warrant and probable-cause requirement in California

2016There, however, the United States Supreme Court explicitly based its holding on the applicability of the warrant requirement. ( Riley, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2493 .) In contrast, T.L.O. "recognized an exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement for searches conducted by public school officials." ( In re Joseph G. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1735 , 1739, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 902 , italics added.) As the United States Supreme Court explained, "[t]he warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspecte

2016There, however, the United States Supreme Court explicitly based its holding on the applicability of the warrant requirement. ( Riley, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2493 .) In contrast, T.L.O. "recognized an exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement for searches conducted by public school officials." ( In re Joseph G. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1735 , 1739, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 902 , italics added.) As the United States Supreme Court explained, "[t]he warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspecte

2016In these circumstances, " '[t]he special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens ... the safety of schoolchildren and teachers ... justifies the Court in excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirement, and in applying a standard determined by balancing the relevant interests.' " 4 ( In re J.D., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 715 , 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 464 , quoting T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 353 , 105 S.Ct. 733 (conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.).) Finally, the search in this case occurred before the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Riley .

2016In these circumstances, " '[t]he special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens ... the safety of schoolchildren and teachers ... justifies the Court in excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirement, and in applying a standard determined by balancing the relevant interests.' " 4 ( In re J.D., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 715 , 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 464 , quoting T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 353 , 105 S.Ct. 733 (conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.).) Finally, the search in this case occurred before the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Riley .

2016There, however, the United States Supreme Court explicitly based its holding on the applicability of the warrant requirement. ( Riley, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2493 .) In contrast, T.L.O. "recognized an exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement for searches conducted by public school officials." ( In re Joseph G. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1735 , 1739, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 902 , italics added.) As the United States Supreme Court explained, "[t]he warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspecte

2016(Riley, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2493 .) In contrast, T.L.O. “recognized an exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement for searches conducted by public school officials.” (In re Joseph G. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1735, 1739 , italics added.) As the United States Supreme Court explained, “[t]he warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary proced

2014(Id. at pp. 664-665.) 8 In Earls, the Court upheld a drug testing policy for all students who participated in any competitive extracurricular activity in the school district. “[I]n the context of safety and administrative regulations, a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable ‘when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” ’ ” ( Earls, supra, 536 U.S. 822, 829 .) “ ‘Fourth Amendment rights . . . are different in public schools than elsewhere; the “reasonableness” inquiry cannot disregard the school

2014(Id. at p. 649.) No individualized suspicion or probable cause was necessary for the test. {Id. at pp. 664-665.) In Earls , the court upheld a drug testing policy for all students who participated in any competitive extracurricular activity in the school district. “[I]n the context of safety and administrative regulations, a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable ‘when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” ’ ” ( Earls, supra, 536 U.S. 822, 829 .) “ ‘Fourth Amendment rights ... are different in

2014The case of In re Patrick Y. (2000) 358 Md. 50 [ 746 A.2d 405 ] dealt with an unidentified source advising a school security officer there were drugs and weapons in the “middle school area” of Mark Twain School.

2014The case of In re Patrick Y. (2000) 358 Md. 50 [ 746 A.2d 405 ] dealt with an unidentified source advising a school security officer there were drugs and weapons in the “middle school area” of Mark Twain School.

2006However, the searches they discussed were performed on free persons, not incarcerated felons.” (Padgett v. Donald, supra, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 .) The special needs doctrine is an exception “to the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements . .. where ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” (Nicholas v. Goord, supra, 430 F.3d 652 , 660.) “Such searches, which have historically been treated as a ‘closely guarded category,’ Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997), have b

2006However, the searches they discussed were performed on free persons, not incarcerated felons.” (Padgett v. Donald, supra, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 .) The special needs doctrine is an exception “to the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements . .. where ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” (Nicholas v. Goord, supra, 430 F.3d 652 , 660.) “Such searches, which have historically been treated as a ‘closely guarded category,’ Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997), have b

