land claim in Kansas

1915But the whole matter was one between the appellant and the state, and the decision in the case of Baker v. Newland, 25 Kan. 25 , is controlling.” (p. 212.) In Doty v. Walling, 85 Kan. 455 , 116 Pac. 487 , it was said: “The state in issuing the patent to the last assignee of the certificate of purchase probably waived, as it might, the forfeiture of all previous holders thereof (Baker v. Newland, 25 Kan. 25), and no one else appears to be in a position to complain.” (p. 456.) The case of Matkin v. Vickers, 92 Kan. 310 , 140 Pac. 846 , is practically the case at bar except that there the plainti

1915But the whole matter was one between the appellant and the state, and the decision in the case of Baker v. Newland, 25 Kan. 25 , is controlling.” (p. 212.) In Doty v. Walling, 85 Kan. 455 , 116 Pac. 487 , it was said: “The state in issuing the patent to the last assignee of the certificate of purchase probably waived, as it might, the forfeiture of all previous holders thereof (Baker v. Newland, 25 Kan. 25), and no one else appears to be in a position to complain.” (p. 456.) The case of Matkin v. Vickers, 92 Kan. 310 , 140 Pac. 846 , is practically the case at bar except that there the plainti

2015We reached the merits in Williams due in part to tire fact that we had previously allowed the land of claim Williams asserted to be made for the first time on appeal. 298 Kan. at 1085 .

2015But we likewise included a warning to future litigants in Williams that Rule 6.02(a)(5) would, in the future, be strictly enforced. 298 Kan. at 1085 .

1999The court ruled the property was held in trust for the benefit of the Rock Creek church and the action of the bishop in selling and conveying the land was in violation of that trust. 40 Kan. at 274 .

1934(Morgan v. Field, 35 Kan. 162 , 10 Pac. 448 ; and Weir v. McVey, 130 Kan. 743 , 288 Pac. 766 .) It was said in Maclellan v. Seim, 57 Kan. 471 , 46 Pac. 959 : “While in a cause of an equitable character neither party can demand a jury as a matter of right, and usually the better practice is for the court to try it alone, yet the court may in its discretion order any issue or issues of fact to be tried by a jury, and error will not lie unless for an abuse of such discretion.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) If the note had in any way been separable from the claim of lien on the land the rule might have been differe

1934(Morgan v. Field, 35 Kan. 162 , 10 Pac. 448 ; and Weir v. McVey, 130 Kan. 743 , 288 Pac. 766 .) It was said in Maclellan v. Seim, 57 Kan. 471 , 46 Pac. 959 : “While in a cause of an equitable character neither party can demand a jury as a matter of right, and usually the better practice is for the court to try it alone, yet the court may in its discretion order any issue or issues of fact to be tried by a jury, and error will not lie unless for an abuse of such discretion.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) If the note had in any way been separable from the claim of lien on the land the rule might have been differe

1934(Morgan v. Field, 35 Kan. 162 , 10 Pac. 448 ; and Weir v. McVey, 130 Kan. 743 , 288 Pac. 766 .) It was said in Maclellan v. Seim, 57 Kan. 471 , 46 Pac. 959 : “While in a cause of an equitable character neither party can demand a jury as a matter of right, and usually the better practice is for the court to try it alone, yet the court may in its discretion order any issue or issues of fact to be tried by a jury, and error will not lie unless for an abuse of such discretion.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) If the note had in any way been separable from the claim of lien on the land the rule might have been differe

1934The case of Fisher v. Rakestraw et al., 117 Kan. 441 , 232 Pac. 605 , involved a contract for the exchange of land for a stock of hardware, and the issues framed required an accounting and determination of a set-off, and it was held: ". . . that the action being essentially one for equitable relief, a jury trial was not demandable as a matter of right, notwithstanding the facts pleaded by defendant to support his set-off and counterclaim, if involved in an ordinary action at law, might have been justiciable before a jury as a matter of right.” (Syl. ¶ 2.

1934The case of Fisher v. Rakestraw et al., 117 Kan. 441 , 232 Pac. 605 , involved a contract for the exchange of land for a stock of hardware, and the issues framed required an accounting and determination of a set-off, and it was held: ". . . that the action being essentially one for equitable relief, a jury trial was not demandable as a matter of right, notwithstanding the facts pleaded by defendant to support his set-off and counterclaim, if involved in an ordinary action at law, might have been justiciable before a jury as a matter of right.” (Syl. ¶ 2.

