land claim in California

2016The obligation rested for its fulfillment in the good faith of the government, and required legislative action." ( Flint , at p. 1109, italics added.) In Beard v. Federy (1865) 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478, 489 , 18 L.Ed. 88 ( Beard ), the United States Supreme Court held that the land claim of a Catholic bishop based not on a writing or grant, but on long possession and canon law in force in Mexico prior to war, was within the jurisdiction of the Board under the 1851 Act.

2016The obligation rested for its fulfillment in the good faith of the government, and required legislative action." ( Flint , at p. 1109, italics added.) In Beard v. Federy (1865) 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478, 489 , 18 L.Ed. 88 ( Beard ), the United States Supreme Court held that the land claim of a Catholic bishop based not on a writing or grant, but on long possession and canon law in force in Mexico prior to war, was within the jurisdiction of the Board under the 1851 Act.

2002But we prefer to believe that the Hague Convention establishes not a fixed rule but rather a minimum measure of international cooperation; our reading of article 27 of the convention encourages us to conclude that this is, indeed, what the ratifying states intend.” (Id. at p. 859.) 1 In Aérospatiale, the United States Supreme Court also ruled that the Hague Convention is not the exclusive means of obtaining evidence abroad. “[A] rule of exclusivity would subordinate the court’s supervision of even the most routine of these pretrial proceedings to the actions or, equally, to the inactions of fo

2002But we prefer to believe that the Hague Convention establishes not a fixed rule but rather a minimum measure of international cooperation; our reading of article 27 of the convention encourages us to conclude that this is, indeed, what the ratifying states intend.” (Id. at p. 859.) 1 In Aérospatiale, the United States Supreme Court also ruled that the Hague Convention is not the exclusive means of obtaining evidence abroad. “[A] rule of exclusivity would subordinate the court’s supervision of even the most routine of these pretrial proceedings to the actions or, equally, to the inactions of fo

1999(Kiewit-Shea’s own motion for summary judgment was based solely on the issue of Land’s right to the subcontract; Kiewit-Shea did not contend that it was entitled to summary judgment based on the statute of limitations defense.) Land’s requests for summary adjudication of the statute of limitations and damages issues may be reviewed upon appeal from the summary judgment (White Motor Corp. v. Teresinski (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 754, 764, fn. 17 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 26 ]), but in this case they require only brief discussion.

1999(Kiewit-Shea’s own motion for summary judgment was based solely on the issue of Land’s right to the subcontract; Kiewit-Shea did not contend that it was entitled to summary judgment based on the statute of limitations defense.) Land’s requests for summary adjudication of the statute of limitations and damages issues may be reviewed upon appeal from the summary judgment (White Motor Corp. v. Teresinski (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 754, 764, fn. 17 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 26 ]), but in this case they require only brief discussion.

1978(Daluiso v. Boone, 71 Cal.2d 484, 495-496 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 455 P.2d 811 ]; Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal.2d 597, 604 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 488 , 361 P.2d 20 , 6 A.L.R.3d 161 ].) The plaintiff’s interest in peaceable even if wrongful possession is secured against forcible intrusion by conferring on him the right to restitution of the premises, the primary remedy, and incidentally awarding damages proximately caused by the forcible entry.

1978(Daluiso v. Boone, 71 Cal.2d 484, 495-496 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 455 P.2d 811 ]; Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal.2d 597, 604 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 488 , 361 P.2d 20 , 6 A.L.R.3d 161 ].) The plaintiff’s interest in peaceable even if wrongful possession is secured against forcible intrusion by conferring on him the right to restitution of the premises, the primary remedy, and incidentally awarding damages proximately caused by the forcible entry.

1978(Brenner v. Haley, 185 Cal.App.2d 183, 187 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 224 ]; 1 Harper & James, Law of Torts (1956) § 1.2, p. 5.) Under the forcible entry statutes the fact that a *219 defendant may have title or the right to possession of the land is no defense.

1978(Brenner v. Haley, 185 Cal.App.2d 183, 187 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 224 ]; 1 Harper & James, Law of Torts (1956) § 1.2, p. 5.) Under the forcible entry statutes the fact that a *219 defendant may have title or the right to possession of the land is no defense.

1978(Daluiso v. Boone, 71 Cal.2d 484, 495-496 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 455 P.2d 811 ]; Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal.2d 597, 604 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 488 , 361 P.2d 20 , 6 A.L.R.3d 161 ].) The plaintiff’s interest in peaceable even if wrongful possession is secured against forcible intrusion by conferring on him the right to restitution of the premises, the primary remedy, and incidentally awarding damages proximately caused by the forcible entry.

