land claim in Illinois

2011Thus, Limestone did not consider the element of exclusivity or whether the true owner must be altogether deprived of use of the land for a claim of easement by prescription. ¶ 27 Defendants lastly rely on Schultz v. Kant, 148 Ill.App.3d 565 , 101 Ill.Dec. 764 , 499 N.E.2d 131 (1986), to support their argument.

2011Thus, Limestone did not consider the element of exclusivity or whether the true owner must be altogether deprived of use of the land for a claim of easement by prescription. ¶ 27 Defendants lastly rely on Schultz v. Kant, 148 Ill.App.3d 565 , 101 Ill.Dec. 764 , 499 N.E.2d 131 (1986), to support their argument.

1982Hart v. Village of Lombard, 319 Ill. 56, 59 , the court stated, ‘The word “owner” has been defined to include one who has the use, control or occupation of the land with claim of ownership, whether his interest be an absolute fee or a less estate.’ [Citation.] We are of the opinion that the statute itself must be examined to determine the meaning of the term ‘owners’ based upon the context in which it is used.

1973Hart v. Village of Lombard, 319 Ill. 56, 59 , the court stated, “The word ‘owner’ has been defined to include one who has the use, control or occupation of the land with claim of ownership, whether his interest be an absolute fee or a less estate.” (See also Woodward Governor Co. v. City of Loves Park, 335 Ill.

1995App. 3d 662 , 642 N.E.2d 1335 (Evans II), succinctly presented the determinative issue: "[T]he outcome of this case hinges on whether plaintiff is seeking redress for illegal acts by State officers, or whether plaintiff is seeking merely to adjudicate a land claim against the State of Illinois.

1982As the Illinois Supreme Court stated in Chapman v. County of Will (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 524, 531-32 , 304 N.E.2d 287 , 291: “In People ex rel.

1982As the Illinois Supreme Court stated in Chapman v. County of Will (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 524, 531-32 , 304 N.E.2d 287 , 291: “In People ex rel.

1982In Bredberg v. City of Wheaton, 24 Ill. 2d 612 , the court concluded that a statute, comparable to section 5, was designed to afford a right of protest to qualified persons who would be most affected by a zoning change.

1973Hart v. Village of Lombard, 319 Ill. 56, 59 , the court stated, “The word ‘owner’ has been defined to include one who has the use, control or occupation of the land with claim of ownership, whether his interest be an absolute fee or a less estate.” (See also Woodward Governor Co. v. City of Loves Park, 335 Ill.

1960In McCoy v. Morrow, 18 Ill. 519 , it was announced that after the lapse of twenty years, debts of whatever degree, are presumed to have been satisfied, and this presumption will defeat a recovery on them unless rebutted by proof.

1934There are circumstances where a municipality may be estopped by its conduct to assert its rights to an easement, as where there has been a long period of non-user and permanent buildings or improvements have been built upon the land in good faith, ( City of ElPaso v. Hoagland , 224 Ill. 263 ), but such is not the case here.

1930The appellees rely upon the case of Rasch v. Rasch, 278 Ill. 261 , as authority that the decree of registration is conclusive upon the appellant by virtue of section 26 of the Registration act, which provides that any person having an interest in the land who has not been actually served with process or notified of the application, may, at any time within two years after the entry of the decree, and not after-wards, appear and file his sworn answer, whereupon the court may proceed to review the decree and enter such order in the case as shall be according to equity.

1925(Hartford v. Brady, 114 Mass. 466 ; Hull v. Sangamon River Drainage District, 219 Ill. 454 ; Coombs v. People, 198 id. 586 ; Chiesa v. DesMoines, 158 Iowa, 343 .) The word “owner” has been defined to include one who has the use, control or occupation of the land with claim of ownership, whether his interest be an absolute fee or a less estate.

1925(Fort Dearborn Lodge v. Klein, 115 Ill. 177 ; Huston v. Tribbetts, 171 id. 547; Arms v. Ayer, 192 id. 601; People v. Barnes, 193 id. 620; Coombs v. People, supra.) In Springer v. Kroeschell, 161 Ill. 358 , certain contractors had entered into a contract for the construction of a building with the trustee, who held the legal title to the land on which it was to be built, and others entered into certain contracts for work on the building with the cestui que trust.

