Anderson motion in Georgia

2024See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8); Arrowhead Alternator v. CIT Communications Finance Corp., 268 Ga. App. 464, 466 ( 602 SE2d 231 ) (2004).

2024See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8); Arrowhead Alternator v. CIT Communications Finance Corp., 268 Ga. App. 464, 466 ( 602 SE2d 231 ) (2004).

2026See McDowell v. Hartzog, 292 Ga. 300, 302 ( 736 SE2d 395 ) (2013) (holding that objection was preserved for appeal when the “appellants distinctly stated their objection at the charge conference, excepted to the charge as given on the same ground, and the trial court clearly understood the basis of their objection”). 5 requirement is that the person act with ordinary care under, under all particular facts and circumstances surrounding the situation.2 Following the instructions, Anderson renewed his objection.

2026See McDowell v. Hartzog, 292 Ga. 300, 302 ( 736 SE2d 395 ) (2013) (holding that objection was preserved for appeal when the “appellants distinctly stated their objection at the charge conference, excepted to the charge as given on the same ground, and the trial court clearly understood the basis of their objection”). 5 requirement is that the person act with ordinary care under, under all particular facts and circumstances surrounding the situation.2 Following the instructions, Anderson renewed his objection.

2021The determination of whether evidence is relevant is made by reference to OCGA § 24-4-401, which defines “relevant evidence” as evidence that “ha[s] any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” “This is a binary question – evidence is either relevant or it is not.” Strong v. State, 309 Ga. 295, 300 (2) (a) ( 845 SE2d 653 ) (2020). 12 The trial court found that Anderson’s speeding convictions and Vine videos were relevant to show the proper purposes of intent and kn

2021The determination of whether evidence is relevant is made by reference to OCGA § 24-4-401, which defines “relevant evidence” as evidence that “ha[s] any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” “This is a binary question – evidence is either relevant or it is not.” Strong v. State, 309 Ga. 295, 300 (2) (a) ( 845 SE2d 653 ) (2020). 12 The trial court found that Anderson’s speeding convictions and Vine videos were relevant to show the proper purposes of intent and kn

2021See State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 160 (2) ( 773 SE2d 170 ) (2015) (explaining that even when prosecuting general intent crimes, the State must prove the intent to do the acts that make up the crime).11 Further, Anderson’s defense in this case was that he did not have anything to do with Kanlica losing control, that he did not engage in any acts of reckless or aggressive driving, and that any speeding during the course of his interaction with Kanlica was of brief duration and minimal and was done to avoid Kanlica, who he said tried at one point to run him off the road.

2021See State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 160 (2) ( 773 SE2d 170 ) (2015) (explaining that even when prosecuting general intent crimes, the State must prove the intent to do the acts that make up the crime).11 Further, Anderson’s defense in this case was that he did not have anything to do with Kanlica losing control, that he did not engage in any acts of reckless or aggressive driving, and that any speeding during the course of his interaction with Kanlica was of brief duration and minimal and was done to avoid Kanlica, who he said tried at one point to run him off the road.

2020Lewis, supra, 293 Ga. at 114 (2) (b). 12 At the hearing on Anderson’s motion for new trial, the prosecutor testified that the State never had any written coroner’s report in its possession and that she first became aware of Anderson’s contentions regarding the matter during trial. 5.

2020Lewis, supra, 293 Ga. at 114 (2) (b). 12 At the hearing on Anderson’s motion for new trial, the prosecutor testified that the State never had any written coroner’s report in its possession and that she first became aware of Anderson’s contentions regarding the matter during trial. 5.

2016However, our Supreme Court has held that “Georgia law does not authorize a trial court to grant use immunity to a witness at the.request of a defendant.” Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 804, 811 (5) (b) ( 764 SE2d 376 ) (2014). 7 We also reject Anderson’s claim that Vicki did not have “reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer” because Georgia’s statute of limitation for any drug-related offense had already run.