2006However, the searches they discussed were performed on free persons, not incarcerated felons.” (Padgett v. Donald, supra, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 .) The special needs doctrine is an exception “to the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements . .. where ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” (Nicholas v. Goord, supra, 430 F.3d 652 , 660.) “Such searches, which have historically been treated as a ‘closely guarded category,’ Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997), have b

2006However, the searches they discussed were performed on free persons, not incarcerated felons.” (Padgett v. Donald, supra, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 .) The special needs doctrine is an exception “to the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements . .. where ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” (Nicholas v. Goord, supra, 430 F.3d 652 , 660.) “Such searches, which have historically been treated as a ‘closely guarded category,’ Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997), have b

2006However, the searches they discussed were performed on free persons, not incarcerated felons.” (Padgett v. Donald, supra, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 .) The special needs doctrine is an exception “to the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements . .. where ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” (Nicholas v. Goord, supra, 430 F.3d 652 , 660.) “Such searches, which have historically been treated as a ‘closely guarded category,’ Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997), have b

2006However, the searches they discussed were performed on free persons, not incarcerated felons.” (Padgett v. Donald, supra, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 .) The special needs doctrine is an exception “to the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements . .. where ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” (Nicholas v. Goord, supra, 430 F.3d 652 , 660.) “Such searches, which have historically been treated as a ‘closely guarded category,’ Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997), have b

1999Drawing extensively upon federal precedent, the court noted the principle that “the government may dispense with the warrant requirement in situations when ‘ “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable” ’ ” and how the operation of a probation system presented special needs of speed, deterrence, and deference to a separate administrative system. {Id. at pp. 77-78, quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 873 [ 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3168 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 ].) Following the approach of this court in In re Marcellus L

1999Drawing extensively upon federal precedent, the court noted the principle that “the government may dispense with the warrant requirement in situations when ‘ “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable” ’ ” and how the operation of a probation system presented special needs of speed, deterrence, and deference to a separate administrative system. {Id. at pp. 77-78, quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 873 [ 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3168 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 ].) Following the approach of this court in In re Marcellus L

2006(King, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1371 .) King relied on language in Skinner , in which the Supreme Court recognized the special needs exception, stating: “In most criminal cases, we strike this balance in favor of the procedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. [Citations.] Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. [Citations.] We have recognized exceptions to this rule, however, ‘when “special needs, beyond the normal need for

1999Analogous to probation search conditions, administrative searches are validated in part on the rationale of implied consent. "[W]hen an entrepreneur embarks upon [a pervasively or closely regulated] business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation," including warrantless inspections. ( Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 313 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 ; cf. People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 765 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 488 P.2d 630 [analogizing probation search condition to government contract provision requiring access to a

1999Analogous to probation search conditions, administrative searches are validated in part on the rationale of implied consent. "[W]hen an entrepreneur embarks upon [a pervasively or closely regulated] business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation," including warrantless inspections. ( Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 313 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 ; cf. People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 765 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 488 P.2d 630 [analogizing probation search condition to government contract provision requiring access to a

1999Drawing extensively upon federal precedent, the Court noted the principle that "the government may dispense with the warrant requirement in situations when ` "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable"'" and how the operation of a probation system presented special needs of speed, deterrence, and deference to a separate administrative system. ( Id. at pp. 77-78, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 , quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 .) Following the approach of this

1999Drawing extensively upon federal precedent, the Court noted the principle that "the government may dispense with the warrant requirement in situations when ` "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable"'" and how the operation of a probation system presented special needs of speed, deterrence, and deference to a separate administrative system. ( Id. at pp. 77-78, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 , quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 .) Following the approach of this

1999Analogous to probation search conditions, administrative searches are validated in part on the rationale of implied consent. "[W]hen an entrepreneur embarks upon [a pervasively or closely regulated] business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation," including warrantless inspections. ( Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 313 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 ; cf. People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 765 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 488 P.2d 630 [analogizing probation search condition to government contract provision requiring access to a