1934(Morgan v. Field, 35 Kan. 162 , 10 Pac. 448 ; and Weir v. McVey, 130 Kan. 743 , 288 Pac. 766 .) It was said in Maclellan v. Seim, 57 Kan. 471 , 46 Pac. 959 : “While in a cause of an equitable character neither party can demand a jury as a matter of right, and usually the better practice is for the court to try it alone, yet the court may in its discretion order any issue or issues of fact to be tried by a jury, and error will not lie unless for an abuse of such discretion.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) If the note had in any way been separable from the claim of lien on the land the rule might have been differe

1934(Morgan v. Field, 35 Kan. 162 , 10 Pac. 448 ; and Weir v. McVey, 130 Kan. 743 , 288 Pac. 766 .) It was said in Maclellan v. Seim, 57 Kan. 471 , 46 Pac. 959 : “While in a cause of an equitable character neither party can demand a jury as a matter of right, and usually the better practice is for the court to try it alone, yet the court may in its discretion order any issue or issues of fact to be tried by a jury, and error will not lie unless for an abuse of such discretion.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) If the note had in any way been separable from the claim of lien on the land the rule might have been differe

1915But the whole matter was one between the appellant and the state, and the decision in the case of Baker v. Newland, 25 Kan. 25 , is controlling.” (p. 212.) In Doty v. Walling, 85 Kan. 455 , 116 Pac. 487 , it was said: “The state in issuing the patent to the last assignee of the certificate of purchase probably waived, as it might, the forfeiture of all previous holders thereof (Baker v. Newland, 25 Kan. 25), and no one else appears to be in a position to complain.” (p. 456.) The case of Matkin v. Vickers, 92 Kan. 310 , 140 Pac. 846 , is practically the case at bar except that there the plainti

1915But the whole matter was one between the appellant and the state, and the decision in the case of Baker v. Newland, 25 Kan. 25 , is controlling.” (p. 212.) In Doty v. Walling, 85 Kan. 455 , 116 Pac. 487 , it was said: “The state in issuing the patent to the last assignee of the certificate of purchase probably waived, as it might, the forfeiture of all previous holders thereof (Baker v. Newland, 25 Kan. 25), and no one else appears to be in a position to complain.” (p. 456.) The case of Matkin v. Vickers, 92 Kan. 310 , 140 Pac. 846 , is practically the case at bar except that there the plainti

1915But the whole matter was one between the appellant and the state, and the decision in the case of Baker v. Newland, 25 Kan. 25 , is controlling.” (p. 212.) In Doty v. Walling, 85 Kan. 455 , 116 Pac. 487 , it was said: “The state in issuing the patent to the last assignee of the certificate of purchase probably waived, as it might, the forfeiture of all previous holders thereof (Baker v. Newland, 25 Kan. 25), and no one else appears to be in a position to complain.” (p. 456.) The case of Matkin v. Vickers, 92 Kan. 310 , 140 Pac. 846 , is practically the case at bar except that there the plainti

1915But the whole matter was one between the appellant and the state, and the decision in the case of Baker v. Newland, 25 Kan. 25 , is controlling.” (p. 212.) In Doty v. Walling, 85 Kan. 455 , 116 Pac. 487 , it was said: “The state in issuing the patent to the last assignee of the certificate of purchase probably waived, as it might, the forfeiture of all previous holders thereof (Baker v. Newland, 25 Kan. 25), and no one else appears to be in a position to complain.” (p. 456.) The case of Matkin v. Vickers, 92 Kan. 310 , 140 Pac. 846 , is practically the case at bar except that there the plainti

1914(Forbes v. Caldwell, 39 Kan. 14 , 17 Pac. 478 .) Sophia A. Everhart entered upon the land under a claim of full title.

1903That every man who claims an estate in the land has a claim or right against every other person making a claim by which his adversary claimant is bound to pay the taxes is not the law.” Chief Justice Horton, in delivering the opinion in the case of Waterson v. Devoe, 18 Kan. 223, 232 , said : ■ “This involves two inquiries — First, was there any obligation on the part of Waterson to pay the taxes ? and second, was there such a relation of trust or confidence existing between Waterson, the mortgagee, and Devoe, the mortgagor, as to preclude the former from becoming a purchaser of a tax title on

1903It is settled, that a party under obligation to pay taxes cannot acquire a title at a tax sale.” In the opinion in Sands v. Davis, 40 Mich. 14 , Chief Justice Campbell said : “Whatever may have been Filer’s disability to purchase a tax title that was the result of his own default, it is difficult to see how Sands can be made subject to any such disability.

1896(United States v. Dunnington, 146 U. S. 338 ; Crane v. City of Elizabeth) 36 N. J.