2016However, our Supreme Court has held that “Georgia law does not authorize a trial court to grant use immunity to a witness at the.request of a defendant.” Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 804, 811 (5) (b) ( 764 SE2d 376 ) (2014). 7 We also reject Anderson’s claim that Vicki did not have “reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer” because Georgia’s statute of limitation for any drug-related offense had already run.

2011The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this “more flexible standard” in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 434 (112 SC 2059, 119 LE2d 245) (1992) and Crawford, supra, 553 U. S. at 189-191 .

2011The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this “more flexible standard” in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 434 (112 SC 2059, 119 LE2d 245) (1992) and Crawford, supra, 553 U. S. at 189-191 .

2011See also Cox v. Barber, 275 Ga. 415, 418 ( 568 SE2d 478 ) (2002) (applying the Anderson test to equal protection challenges to residency requirements of election candidates).

2011See also Cox v. Barber, 275 Ga. 415, 418 ( 568 SE2d 478 ) (2002) (applying the Anderson test to equal protection challenges to residency requirements of election candidates).

2010In so doing, we relied on the then-current rule that “[tjelephone and mail contact by an out-of-state defendant [with a Georgia resident] do not, alone,” constitute the requisite minimum contacts for the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction. 232 Ga. App. at 650 (1).

2007Moore v. Pitt-DesMoines, Inc., 245 Ga. App. at 679-681 ; Vaughan v. Glymph, 241 Ga. App. 346, 348 ( 526 SE2d 357 ) (1999).

2007Moore v. Pitt-DesMoines, Inc., 245 Ga. App. at 679-681 ; Vaughan v. Glymph, 241 Ga. App. 346, 348 ( 526 SE2d 357 ) (1999).

2005Head v. State, 256 Ga. App. at 628 (2).

2001Cox Enterprises v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 154 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000). 2 Compare Odum v. Montgomery, 249 Ga. App. 211, 212 ( 547 SE2d 770 ) (2001).

2001Cox Enterprises v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 154 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000). 2 Compare Odum v. Montgomery, 249 Ga. App. 211, 212 ( 547 SE2d 770 ) (2001).

2001Cox Enterprises v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 154 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000). 2 Compare Odum v. Montgomery, 249 Ga. App. 211, 212 ( 547 SE2d 770 ) (2001).

2001Cox Enterprises v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 154 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000). 2 Compare Odum v. Montgomery, 249 Ga. App. 211, 212 ( 547 SE2d 770 ) (2001).

1998In this case, whether the conduct at the jail was sufficient to provoke Anderson’s later misconduct was a question for the jury (Dyer v. State, 99 Ga. 20, 21 (2) ( 25 SE 609 )), and thus the trial court did not err by denying Anderson’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. 3.

1998In this case, whether the conduct at the jail was sufficient to provoke Anderson’s later misconduct was a question for the jury (Dyer v. State, 99 Ga. 20, 21 (2) ( 25 SE 609 )), and thus the trial court did not err by denying Anderson’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. 3.

1997Hogan v. State, 210 Ga. App. 122, 123 (1) ( 435 SE2d 494 ) (1993).

1997Hogan v. State, 210 Ga. App. 122, 123 (1) ( 435 SE2d 494 ) (1993).

1996In cases involving a “static” dangerous condition, it is well established that the basis of the proprietor’s liability is his superior knowledge, and, “if the invitee knows of the condition or hazard there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn him and there is no liability for resulting injury because the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor does and then by voluntarily acting in view of his knowledge, assumes the risks and dangers incident to the known condition.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rose v. Kennesaw House, 203 Ga. App. 648, 649 ( 417 SE2d 379 ) (1992).

1996In cases involving a “static” dangerous condition, it is well established that the basis of the proprietor’s liability is his superior knowledge, and, “if the invitee knows of the condition or hazard there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn him and there is no liability for resulting injury because the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor does and then by voluntarily acting in view of his knowledge, assumes the risks and dangers incident to the known condition.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rose v. Kennesaw House, 203 Ga. App. 648, 649 ( 417 SE2d 379 ) (1992).