land clause in North Carolina

2019App. 726 , 731, 676 S.E.2d 69 , 73 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). "[A]lthough the North Carolina Constitution does not contain an express provision prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without payment of just compensation, this Court has inferred such a provision as a fundamental right integral to the 'law of the land' clause in article I, section 19 of our Constitution." Finch v. City of Durham , 325 N.C. 352 , 362-63, 384 S.E.2d 8 , 14 (1989) (citations omitted). "[A] reasonable user fee is not a taking if it is imposed for the reimbursement of the cost

2019App. 726 , 731, 676 S.E.2d 69 , 73 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). "[A]lthough the North Carolina Constitution does not contain an express provision prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without payment of just compensation, this Court has inferred such a provision as a fundamental right integral to the 'law of the land' clause in article I, section 19 of our Constitution." Finch v. City of Durham , 325 N.C. 352 , 362-63, 384 S.E.2d 8 , 14 (1989) (citations omitted). "[A] reasonable user fee is not a taking if it is imposed for the reimbursement of the cost

2020“The law of the land clause, the basis for the former jeopardy defense in North Carolina, is conceptually similar to federal due process,” and therefore we “view the opinions of the United States Supreme Court with high regard in the context of interpreting our own law of the land clause.” Brunson, 327 N.C. at 249 , 393 S.E.2d at 864 (citations omitted).

2020“The law of the land clause, the basis for the former jeopardy defense in North Carolina, is conceptually similar to federal due process,” and therefore we “view the opinions of the United States Supreme Court with high regard in the context of interpreting our own law of the land clause.” Brunson, 327 N.C. at 249 , 393 S.E.2d at 864 (citations omitted).

2001Ed. at 1165 , and although “[decisions by the federal courts as to the construction and effect of the due process clause of the United States Constitution ... do not control an interpretation by this Court of the law of the land clause of our state Constitution], they] are . . . persuasive [authority],” McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 563 , 398 S.E.2d 475, 481 (1990) (citations omitted).

2001Ed. at 1165 , and although “[decisions by the federal courts as to the construction and effect of the due process clause of the United States Constitution ... do not control an interpretation by this Court of the law of the land clause of our state Constitution], they] are . . . persuasive [authority],” McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 563 , 398 S.E.2d 475, 481 (1990) (citations omitted).

2006“Whether a state statute violates the law of the land clause ‘is a question of degree and reasonableness in relation to the public good likely to result from it.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Hospital, 282 N.C. 542 , 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973)).

2006“Whether a state statute violates the law of the land clause ‘is a question of degree and reasonableness in relation to the public good likely to result from it.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Hospital, 282 N.C. 542 , 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973)).

2025See State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87 , 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001) (“Constitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 18 , 484 S.E.2d 350, 361 (1997) (holding that [the] defendant waived confrontation and due process arguments by not first raising the issues in the trial court); Dep’t of Transp. v. Haywood Oil Co., 195 N.C. App. 668, 677-78 , 673 S.E.2d 712, 718 (2009) (holding that arguments pertaining to Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and law of the land clause of the Nor

2025See State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87 , 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001) (“Constitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 18 , 484 S.E.2d 350, 361 (1997) (holding that [the] defendant waived confrontation and due process arguments by not first raising the issues in the trial court); Dep’t of Transp. v. Haywood Oil Co., 195 N.C. App. 668, 677-78 , 673 S.E.2d 712, 718 (2009) (holding that arguments pertaining to Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and law of the land clause of the Nor

2025See State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87 , 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001) (“Constitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 18 , 484 S.E.2d 350, 361 (1997) (holding that [the] defendant waived confrontation and due process arguments by not first raising the issues in the trial court); Dep’t of Transp. v. Haywood Oil Co., 195 N.C. App. 668, 677-78 , 673 S.E.2d 712, 718 (2009) (holding that arguments pertaining to Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and law of the land clause of the Nor