1999Analogous to probation search conditions, administrative searches are validated in part on the rationale of implied consent. "[W]hen an entrepreneur embarks upon [a pervasively or closely regulated] business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation," including warrantless inspections. ( Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 313 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 ; cf. People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 765 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 488 P.2d 630 [analogizing probation search condition to government contract provision requiring access to a

1999Analogous to probation search conditions, administrative searches are validated in part on the rationale of implied consent. "[W]hen an entrepreneur embarks upon [a pervasively or closely regulated] business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation," including warrantless inspections. ( Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 313 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 ; cf. People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 765 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 488 P.2d 630 [analogizing probation search condition to government contract provision requiring access to a

1999Analogous to probation search conditions, administrative searches are validated in part on the rationale of implied consent. "[W]hen an entrepreneur embarks upon [a pervasively or closely regulated] business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation," including warrantless inspections. ( Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 313 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 ; cf. People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 765 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 488 P.2d 630 [analogizing probation search condition to government contract provision requiring access to a

1999In People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743 , 80 Cal. Rptr.2d 734 , 968 P.2d 445 , the Court overruled a previous decision, People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 112 , 714 P.2d 1251 , and held that an adult parolee subject to a search condition could be searched even if the searching officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that the parolee had violated or was planning to violate either the law or the conditions of parole.

1999In People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743 , 80 Cal. Rptr.2d 734 , 968 P.2d 445 , the Court overruled a previous decision, People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 112 , 714 P.2d 1251 , and held that an adult parolee subject to a search condition could be searched even if the searching officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that the parolee had violated or was planning to violate either the law or the conditions of parole.

1999Analogous to probation search conditions, administrative searches are validated in part on the rationale of implied consent. "[W]hen an entrepreneur embarks upon [a pervasively or closely regulated] business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation," including warrantless inspections. ( Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 313 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 ; cf. People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 765 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 488 P.2d 630 [analogizing probation search condition to government contract provision requiring access to a

1999Analogous to probation search conditions, administrative searches are validated in part on the rationale of implied consent. "[W]hen an entrepreneur embarks upon [a pervasively or closely regulated] business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation," including warrantless inspections. ( Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 313 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 ; cf. People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 765 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 488 P.2d 630 [analogizing probation search condition to government contract provision requiring access to a

1999In People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743 , 80 Cal. Rptr.2d 734 , 968 P.2d 445 , the Court overruled a previous decision, People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 112 , 714 P.2d 1251 , and held that an adult parolee subject to a search condition could be searched even if the searching officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that the parolee had violated or was planning to violate either the law or the conditions of parole.

1999In People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743 , 80 Cal. Rptr.2d 734 , 968 P.2d 445 , the Court overruled a previous decision, People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 112 , 714 P.2d 1251 , and held that an adult parolee subject to a search condition could be searched even if the searching officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that the parolee had violated or was planning to violate either the law or the conditions of parole.

1994See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin [(1987) 483 U.S. 868 ] at 873 [ 97 L.Ed.2d 709, 717 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 ] (search of probationer’s home); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 601, 612-615 , 107 S.Ct. 2636 ] (1987) (search of premises of certain highly regulated businesses); O’Connor v. Ortega [(1987) 480 U.S. 709 ] at 721-725 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 714, 725-728 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 ] (work-related searches of employees’ desks and offices); New Jersey v. T.L.O. [(1985) 469 U.S. 325 ] at 337-342 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 731-735 , 105 S.Ct. 733 ] (search of student’s property by school officials); Bell

1994See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin [(1987) 483 U.S. 868 ] at 873 [ 97 L.Ed.2d 709, 717 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 ] (search of probationer’s home); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 601, 612-615 , 107 S.Ct. 2636 ] (1987) (search of premises of certain highly regulated businesses); O’Connor v. Ortega [(1987) 480 U.S. 709 ] at 721-725 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 714, 725-728 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 ] (work-related searches of employees’ desks and offices); New Jersey v. T.L.O. [(1985) 469 U.S. 325 ] at 337-342 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 731-735 , 105 S.Ct. 733 ] (search of student’s property by school officials); Bell