1978(Daluiso v. Boone, 71 Cal.2d 484, 495-496 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 455 P.2d 811 ]; Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal.2d 597, 604 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 488 , 361 P.2d 20 , 6 A.L.R.3d 161 ].) The plaintiff’s interest in peaceable even if wrongful possession is secured against forcible intrusion by conferring on him the right to restitution of the premises, the primary remedy, and incidentally awarding damages proximately caused by the forcible entry.

1975(Woodward v. Paris, 109 Cal. 12 , 17 [ 41 P. 781 ]; Park v. Powers, 2 Cal.2d 590, 596 [ 42 P.2d 75 ]; Sorenson v. Costa, 32 Cal.2d 453, 460 [ 196 P.2d 900 ]; Lobro v. Watson, 42 Cal.App.3d 180 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) In the present case, Safwenberg claims that she held the land under a claim of right since she mistakenly thought that she already owned the land.

1975(Woodward v. Paris, 109 Cal. 12 , 17 [ 41 P. 781 ]; Park v. Powers, 2 Cal.2d 590, 596 [ 42 P.2d 75 ]; Sorenson v. Costa, 32 Cal.2d 453, 460 [ 196 P.2d 900 ]; Lobro v. Watson, 42 Cal.App.3d 180 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) In the present case, Safwenberg claims that she held the land under a claim of right since she mistakenly thought that she already owned the land.

1975(Woodward v. Paris, 109 Cal. 12 , 17 [ 41 P. 781 ]; Park v. Powers, 2 Cal.2d 590, 596 [ 42 P.2d 75 ]; Sorenson v. Costa, 32 Cal.2d 453, 460 [ 196 P.2d 900 ]; Lobro v. Watson, 42 Cal.App.3d 180 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) In the present case, Safwenberg claims that she held the land under a claim of right since she mistakenly thought that she already owned the land.

1975(Woodward v. Paris, 109 Cal. 12 , 17 [ 41 P. 781 ]; Park v. Powers, 2 Cal.2d 590, 596 [ 42 P.2d 75 ]; Sorenson v. Costa, 32 Cal.2d 453, 460 [ 196 P.2d 900 ]; Lobro v. Watson, 42 Cal.App.3d 180 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) In the present case, Safwenberg claims that she held the land under a claim of right since she mistakenly thought that she already owned the land.

1961Thus, it has been held that when the husband uses community funds to improve the separate property of the wife the community interest in the funds is lost and the husband takes no interest in the land and has no claim for reimbursement.” (Callnon v. Callnon, 7 Cal.App.2d 676, 680-681 [ 46 P.2d 988 ].) Additionally, services rendered in the improvement of the wife’s separate property do not create a community interest in the husband. {Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal.App. 300, 303 [101P. 923].) Improvements and expenditures made by the husband from community funds are presumed to be gifts. {Estate of

1961Thus, it has been held that when the husband uses community funds to improve the separate property of the wife the community interest in the funds is lost and the husband takes no interest in the land and has no claim for reimbursement.” (Callnon v. Callnon, 7 Cal.App.2d 676, 680-681 [ 46 P.2d 988 ].) Additionally, services rendered in the improvement of the wife’s separate property do not create a community interest in the husband. {Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal.App. 300, 303 [101P. 923].) Improvements and expenditures made by the husband from community funds are presumed to be gifts. {Estate of

1961Thus, it has been held that when the husband uses community funds to improve the separate property of the wife the community interest in the funds is lost and the husband takes no interest in the land and has no claim for reimbursement.” (Callnon v. Callnon, 7 Cal.App.2d 676, 680-681 [ 46 P.2d 988 ].) Additionally, services rendered in the improvement of the wife’s separate property do not create a community interest in the husband. {Carlson v. Carlson, 10 Cal.App. 300, 303 [101P. 923].) Improvements and expenditures made by the husband from community funds are presumed to be gifts. {Estate of

1935(Dunn v. Mullan, 211 Cal. 583, 589 [ 296 Pac. 604 , 77 A. L.

1935(Dunn v. Mullan, 211 Cal. 583, 589 [ 296 Pac. 604 , 77 A. L.

1922(Owsley v. Matson, 156 Cal. 401, 402 [ 104 Pac. 983 ].) Section 322 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that: “When it appears *641 that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into the possession of property under claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding such claim upon a written instrument, as being a conveyance of the property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the property included in such instrument, decree, or judgment, or of some part of the property, under such cla

1922(Owsley v. Matson, 156 Cal. 401, 402 [ 104 Pac. 983 ].) Section 322 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that: “When it appears *641 that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into the possession of property under claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding such claim upon a written instrument, as being a conveyance of the property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the property included in such instrument, decree, or judgment, or of some part of the property, under such cla