family purpose doctrine in South Carolina

2013Basically, under this doctrine, where the head of the family owns, furnishes and maintains a vehicle for the general use, pleasure and convenience of the family, he is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having general authority to drive it while the vehicle is being so used.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); but see Lucht v. Youngblood, 266 S.C. 127, 133 , 221 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1976) (affirming the trial court’s application of the family purpose doctrine, and stating, “Further, the testimony is uncontradicted that the boy was seventeen years old and a student living at ho

2013Basically, under this doctrine, where the head of the family owns, furnishes and maintains a vehicle for the general use, pleasure and convenience of the family, he is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having general authority to drive it while the vehicle is being so used.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); but see Lucht v. Youngblood, 266 S.C. 127, 133 , 221 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1976) (affirming the trial court’s application of the family purpose doctrine, and stating, “Further, the testimony is uncontradicted that the boy was seventeen years old and a student living at ho

2008See Thompson v. Michael, 315 S.C. 268, 273 , 433 S.E.2d 853, 856 (1993) (“Since there is evidence the car was not provided by [the father who is the title-owner] for the general use and convenience of the family but rather was a gift to [the driver’s sister], a question of fact exists whether [the father] is liable under the family purpose doctrine.”).

2008See Thompson v. Michael, 315 S.C. 268, 273 , 433 S.E.2d 853, 856 (1993) (“Since there is evidence the car was not provided by [the father who is the title-owner] for the general use and convenience of the family but rather was a gift to [the driver’s sister], a question of fact exists whether [the father] is liable under the family purpose doctrine.”).

2013Id. at 477-78, 129 S.E.2d at 132 (remanding for entry of judgment in favor of the defendant); see also Lollar v. Dewitt, 255 S.C. 452, 456 , 179 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971) (“The family purpose doctrine has been adopted in this state.

2013See Davis, 97 S.C. at 176 , 81 S.E. at 487 (noting that the father provided the vehicle for the “health and pleasure,” of his family); Porter v. Hardee, 241 S.C. at 477 , 129 S.E.2d at 132 (denying liability under the family purpose doctrine where the plaintiff could not establish that defendant provided the vehicle for “general family purposes”); Lol lar, 255 S.C. at 456 , 179 S.E.2d at 608 (“Basically, under this doctrine, where the head of the family, owns, furnishes, and maintains a vehicle for the general use, pleasure, and convenience of the family, he is liable for the negligence of a m

2013Furthermore, “[t]he rationale of the family purpose doctrine is that it serves to place financial responsibility upon the head of the family who is more likely to respond in damages when the family vehicle is used negligently by a person without sufficient assets of his own.” Lollar v. Dewitt, 255 S.C. 452, 456 , 179 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971).

2013Furthermore, “[t]he rationale of the family purpose doctrine is that it serves to place financial responsibility upon the head of the family who is more likely to respond in damages when the family vehicle is used negligently by a person without sufficient assets of his own.” Lollar v. Dewitt, 255 S.C. 452, 456 , 179 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971).

2013The family purpose doctrine, which arises from the law of agency, is derived from the notion that one “who has made it his business to furnish a car for the use of his family is liable as principal or master when such business is being carried out by a family member using the vehicle for its intended purpose, the family member thereby filling the role of agent or servant.” Campbell v. Paschal, 290 S.C. 1, 8 , 347 S.E.2d 892, 897 (Ct.App.1986) (internal citation omitted).

2013The family purpose doctrine, which arises from the law of agency, is derived from the notion that one “who has made it his business to furnish a car for the use of his family is liable as principal or master when such business is being carried out by a family member using the vehicle for its intended purpose, the family member thereby filling the role of agent or servant.” Campbell v. Paschal, 290 S.C. 1, 8 , 347 S.E.2d 892, 897 (Ct.App.1986) (internal citation omitted).

2013Evans v. Stewart, 370 S.C. 522, 527 , 636 S.E.2d 632, 635 (Ct.App.2006).

2013Evans v. Stewart, 370 S.C. 522, 527 , 636 S.E.2d 632, 635 (Ct.App.2006).

2013In Davis v. Littlefield, 97 S.C. 171 , 81 S.E. 487 (1914), this Court adopted the family purpose doctrine.

2013In Davis v. Littlefield, 97 S.C. 171 , 81 S.E. 487 (1914), this Court adopted the family purpose doctrine.

2013In Player v. Thompson, 259 S.C. 600 , 193 S.E.2d 531 (1972), minor Diane Player was injured in a one-car automobile collision with a mailbox and fence while a guest passenger in an automobile driven by Nancy Carder, a minor, and owned by Bobby and Geraldine Thompson (collectively, the Thompsons).

2013In Player v. Thompson, 259 S.C. 600 , 193 S.E.2d 531 (1972), minor Diane Player was injured in a one-car automobile collision with a mailbox and fence while a guest passenger in an automobile driven by Nancy Carder, a minor, and owned by Bobby and Geraldine Thompson (collectively, the Thompsons).

