the agent or employee of the owner at the time of the accident, Hunt v. Whitlock’s Adm’r, 259 Ky. 286 , 82 S.W.2d 364 (1935); or where the vehicle was furnished to the operator pursuant to the family purpose doctrine, Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386 , 144 S.W. 52 (1912); or where the owner consented to its operation by another while retaining possession and control of the vehicle, e.g. as a passenger, McCulloch’s Adm’r v. Abell’s Adm’r, 272 Ky. 756 , 115 S.W.2d 386 (1938).

1999The owner can also be held hable for the negligence of a permittee of his agent, servant, or family member, if the agent, servant or family member retains possession and control of the vehicle while it is being operated by the second permittee, Thixton v. Palmer, 210 Ky. 838 , 276 S.W. 971 (1925), or if the second permittee is also acting as the agent or servant of the owner.

1999The owner can also be held hable for the negligence of a permittee of his agent, servant, or family member, if the agent, servant or family member retains possession and control of the vehicle while it is being operated by the second permittee, Thixton v. Palmer, 210 Ky. 838 , 276 S.W. 971 (1925), or if the second permittee is also acting as the agent or servant of the owner.

1999There are exceptions to the common law rule, e.g., where the permissive user was operating the vehicle as the agent or employee of the owner at the time of the accident, Hunt v. Whitlock’s Adm’r, 259 Ky. 286 , 82 S.W.2d 364 (1935); or where the vehicle was furnished to the operator pursuant to the family purpose doctrine, Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386 , 144 S.W. 52 (1912); or where the owner consented to its operation by another while retaining possession and control of the vehicle, e.g. as a passenger, McCulloch’s Adm’r v. Abell’s Adm’r, 272 Ky. 756 , 115 S.W.2d 386 (1938).

1999There are exceptions to the common law rule, e.g., where the permissive user was operating the vehicle as the agent or employee of the owner at the time of the accident, Hunt v. Whitlock’s Adm’r, 259 Ky. 286 , 82 S.W.2d 364 (1935); or where the vehicle was furnished to the operator pursuant to the family purpose doctrine, Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386 , 144 S.W. 52 (1912); or where the owner consented to its operation by another while retaining possession and control of the vehicle, e.g. as a passenger, McCulloch’s Adm’r v. Abell’s Adm’r, 272 Ky. 756 , 115 S.W.2d 386 (1938).

1975Taylor v. Rawls, Ky., 274 S.W.2d 50 (1954); Farmer v. Stidham, Ky., 439 S. W.2d 71 (1969).

1975But where the parent is under no such moral or legal duty, and where the child is an adult and has assumed the station in life in which he relies upon his own abilities, the lending of a machine by the father to the son in order that the latter may take a pleasure trip of his own does not establish any relationship of principal and agent or master and servant, for in truth the adult son when so using the machine is not discharging any functions of the parent or carrying out any affair or business of the parent. * * * Although our decisions from time to time have acknowledged other rationales a

1960Baldwin v. Wiggins, supra. (Though the form of instruction No. 5 in § 384 of Stanley’s Instruction to Juries is correct as to joint tort-feasors it is erroneous as to master and servant.) Hence it would not apply in the case of imputed liability under the family purpose doctrine.

1960The acts of Preston and Tom Roy Daniel, even though they be considered as separate and independent rather than joint, concurred in injuring the appellee (cf. Murphy v. Taxicabs of Louisville, Inc., Ky., 330 S.W.2d 395 ), and it would therefore have been correct to instruct simply that if the jury should find against both of them the award might be made in the form of a single sum jointly or different sums separately.

1958She relies upon the case of Rutherford v. Smith, 284 Ky. 592 , 145 S.W.2d 533 , where we held a grandmother, who stood in loco parentis, liable for her grandson’s negligent operation of an automobile.

1958She relies upon the case of Rutherford v. Smith, 284 Ky. 592 , 145 S.W.2d 533 , where we held a grandmother, who stood in loco parentis, liable for her grandson’s negligent operation of an automobile.

1958Although the courts have used some principal and agent analogies in working out the family purpose doctrine, the doctrine is not really based on principles of agency, but rather on “justice or supposed necessity,” McNamara v. Prather, 277 Ky. 754 , 127 S.W.2d 160, 161 , or “humanitarian principles designed to protect the public,” Richardson v. True, Ky., 259 S.W.2d 70, 71 .

1958Although the courts have used some principal and agent analogies in working out the family purpose doctrine, the doctrine is not really based on principles of agency, but rather on “justice or supposed necessity,” McNamara v. Prather, 277 Ky. 754 , 127 S.W.2d 160, 161 , or “humanitarian principles designed to protect the public,” Richardson v. True, Ky., 259 S.W.2d 70, 71 .

1958To hold otherwise would, as said in Turner v. Hall’s Adm’x, Ky., 252 S.W. 2d 30 , destroy the purpose of the doctrine.

1948Beginning with Bradley v. Schmidt, 223 Ky. 784 , 4 S. W. 2d 703 , 57 A. L.

1948Beginning with Bradley v. Schmidt, 223 Ky. 784 , 4 S. W. 2d 703 , 57 A. L.

1944United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hall, supra; Randig v. O’Hara, 123 Pa. Super. 251 , 187 A. 83 .

1944United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hall, supra; Randig v. O’Hara, 123 Pa. Super. 251 , 187 A. 83 .

1941Our opinion on the first appeal, which recites the facts, is reported in 261 Ky. 810 , 88 S. W. (2d) 926 .

1941Our opinion on the first appeal, which recites the facts, is reported in 261 Ky. 810 , 88 S. W. (2d) 926 .

1939In Steele v. Age’s Adm’x, 233 Ky. 714 , 26 S. W. (2d) 563 , it was held that the family purpose doctrine was applicable to the mother where she, though married, owned the car and maintained it for general use, pleasure, and convenience of members of her family.

1939In Steele v. Age’s Adm’x, 233 Ky. 714 , 26 S. W. (2d) 563 , it was held that the family purpose doctrine was applicable to the mother where she, though married, owned the car and maintained it for general use, pleasure, and convenience of members of her family.

1934Corp., 240 Ky. 673 , 42 S. W. [2d] 916.” In Rauckhorst v. Kraut, the principle is stated that for a head of a family to be responsible for the negligence of a member of a family in the operation of an automobile, under the family purpose doctrine, operated at the time of the accident, it must be operated within the scope of the family purpose.

1934In Beard v. Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 133 , 164 S. W. 319 , 50 L.

1929J. 1331; Haunert v. Speier, 214 Ky. 46 , 281 S. W. 998 .

1929J. 1331; Haunert v. Speier, 214 Ky. 46 , 281 S. W. 998 .

1928As we said in the case of Rauckhorst v. Kraut, 216 Ky. 323 , 287 S. W. 895 , learned commentators have pointed out the difficulty in arriving at a true basis for the family purpose doctrine.

1928As we said in the case of Rauckhorst v. Kraut, 216 Ky. 323 , 287 S. W. 895 , learned commentators have pointed out the difficulty in arriving at a true basis for the family purpose doctrine.