inappropriate standard in California

2020We conclude the trial court did not err. 4 We do not summarize Bay’s testimony because Tammy does not challenge this finding. 23 A The Trial Court Applied The Correct Legal Standard Tammy argues the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard regarding mental capacity because the trial court failed to “undertake the analysis called for under Probate Code Section 812” and mistakenly relied on section 6100.5 when Lintz “specifically holds that Probate Code Section 6100.5 is an inappropriate standard for assessing mental capacity related to a trust, or trust amendment that is more complex th

2020We conclude the trial court did not err. 5 We do not summarize Bay’s testimony because Tammy does not challenge this finding. 23 A The Trial Court Applied The Correct Legal Standard Tammy argues the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard regarding mental capacity because the trial court failed to “undertake the analysis called for under Probate Code Section 812” and mistakenly relied on section 6100.5 when Lintz “specifically holds that Probate Code Section 6100.5 is an inappropriate standard for assessing mental capacity related to a trust, or trust amendment that is more complex th

2025(People v. Long (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 865, 872 .) Moreover, contrary to defendant’s assertion that his right to a fair trial was violated, “[t]he omission of an inappropriate instruction does not violate a defendant’s rights to due process and to present a defense.” (Ibid.) Because the blacking out of the instruction did not result in a miscarriage of justice, the contention is forfeited.

2020The majority casts this case as one in which the trial court improperly denied Ms. Best the right to represent herself based on the court’s purported assessment of her “ignorance of legal procedure and language.” (Maj. opn. at p. 14.) The majority deems this an inappropriate inquiry because “technical legal knowledge is irrelevant to whether [a defendant] is competent to waive the right to counsel.” (Maj. opn. at p. 11.) In my view, review of the record demonstrates that the trial judge was not focused on testing Ms. Best’s technical legal knowledge, but was instead appropriately concerned wit

2019(See ibid. [lamenting the adoption of an inappropriate standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a jury trial based on appellate decisions employing overbroad language].) First, Gann, McIntosh, and Byram all repeat the questionable statement that courts cannot presume prejudice from denial of the right to a jury trial because we assume a party had the benefit of a fair and impartial court trial.

2019(See Gann, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1704 ; McIntosh, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 363 ; Byram, at p. 653.) This assumption, however, arises from cases that were tried to a jury instead of the court after the plaintiffs had waived their right to a jury trial.

2019(See Gann, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1704 ; McIntosh, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 363 ; Byram, at p. 653.) This assumption, however, arises from cases that were tried to a jury instead of the court after the plaintiffs had waived their right to a jury trial.

2015(People v. Prock (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 812, 821 ; Strickland, at pp. 687- 690.) Turning to the second jury note, we reject Larios’s assertion that the court should have responded with an unequivocal no.

2014(Id. at p. 161.) A court only abuses its discretion in declining to strike a prior conviction under limited circumstances, because the law creates a “strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 .) An abuse of discretion can occur if the court is unaware of its discretion to dismiss a prior strike, or if it considered impermissible factors when declining to dismiss. 4 Here there is nothing to indicate the trial court considered inappropriate factors when it declined to dismiss his prior

2013(See, e.g., Mateel, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 21–24 [court rejected defendant’s attempt to hold a plaintiff to an inappropriate standard of testing for lead]; Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333 , 364–368 (Baxter) [court rejected attempt by OEHHA to require alleged violator to prove affirmative defense by clear and convincing evidence]; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1278–1285 [court rejected an attempt by potential violators to remove a chemical from the list by applying an overly strict interpre

2013(See, e.g., Mateel, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 21–24 [court rejected defendant’s attempt to hold a plaintiff to an inappropriate standard of testing for lead]; Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333 , 364–368 (Baxter) [court rejected attempt by OEHHA to require alleged violator to prove affirmative defense by clear and convincing evidence]; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1278–1285 [court rejected an attempt by potential violators to remove a chemical from the list by applying an overly strict interpre

2013(See, e.g., Mateel, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 21–24 [court rejected defendant’s attempt to hold a plaintiff to an inappropriate standard of testing for lead]; Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333 , 364–368 (Baxter) [court rejected attempt by OEHHA to require alleged violator to prove affirmative defense by clear and convincing evidence]; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1278–1285 [court rejected an attempt by potential violators to remove a chemical from the list by applying an overly strict interpre

2013(See, e.g., Mateel, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 21–24 [court rejected defendant’s attempt to hold a plaintiff to an inappropriate standard of testing for lead]; Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333 , 364–368 (Baxter) [court rejected attempt by OEHHA to require alleged violator to prove affirmative defense by clear and convincing evidence]; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1278–1285 [court rejected an attempt by potential violators to remove a chemical from the list by applying an overly strict interpre

1988We held, however, that the court's refusal to delete the inappropriate factors from the instruction and give a properly tailored instruction was error. ( Id., at p. 159.) We found the error harmless because the court gave CALJIC Nos. 2.20 and 2.91, but declared, "In the future, the trial courts should consider and give appropriate instructions involving reasonable doubt and eyewitness identification." ( Id., at pp. 159-160.) We stated, "it is error to refuse to give an instruction requested by a defendant which `directs attention to evidence from ... which a reasonable doubt of guilt could be

