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15 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1989–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Griffin v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences2017The “Special Needs” Exception The State is correct that some school searches fall under the special needs exception. 5 Under the special needs exception, a warrantless search is reasonable when “ ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)). 2017The “Special Needs” Exception The State is correct that some school searches fall under the special needs exception. 5 Under the special needs exception, a warrantless search is reasonable when “ ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)). | 5 | 11 |
Vernonia School District 47J v. Actongreen2 sentences2010Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 , 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), “a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable ‘when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” ’ ” Earls, 536 U.S. at 829 , 122 S.Ct. 2559 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring))); see Acton, 515 U.S. at 653 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 . 2010Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 , 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), “a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable ‘when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” ’ ” Earls, 536 U.S. at 829 , 122 S.Ct. 2559 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring))); see Acton, 515 U.S. at 653 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 . | 4 | 6 |
New Jersey v. T. L. O.green2 sentences2017The “Special Needs” Exception The State is correct that some school searches fall under the special needs exception. 5 Under the special needs exception, a warrantless search is reasonable when “ ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)). 2017The “Special Needs” Exception The State is correct that some school searches fall under the special needs exception. 5 Under the special needs exception, a warrantless search is reasonable when “ ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)). | 2 | 7 |
In Re DLCgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., In re D.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 354, 370-73 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). 2005See, e.g., In re D.L.C. , 124 S.W.3d 354 , 370 B 73 (Tex. App. C Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earlsgreen2 sentences2014No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earl, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) (holding that in the context of safety and administrative regulations, a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable when special needs . . . make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.). 2010Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 , 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), “a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable ‘when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” ’ ” Earls, 536 U.S. at 829 , 122 S.Ct. 2559 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring))); see Acton, 515 U.S. at 653 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 . | 1 | 5 |
United States v. Anthony Brian Lewisgreen1 sentence2000See also United States v. Lewis, 71 F.3d 358, 363 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that the warrantless search of the defendant’s residence by parole agents and police acting at the agents’ request did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60, 66 (1st Cir.1990) (determining that the arrest of a parolee for parole violations in the absence of a warrant supported by probable cause did not offend the Fourth Amendment when the arresting police officers acted at the request of the parole board). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Edward Cardonagreen1 sentence2000See also United States v. Lewis, 71 F.3d 358, 363 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that the warrantless search of the defendant’s residence by parole agents and police acting at the agents’ request did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60, 66 (1st Cir.1990) (determining that the arrest of a parolee for parole violations in the absence of a warrant supported by probable cause did not offend the Fourth Amendment when the arresting police officers acted at the request of the parole board). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Delaware v. Prouse
green
2 sentences2015The United States Supreme Court has "recognized exceptions to this rule, however, “when 'special needs’, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.'" Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). 2014The United States Supreme Court has “recognized exceptions to this rule, however, “when ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’” Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)). | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences2000Analogizing the state’s operation of a probation system to its operation of institutions such as schools, government offices, or prisons, where exigencies may justify departure from the warrant and probable cause requirement, the Court observed: To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of probationers (as we have said it to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only ... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.” Id. (quoting from Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 , 9 2000Analogizing the state’s operation of a probation system to its operation of institutions such as schools, government offices, or prisons, where exigencies may justify departure from the warrant and probable cause requirement, the Court observed: To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of probationers (as we have said it to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only ... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.” Id. (quoting from Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 , 9 | 2 | 1990–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.