2025See State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87 , 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001) (“Constitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 18 , 484 S.E.2d 350, 361 (1997) (holding that [the] defendant waived confrontation and due process arguments by not first raising the issues in the trial court); Dep’t of Transp. v. Haywood Oil Co., 195 N.C. App. 668, 677-78 , 673 S.E.2d 712, 718 (2009) (holding that arguments pertaining to Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and law of the land clause of the Nor

2025See State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87 , 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001) (“Constitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 18 , 484 S.E.2d 350, 361 (1997) (holding that [the] defendant waived confrontation and due process arguments by not first raising the issues in the trial court); Dep’t of Transp. v. Haywood Oil Co., 195 N.C. App. 668, 677-78 , 673 S.E.2d 712, 718 (2009) (holding that arguments pertaining to Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and law of the land clause of the Nor

2025See State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87 , 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001) (“Constitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 18 , 484 S.E.2d 350, 361 (1997) (holding that [the] defendant waived confrontation and due process arguments by not first raising the issues in the trial court); Dep’t of Transp. v. Haywood Oil Co., 195 N.C. App. 668, 677-78 , 673 S.E.2d 712, 718 (2009) (holding that arguments pertaining to Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and law of the land clause of the Nor

2025See State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87 , 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001) (“Constitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 18 , 484 S.E.2d 350, 361 (1997) (holding that [the] defendant waived confrontation and due process arguments by not first raising the issues in the trial court); Dep’t of Transp. v. Haywood Oil Co., 195 N.C. App. 668, 677-78 , 673 S.E.2d 712, 718 (2009) (holding that arguments pertaining to Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and law of the land clause of the Nor

2025See State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87 , 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001) (“Constitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 18 , 484 S.E.2d 350, 361 (1997) (holding that [the] defendant waived confrontation and due process arguments by not first raising the issues in the trial court); Dep’t of Transp. v. Haywood Oil Co., 195 N.C. App. 668, 677-78 , 673 S.E.2d 712, 718 (2009) (holding that arguments pertaining to Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and law of the land clause of the Nor

2021See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 453 , 186 L. Ed. 2d 1, 24 (2013). ¶ 76 The second prong of the Law of the Land Clause inquiry is also met, N.C. Gen.

2021See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 453 , 186 L. Ed. 2d 1, 24 (2013). ¶ 76 The second prong of the Law of the Land Clause inquiry is also met, N.C. Gen.

2021Our state’s “law of the land clause is considered ‘synonymous’ with the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Woods v. City of Wilmington, 125 N.C. App. 226, 230 , 480 S.E.2d 429, 432 (1997) (citation omitted).

2021Our state’s “law of the land clause is considered ‘synonymous’ with the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Woods v. City of Wilmington, 125 N.C. App. 226, 230 , 480 S.E.2d 429, 432 (1997) (citation omitted).

2020I, § 19; State v. Sanderson, 346 N.C. 669, 676 , 488 S.E.2d 133, 136 (1997) (citing Crocker, 239 N.C. 446 , 80 S.E.2d 243 ) (noting that the prohibition against double jeopardy is embodied in the Law of the Land Clause of the North Carolina Constitution). 9 This clause has appeared in every version of the North Carolina Constitution.

2020I, § 19; State v. Sanderson, 346 N.C. 669, 676 , 488 S.E.2d 133, 136 (1997) (citing Crocker, 239 N.C. 446 , 80 S.E.2d 243 ) (noting that the prohibition against double jeopardy is embodied in the Law of the Land Clause of the North Carolina Constitution). 9 This clause has appeared in every version of the North Carolina Constitution.

