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7 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Simon v. Stategreen1 sentence2012The propriety of the trial judge's action might be debatable, but that action was not obviously improper. 5 And as we explained in Simon v. State, 121 P.3d 815, 820 (Alaska App.2005), "If a claim of error is reasonably debatable-if reasonable judges could differ on what the law requires-then a claim of plain error fails." Accordingly, we reject Anderson's claim of error. | 1 | 1 |
Vester v. Rogersgreen2 sentences1988See Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wash.App. 29 , 723 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3189 , 96 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); Litz v. Pierce County, 44 Wash.App. 674 , 723 P.2d 475 , 480 n. 8 (1986). 4 . 1988See Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wash.App. 29 , 723 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3189 , 96 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); Litz v. Pierce County, 44 Wash.App. 674 , 723 P.2d 475 , 480 n. 8 (1986). 4 . | 1 | 1 |
Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencergreen2 sentences1988See Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wash.App. 29 , 723 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3189 , 96 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); Litz v. Pierce County, 44 Wash.App. 674 , 723 P.2d 475 , 480 n. 8 (1986). 4 . 1988See Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wash.App. 29 , 723 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3189 , 96 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); Litz v. Pierce County, 44 Wash.App. 674 , 723 P.2d 475 , 480 n. 8 (1986). 4 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Colemangreen2 sentences1981Basically, the prudent person test requires that "a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success, in developing a valuable mine." [3] The marketability test requires that "it must be shown that the mineral can *518 be `extracted, removed and marketed at a profit.'" [4] In addition to the foregoing, since the only claimed use for the slate found in Anderson's claim is as building stone, it also comes under the Common Varieties Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 611 (West 1971). [5] This act provides that: No deposit of c 1981Basically, the prudent person test requires that "a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success, in developing a valuable mine." [3] The marketability test requires that "it must be shown that the mineral can *518 be `extracted, removed and marketed at a profit.'" [4] In addition to the foregoing, since the only claimed use for the slate found in Anderson's claim is as building stone, it also comes under the Common Varieties Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 611 (West 1971). [5] This act provides that: No deposit of c | 1 | 1 |
Alaska Placer Company v. Leegreen2 sentences1981It based its instructions on Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54, 57-58 (Alaska 1976) (footnotes omitted), where we stated: When a trespasser removes minerals from the land of another, there are two generally accepted rules of damages: a ‘mild’ rule for good faith trespassers and a ‘harsh’ rule for willful trespassers. 1981It based its instructions on Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54, 57-58 (Alaska 1976) (footnotes omitted), where we stated: When a trespasser removes minerals from the land of another, there are two generally accepted rules of damages: a `mild' rule for good faith trespassers and a `harsh' rule for willful trespassers. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Anderson v. State
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 8 . 2014Anderson, 289 P.3d at 5 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
DeGross v. State
green
1 sentence2005In this appeal, Anderson claims that his composite sentence of 33 years to serve is excessive as a matter of law under this Court’s decision in DeGross v. State, 816 P.2d 212 (Alaska App.1991). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Fehring v. Republic Insurance
green
2 sentences1993In Fehring v. Republic Insurance Co., 118 Wis.2d 299 , 347 N.W.2d 595 (1984), the court held that proof that a reasonable insurer would not have acted as the defendant did under the circumstances establishes bad faith. . 1993In Fehring v. Republic Insurance Co., 118 Wis.2d 299 , 347 N.W.2d 595 (1984), the court held that proof that a reasonable insurer would not have acted as the defendant did under the circumstances establishes bad faith. . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge v. International Fidelity Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1993In Fehring v. Republic Insurance Co., 118 Wis.2d 299 , 347 N.W.2d 595 (1984), the court held that proof that a reasonable insurer would not have acted as the defendant did under the circumstances establishes bad faith. [7] In Loyal Order of Moose v. International Fidelity Insurance Co., 797 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1990), a case involving the somewhat analogous relationship between a surety and its obligee, we stated: "A surety may satisfy its duty of good faith to its obligee by acting reasonably in response to a claim by its obligee, and by acting promptly to remedy or perform the principal's duties 1993In Fehring v. Republic Insurance Co., 118 Wis.2d 299 , 347 N.W.2d 595 (1984), the court held that proof that a reasonable insurer would not have acted as the defendant did under the circumstances establishes bad faith. [7] In Loyal Order of Moose v. International Fidelity Insurance Co., 797 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1990), a case involving the somewhat analogous relationship between a surety and its obligee, we stated: "A surety may satisfy its duty of good faith to its obligee by acting reasonably in response to a claim by its obligee, and by acting promptly to remedy or perform the principal's duties | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Litz v. Pierce County
green
2 sentences1988See Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wash.App. 29 , 723 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3189 , 96 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); Litz v. Pierce County, 44 Wash.App. 674 , 723 P.2d 475 , 480 n. 8 (1986). 4 . 1988See Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wash.App. 29 , 723 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3189 , 96 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); Litz v. Pierce County, 44 Wash.App. 674 , 723 P.2d 475 , 480 n. 8 (1986). 4 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Cordova Fish & Cold Storage Company v. Estes
green
1 sentence1981The Board, in its decision, did mention this issue, but the Board, like the superior court, apparently concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider Anderson’s claim on the strength of our holding in Cordova Fish & Cold Storage Co. v. Estes, 370 P.2d 180 (Alaska 1962). 2 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.