1986Norwood v. Parlemos, 230 S. C. 207, 95 S. E. (2d) 168 (1956).

1971Burbage v. Curry, 127 S. C. 349, 121 S. E. 267 , and Norwood, v. Parthemos, 230 S. C. 207, 95 S. E. (2d) 168 .

2013Father relies on Jordan v. Payton, 305 S.C. 537 , 409 S.E.2d 793 (Ct.App.1991), for the proposition that his liability is indivisible from Son’s liability In Jordan , the plaintiff was injured when a minor lost control of his vehicle and struck her house, and she sued the minor and his legal guardian based on the family purpose doctrine.

2013Father relies on Jordan v. Payton, 305 S.C. 537 , 409 S.E.2d 793 (Ct.App.1991), for the proposition that his liability is indivisible from Son’s liability In Jordan , the plaintiff was injured when a minor lost control of his vehicle and struck her house, and she sued the minor and his legal guardian based on the family purpose doctrine.

2013Id. at 539 , 409 S.E.2d at 794 (citation omitted); see also Unisun Ins. v. Hawkins, 342 S.C. 537, 543-44 , 537 S.E.2d 559, 562-63 (Ct.App.2000), cert. dismissed, 350 S.C. 6 , 564 S.E.2d 676 (2002) (“The court ... held that even had Unisun properly pled a cause of action under [the family purpose doctrine] Unisun’s recovery was barred because the Hawkinses’ liability was derivative of Bruce’s.

2013Id. at 539 , 409 S.E.2d at 794 (citation omitted); see also Unisun Ins. v. Hawkins, 342 S.C. 537, 543-44 , 537 S.E.2d 559, 562-63 (Ct.App.2000), cert. dismissed, 350 S.C. 6 , 564 S.E.2d 676 (2002) (“The court ... held that even had Unisun properly pled a cause of action under [the family purpose doctrine] Unisun’s recovery was barred because the Hawkinses’ liability was derivative of Bruce’s.

2013Id. at 539 , 409 S.E.2d at 794 (citation omitted); see also Unisun Ins. v. Hawkins, 342 S.C. 537, 543-44 , 537 S.E.2d 559, 562-63 (Ct.App.2000), cert. dismissed, 350 S.C. 6 , 564 S.E.2d 676 (2002) (“The court ... held that even had Unisun properly pled a cause of action under [the family purpose doctrine] Unisun’s recovery was barred because the Hawkinses’ liability was derivative of Bruce’s.

2013Id. at 539 , 409 S.E.2d at 794 (citation omitted); see also Unisun Ins. v. Hawkins, 342 S.C. 537, 543-44 , 537 S.E.2d 559, 562-63 (Ct.App.2000), cert. dismissed, 350 S.C. 6 , 564 S.E.2d 676 (2002) (“The court ... held that even had Unisun properly pled a cause of action under [the family purpose doctrine] Unisun’s recovery was barred because the Hawkinses’ liability was derivative of Bruce’s.

2013Only a limited number of jurisdictions have adopted the family purpose doctrine. 3 See Jacobson v. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 430 , 743 P.2d 410 , 414 n. 1 (Ct.App.1987) (noting that only Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia have adopted the family purpose doctrine).

2013Only a limited number of jurisdictions have adopted the family purpose doctrine. 3 See Jacobson v. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 430 , 743 P.2d 410 , 414 n. 1 (Ct.App.1987) (noting that only Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia have adopted the family purpose doctrine).

2013Ray v. Porter, 464 F.2d 452, 455 (6th Cir.1972). .

2013Reid v. Swindler, 249 S.C. 483, 496 , 154 S.E.2d 910, 916 (1967).

2013Reid v. Swindler, 249 S.C. 483, 496 , 154 S.E.2d 910, 916 (1967).

1994Mears Corp., 312 N.C. 749 , 325 S.E. (2d) 223 (1985); See Brown v. Ward, 221 N.C. 344 , 20 S.E. (2d) 324, 326 (1942) (“It is accepted law that the relationship of lessor and lessee is not that of principal and agent.”) Further, “the non-present owner of a vehicle incurs liability under only the family purpose doctrine, negligent entrustment or respondeat superior; . . . permissive [use] alone will not suffice.” Kline v. Wheels by Kinney, Inc., 464 F. (2d) 184, 185-86 (4th Cir. 1972); see id.

1994Mears Corp., 312 N.C. 749 , 325 S.E. (2d) 223 (1985); See Brown v. Ward, 221 N.C. 344 , 20 S.E. (2d) 324, 326 (1942) (“It is accepted law that the relationship of lessor and lessee is not that of principal and agent.”) Further, “the non-present owner of a vehicle incurs liability under only the family purpose doctrine, negligent entrustment or respondeat superior; . . . permissive [use] alone will not suffice.” Kline v. Wheels by Kinney, Inc., 464 F. (2d) 184, 185-86 (4th Cir. 1972); see id.