2024With respect to the second prong, “[a] single standard determines whether [an] ordinance passes constitutional muster imposed by both section 1 and the ‘law of the land’ clause of section 19: the ordinance must be rationally related to a substantial government purpose.” Treants Enter., Inc. v. Onslow County, 320 N.C. 776 , 778-79, 360 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1987). “[T]o survive constitutional scrutiny under this provision, the challenged state action ‘must be reasonably necessary to promote the - 15 - accomplishment of a public good, or to prevent the infliction of a public harm.’” Ace Speedway Raci

2024With respect to the second prong, “[a] single standard determines whether [an] ordinance passes constitutional muster imposed by both section 1 and the ‘law of the land’ clause of section 19: the ordinance must be rationally related to a substantial government purpose.” Treants Enter., Inc. v. Onslow County, 320 N.C. 776 , 778-79, 360 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1987). “[T]o survive constitutional scrutiny under this provision, the challenged state action ‘must be reasonably necessary to promote the - 15 - accomplishment of a public good, or to prevent the infliction of a public harm.’” Ace Speedway Raci

2021Decisions of the United States Supreme Court as to federal due process are “highly persuasive, but not binding on the courts of this State.” State v. Smith, 90 N.C. App. 161, 163 , 368 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1988). ¶ 32 In order to succeed on a due process challenge, the plaintiff must first show that he “has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’ ” Dobrowolska v. Wall, 138 N.C. App. 1, 11 , 530 S.E.2d 590, 598 (2000) (quoting Am. Mfrs.

2021Decisions of the United States Supreme Court as to federal due process are “highly persuasive, but not binding on the courts of this State.” State v. Smith, 90 N.C. App. 161, 163 , 368 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1988). ¶ 32 In order to succeed on a due process challenge, the plaintiff must first show that he “has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’ ” Dobrowolska v. Wall, 138 N.C. App. 1, 11 , 530 S.E.2d 590, 598 (2000) (quoting Am. Mfrs.

2011V. “[Although the North Carolina Constitution does not contain an express provision prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without payment of just compensation, th[e] [North Carolina Supreme Court] has inferred such a provision as a fundamental right integral to the ‘law of the land’ clause in article 1, section 19 of our Constitution.” Finch v. City of Durham, 325 N.C. 352, 362-63 , 384 S.E.2d 8, 14 (1989) (citing Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 196 , 293 S.E.2d 101, 107-08 (1982)). *315 “It is a well settled constitutional principle that actual physical occupation

2011V. “[Although the North Carolina Constitution does not contain an express provision prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without payment of just compensation, th[e] [North Carolina Supreme Court] has inferred such a provision as a fundamental right integral to the ‘law of the land’ clause in article 1, section 19 of our Constitution.” Finch v. City of Durham, 325 N.C. 352, 362-63 , 384 S.E.2d 8, 14 (1989) (citing Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 196 , 293 S.E.2d 101, 107-08 (1982)). *315 “It is a well settled constitutional principle that actual physical occupation

2021Decisions of the United States Supreme Court as to federal due process are “highly persuasive, but not binding on the courts of this State.” State v. Smith, 90 N.C. App. 161, 163 , 368 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1988). ¶ 32 In order to succeed on a due process challenge, the plaintiff must first show that he “has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’ ” Dobrowolska v. Wall, 138 N.C. App. 1, 11 , 530 S.E.2d 590, 598 (2000) (quoting Am. Mfrs.

2021Decisions of the United States Supreme Court as to federal due process are “highly persuasive, but not binding on the courts of this State.” State v. Smith, 90 N.C. App. 161, 163 , 368 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1988). ¶ 32 In order to succeed on a due process challenge, the plaintiff must first show that he “has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’ ” Dobrowolska v. Wall, 138 N.C. App. 1, 11 , 530 S.E.2d 590, 598 (2000) (quoting Am. Mfrs.

2009North Carolina’s “ ‘law of the land’ clause incorporates similar protections under the North Carolina Constitution.” State v. Ballenger, 123 N.C.

2008North Carolina’s “ ‘law of the land’ clause incorporates similar protections under the North Carolina Constitution.” State v. Ballenger, 123 N.C.

2018I, § 19. “[U]nder the law of the land clause of the State Constitution a judgment of a court cannot bind a person unless he is brought before the court in some way sanctioned by law[.]” Eason v. Spence, 232 N.C. 579, 586 , 61 S.E.2d 717, 722 (1950) (citations omitted).