1988(Id., at p. 159.) We found the error harmless because the court gave CALJIC Nos. 2.20 and 2.91, but declared, “In the future, the trial courts should consider and give appropriate instructions involving reasonable doubt and eyewitness identification.” (Id., at pp. 159-160.) We stated, “it is error to refuse to give an instruction requested by a defendant which ‘directs attention to evidence from . . . which a reasonable doubt of guilt could be engendered.’ (People v. Sears [supra] 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ].) This applies with equal force to a refusal to give a reque

1988(E.g., People v. Sequeira (1981) 126 Cal. App.3d 1, 17-18 [ 179 Cal. Rptr. 249 ].) Beginning with People v. West (1983) 139 Cal. App.3d 606 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 36 ], however, the Courts of Appeal have generally held it error, in appropriate cases, to refuse an instruction listing the factors the jury may consider in evaluating eyewitness identification testimony.

1988(E.g., People v. Sequeira (1981) 126 Cal. App.3d 1, 17-18 [ 179 Cal. Rptr. 249 ].) Beginning with People v. West (1983) 139 Cal. App.3d 606 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 36 ], however, the Courts of Appeal have generally held it error, in appropriate cases, to refuse an instruction listing the factors the jury may consider in evaluating eyewitness identification testimony.

1987Moreover, I believe the trial court was correct in its reading and application of the Phillips and Riley cases ( Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts (1985) 472 U.S. 797 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 628 , 105 S.Ct. 2965 ]; Riley v. Fitzgerald (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 871 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 889 ].) In fact, the Phillips case itself serves to demonstrate there is a conflict between California and certain other states on the specific matter of the rates of interest allowed by their laws (see Cal. Const., art.

1987Moreover, I believe the trial court was correct in its reading and application of the Phillips and Riley cases ( Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts (1985) 472 U.S. 797 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 628 , 105 S.Ct. 2965 ]; Riley v. Fitzgerald (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 871 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 889 ].) In fact, the Phillips case itself serves to demonstrate there is a conflict between California and certain other states on the specific matter of the rates of interest allowed by their laws (see Cal. Const., art.

1987Moreover, I believe the trial court was correct in its reading and application of the Phillips and Riley cases ( Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts (1985) 472 U.S. 797 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 628 , 105 S.Ct. 2965 ]; Riley v. Fitzgerald (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 871 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 889 ].) In fact, the Phillips case itself serves to demonstrate there is a conflict between California and certain other states on the specific matter of the rates of interest allowed by their laws (see Cal. Const., art.

1987Moreover, I believe the trial court was correct in its reading and application of the Phillips and Riley cases ( Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts (1985) 472 U.S. 797 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 628 , 105 S.Ct. 2965 ]; Riley v. Fitzgerald (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 871 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 889 ].) In fact, the Phillips case itself serves to demonstrate there is a conflict between California and certain other states on the specific matter of the rates of interest allowed by their laws (see Cal. Const., art.

1984Particularly if there is evidence which would give a multiple choice in answering the interrogatory, the court should have guidance from the requesting party.” (McAdams v. McElroy, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d 985, 993 .) Casa Blanca’s request of the trial court to answer these questions constituted an inappropriate challenge to the findings or the statement of decision.

1981It also found that plaintiff’s contention of excuse via an inappropriate warning failed under Smith v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 499 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 800 ].

1981It also found that plaintiff’s contention of excuse via an inappropriate warning failed under Smith v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 499 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 800 ].

1971He urges that the closing subordinate phrase in the instruction, as given, involving absence of .intent, is even more defective than a similarly placed subordinate phrase involving felony murder which was strongly condemned in People v. Cobas, 12 Cal.App.3d 952 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 110 ].

1971He urges that the closing subordinate phrase in the instruction, as given, involving absence of .intent, is even more defective than a similarly placed subordinate phrase involving felony murder which was strongly condemned in People v. Cobas, 12 Cal.App.3d 952 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 110 ].

1967Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 57 Cal.2d 123 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 367 P.2d 413 ]), or has applied an inappropriate standard schedule to the specified factors of disability (Young v. Industrial Acc. Com., 38 Cal.App.2d 250 [ 100 P.2d 1062 ]).

1967Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 57 Cal.2d 123 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 367 P.2d 413 ]), or has applied an inappropriate standard schedule to the specified factors of disability (Young v. Industrial Acc. Com., 38 Cal.App.2d 250 [ 100 P.2d 1062 ]).

1967Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 57 Cal.2d 123 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 367 P.2d 413 ]), or has applied an inappropriate standard schedule to the specified factors of disability (Young v. Industrial Acc. Com., 38 Cal.App.2d 250 [ 100 P.2d 1062 ]).

1967Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 57 Cal.2d 123 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 367 P.2d 413 ]), or has applied an inappropriate standard schedule to the specified factors of disability (Young v. Industrial Acc. Com., 38 Cal.App.2d 250 [ 100 P.2d 1062 ]).