inappropriate standard in Indiana

2014The defendant bears the burden to “persuade the appellate court that his sentence has met this inappropriate standard of review.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).

2014Elkins bears the burden to “persuade the appellate court that his sentence has met this inappropriate standard of review.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). 3 The determination of whether we regard a sentence as appropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

2019Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2780 | April 24, 2019 Page 3 of 6 Decision [6] Bense argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve her previously suspended sentence. [7] Our supreme court has held that “a trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied) (rejecting a defendant’s argument that his probation violation sanction should be reviewed u

2018We disagree. [10] Our supreme court has held that “a trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied) (rejecting a defendant’s argument that his probation violation sanction should be reviewed under the inappropriate standard in Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)).

2019Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2780 | April 24, 2019 Page 3 of 6 Decision [6] Bense argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve her previously suspended sentence. [7] Our supreme court has held that “a trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied) (rejecting a defendant’s argument that his probation violation sanction should be reviewed u

2018We disagree. [10] Our supreme court has held that “a trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied) (rejecting a defendant’s argument that his probation violation sanction should be reviewed under the inappropriate standard in Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)).

2019Probation serves as an “alternative[] to commitment to the Department of Correction[,]” and is “made at the sole discretion of the trial court.” Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999), reh’g denied.

2018Probation serves as an “alternative[] to commitment to the Department of Correction[,]” and is “made at the sole discretion of the trial court.” Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999), reh’g denied.

2015See Allen, 791 N.E.2d at 755-756 (holding that the post-conviction court’s language that the petitioner’s ineffective, assistance of counsel claim was without merit because.“the evidence of record” and the petitioner’s contentions “suggested no good faith reasons *910 for the Court to conclude otherwise” suggested that the post-conviction court applied an inappropriate standard when reviewing the petitioner’s claim). ■ “At this stage of the [post-conviction] proceedings, we have only the pleadings[.]” Id. at 756 .

2015See Allen, 791 N.E.2d at 755-756 (holding that the post-conviction court’s language that the petitioner’s ineffective, assistance of counsel claim was without merit because.“the evidence of record” and the petitioner’s contentions “suggested no good faith reasons *910 for the Court to conclude otherwise” suggested that the post-conviction court applied an inappropriate standard when reviewing the petitioner’s claim). ■ “At this stage of the [post-conviction] proceedings, we have only the pleadings[.]” Id. at 756 .

2014Elkins bears the burden to “persuade the appellate court that his sentence has met this inappropriate standard of review.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). 3 The determination of whether we regard a sentence as appropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

2014Moreover, “[t]he principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Id. at 1225 .

2006Such a view comports with our Supreme Court's decision in Tumulty v. State, where it was held that a defendant is "entitled to contest the merits of a trial court's sentencing [decision] where the court has exercised sentencing discretion." 666 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ind.1996); see also Collins, 817 N.E.2d at 230 ; see also Gornick v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1031 , 1035 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that waiver of the inappropriate standard under Appellate Rule 7(B) in no way impinges upon a defendant's ability to challenge the trial court's exercise of its sentencing discretion).

2006Such a view comports with our Supreme Court's decision in Tumulty v. State, where it was held that a defendant is "entitled to contest the merits of a trial court's sentencing [decision] where the court has exercised sentencing discretion." 666 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ind.1996); see also Collins, 817 N.E.2d at 230 ; see also Gornick v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1031 , 1035 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that waiver of the inappropriate standard under Appellate Rule 7(B) in no way impinges upon a defendant's ability to challenge the trial court's exercise of its sentencing discretion).

2006Such a view comports with our Supreme Court's decision in Tumulty v. State, where it was held that a defendant is "entitled to contest the merits of a trial court's sentencing [decision] where the court has exercised sentencing discretion." 666 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ind.1996); see also Collins, 817 N.E.2d at 230 ; see also Gornick v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1031 , 1035 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that waiver of the inappropriate standard under Appellate Rule 7(B) in no way impinges upon a defendant's ability to challenge the trial court's exercise of its sentencing discretion).

2005"A trial rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the sufficiency of a claim, not the facts supporting it." Borgman v. Aikens, 681 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied.

2005"A trial rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the sufficiency of a claim, not the facts supporting it." Borgman v. Aikens, 681 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997), trans. denied.