2018I, § 19. “[U]nder the law of the land clause of the State Constitution a judgment of a court cannot bind a person unless he is brought before the court in some way sanctioned by law[.]” Eason v. Spence, 232 N.C. 579, 586 , 61 S.E.2d 717, 722 (1950) (citations omitted).

2006“Whether a state statute violates the law of the land clause ‘is a question of degree and reasonableness in relation to the public good likely to result from it.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Hospital, 282 N.C. 542 , 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973)).

2006"Whether a state statute violates the law of the land clause `is a question of degree and reasonableness in relation to the public good likely to result from it.'" Id. (quoting In re Hospital, 282 N.C. 542 , 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973)).

2001While “[d]ecisions by the federal courts as to the construction and effect of the due process clause of the United States Constitution are binding on this Court . . . , such decisions, although persuasive, do not control an interpretation by this Court of the law of the land clause in our state Constitution.” McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 563 , 398 S.E.2d 475, 481 (1990); see also State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 713 , 370 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1988) (recognizing that this Court “ha[s] the authority to construe [the Constitution of North Carolina] differently from the construction by the U

2001While “[d]ecisions by the federal courts as to the construction and effect of the due process clause of the United States Constitution are binding on this Court . . . , such decisions, although persuasive, do not control an interpretation by this Court of the law of the land clause in our state Constitution.” McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 563 , 398 S.E.2d 475, 481 (1990); see also State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 713 , 370 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1988) (recognizing that this Court “ha[s] the authority to construe [the Constitution of North Carolina] differently from the construction by the U

2026When a claimant asserts their fundamental right to earn a living has been infringed, the applicable Fruits of Their Labor and Law of the Land test does not require that the means be the best method of achieving the state’s goal; rather, the means chosen must be “reasonably necessary.” See Ace Speedway, 386 N.C. at 424.

2026When a claimant asserts their fundamental right to earn a living has been infringed, the applicable Fruits of Their Labor and Law of the Land test does not require that the means be the best method of achieving the state’s goal; rather, the means chosen must be “reasonably necessary.” See Ace Speedway, 386 N.C. at 424.

2024With respect to the second prong, “[a] single standard determines whether [an] ordinance passes constitutional muster imposed by both section 1 and the ‘law of the land’ clause of section 19: the ordinance must be rationally related to a substantial government purpose.” Treants Enter., Inc. v. Onslow County, 320 N.C. 776 , 778-79, 360 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1987). “[T]o survive constitutional scrutiny under this provision, the challenged state action ‘must be reasonably necessary to promote the - 15 - accomplishment of a public good, or to prevent the infliction of a public harm.’” Ace Speedway Raci

2024With respect to the second prong, “[a] single standard determines whether [an] ordinance passes constitutional muster imposed by both section 1 and the ‘law of the land’ clause of section 19: the ordinance must be rationally related to a substantial government purpose.” Treants Enter., Inc. v. Onslow County, 320 N.C. 776 , 778-79, 360 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1987). “[T]o survive constitutional scrutiny under this provision, the challenged state action ‘must be reasonably necessary to promote the - 15 - accomplishment of a public good, or to prevent the infliction of a public harm.’” Ace Speedway Raci

2013“The ‘law of the land’ clause has the same meaning as ‘due process of law’ under the Federal Constitution.” Summey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. County of Henderson, 96 N.C.

2000Our courts have long held that “[t]he ‘law of the land’ clause has the same meaning as ‘due process of law’ under the Federal Constitution.” Summey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. County of Henderson, 96 N.C.

2009“A single standard” has traditionally determined “whether legislation constitutes an improper exercise of the police power so as to violate the ‘law of the land’ clause: the law must have a rational, real and substantial relation to a valid governmental objective (i.e., the protection of the public health, morals, order, safety, or general welfare).” Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow Cty., 83 N.C.

2008“A single standard has traditionally determined whether legislation . . . violate [s] the ‘law of the land’ clause: the law must have a rational, real and substantial relation to a valid governmental objective (i.e., the protection of the public health, morals, order, safety, or general welfare).” Treants Enter., Inc., 83 N.C.