1925(Fort Dearborn Lodge v. Klein, 115 Ill. 177 ; Huston v. Tribbetts, 171 id. 547; Arms v. Ayer, 192 id. 601; People v. Barnes, 193 id. 620; Coombs v. People, supra.) In Springer v. Kroeschell, 161 Ill. 358 , certain contractors had entered into a contract for the construction of a building with the trustee, who held the legal title to the land on which it was to be built, and others entered into certain contracts for work on the building with the cestui que trust.

1925(Hartford v. Brady, 114 Mass. 466 ; Hull v. Sangamon River Drainage District, 219 Ill. 454 ; Coombs v. People, 198 id. 586 ; Chiesa v. DesMoines, 158 Iowa, 343 .) The word “owner” has been defined to include one who has the use, control or occupation of the land with claim of ownership, whether his interest be an absolute fee or a less estate.

1925(Hartford v. Brady, 114 Mass. 466 ; Hull v. Sangamon River Drainage District, 219 Ill. 454 ; Coombs v. People, 198 id. 586 ; Chiesa v. DesMoines, 158 Iowa, 343 .) The word “owner” has been defined to include one who has the use, control or occupation of the land with claim of ownership, whether his interest be an absolute fee or a less estate.

1925(Hartford v. Brady, 114 Mass. 466 ; Hull v. Sangamon River Drainage District, 219 Ill. 454 ; Coombs v. People, 198 id. 586 ; Chiesa v. DesMoines, 158 Iowa, 343 .) The word “owner” has been defined to include one who has the use, control or occupation of the land with claim of ownership, whether his interest be an absolute fee or a less estate.

1921(Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 Ill. 301 .) The fact that the unsubdivided land was already within the corporate limits of the town of Cicero is claimed to exclude the land from the privilege of subdivision because it would not be an addition to the town.

1919(Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 169 Ill. 329 ; City of Lincoln v. Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. 262 id. 11.) Under the reasoning of the authorities cited in this last case and the other authorities cited heretofore, there can be no question that the trial court erred in not sustaining the objection of counsel for appellant to the general questions asked of the real estate expert witnesses of appellee.

1914The possession and improvement by the complainant, as well as the payment of taxes, may with ‘the same propriety be presumed to have been under his life estate in the land as under a claim of title in fee.” (Fry v. Morrison, 159 Ill. 244 .) While it is true that these facts, taken in connection with the admission of the wife that she held the property in trust for the benefit of the husband, may be sufficient to- rebut the presumption of advancement, (Dorman v. Dorman, 187 Ill. 154 ,) the wife’s statements here on that question, as shown by the testimony of the various witnesses, are not at al

1914The possession and improvement by the complainant, as well as the payment of taxes, may with ‘the same propriety be presumed to have been under his life estate in the land as under a claim of title in fee.” (Fry v. Morrison, 159 Ill. 244 .) While it is true that these facts, taken in connection with the admission of the wife that she held the property in trust for the benefit of the husband, may be sufficient to- rebut the presumption of advancement, (Dorman v. Dorman, 187 Ill. 154 ,) the wife’s statements here on that question, as shown by the testimony of the various witnesses, are not at al

1912In the argument it is first said that if the complainant had a homestead in the land it was error to set aside the sale, and the correct practice would have been to set off the homestead under the equitable doctrine stated in Krupp v. Brand, 200 Ill. 403 , and other cases, which hold that a purchaser at a sale under execution of homestead premises worth more than $1000 may maintain a bill in equity to have the homestead set off.

1910(Mickey v. Barton, 194 Ill. 446 .) The acts that will be sufficient to prove possession depend to some extent upon the nature and locality of the property, the use to which it is adapted and the situation of the parties.

1900This instruction, if given, would have misled the jury as to the effect, under the doctrine of the case of Walker v. Converse, supra, of mere trespasses or temporary entries on the land, or isolated acts of possession thereof, during the period in which the appellees claimed to have been in actual possession thereof.

1896(Smith v. Stevens, 82 Ill. 554 ; Wait v. Smith, 92 id. 385.) The statute does not commence to run until adverse possession is taken.