police test in Michigan

2022“Where, however, the arrest is planned in advance, it is less likely the police can claim exigent circumstances.” State v Olson, 436 NW2d 92 (Minn, 1989), judgment aff’d 495 US at 95, 100-101 .

2022“Where, however, the arrest is planned in advance, it is less likely the police can claim exigent circumstances.” State v Olson, 436 NW2d 92 (Minn, 1989), judgment aff’d 495 US at 95, 100-101 .

2018In other words, the public safety exception is a narrow exception that only applies in cases involving “exigency requiring immediate action by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime.” Quarles, 467 US at 658 -659 & n 8.

2018In other words, the public safety exception is a narrow exception that only applies in cases involving “exigency requiring immediate action by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime.” Quarles, 467 US at 658 -659 & n 8.

2018However, for this exception “to apply, the police inquiry must have been an objectively reasonable question necessary to protect the police or the public from an immediate danger.” People v Attebury, 463 Mich 662, 671-672 ; 624 NW2d 912 (2001).

2018However, for this exception “to apply, the police inquiry must have been an objectively reasonable question necessary to protect the police or the public from an immediate danger.” People v Attebury, 463 Mich 662, 671-672 ; 624 NW2d 912 (2001).

1982We disagree and hold that the briefcase was opened and its contents inspected pursuant to a valid inventory search procedure. *103 In People v Merchant, supra, 361, this Court cited South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364 ; 96 S Ct 3092 ; 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976), and observed: ’’[Opperman] * * * clearly allows the opening of closed containers taken into custody by the police under standard police procedures.

1982We disagree and hold that the briefcase was opened and its contents inspected pursuant to a valid inventory search procedure. *103 In People v Merchant, supra, 361, this Court cited South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364 ; 96 S Ct 3092 ; 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976), and observed: ’’[Opperman] * * * clearly allows the opening of closed containers taken into custody by the police under standard police procedures.

2025On appeal, defendant argues that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel based upon counsel’s failure to move to suppress the statements defendant made to the police in violation of Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), and failure to move to suppress evidence.

2025On appeal, defendant argues that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel based upon counsel’s failure to move to suppress the statements defendant made to the police in violation of Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), and failure to move to suppress evidence.

2020During a trial, a prosecutor is “generally free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence as it relates to their theory of the case.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 236 , citing Bahoda, 448 Mich at 282 .

2020Moreover, defendant fails to demonstrate why the prosecutor was required to ensure that the police test the handgun for DNA evidence where defendant admitted that his DNA would likely be present on the handgun, or how any results from a DNA evidence test would have been dispositive during trial. “ ‘An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.’ ” Henry, 315 Mich App at 148 , quoting Kelly, 231 Mich App at 640-641 .

2020During a trial, a prosecutor is “generally free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence as it relates to their theory of the case.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 236 , citing Bahoda, 448 Mich at 282 .

2020Moreover, defendant fails to demonstrate why the prosecutor was required to ensure that the police test the handgun for DNA evidence where defendant admitted that his DNA would likely be present on the handgun, or how any results from a DNA evidence test would have been dispositive during trial. “ ‘An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.’ ” Henry, 315 Mich App at 148 , quoting Kelly, 231 Mich App at 640-641 .

2016Likewise, “[n]either the prosecution nor the defense has an affirmative duty to search for evidence to aid the other’s case.” People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281 , 289 n 10; 537 NW2d 813 (1995).

2016Likewise, “[n]either the prosecution nor the defense has an affirmative duty to search for evidence to aid the other’s case.” People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281 , 289 n 10; 537 NW2d 813 (1995).

2016Regarding the evidence, due process simply does not require the prosecutor or the police to test evidence unless defendant can show “suppression of evidence, intentional misconduct, or bad faith.” People v Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 21 ; 669 NW2d 831 (2003); see also People v Miller (After Remand), 211 Mich App 30, 43 ; 535 NW2d 518 (1995).

2016Regarding the evidence, due process simply does not require the prosecutor or the police to test evidence unless defendant can show “suppression of evidence, intentional misconduct, or bad faith.” People v Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 21 ; 669 NW2d 831 (2003); see also People v Miller (After Remand), 211 Mich App 30, 43 ; 535 NW2d 518 (1995).

2015In People v Stephens, 58 Mich App 701, 705 ; 228 NW2d 527 (1975), the defendant argued that the police department’s failure to test a weapon for fingerprints was equivalent to the suppression of evidence “since exculpatory evidence that might have been developed through that testing procedure was lost.” This Court recognized that there is a “crucial distinction . . . between failing to disclose evidence that has been developed and failing to develop evidence . . . .” Id.

2015In People v Stephens, 58 Mich App 701, 705 ; 228 NW2d 527 (1975), the defendant argued that the police department’s failure to test a weapon for fingerprints was equivalent to the suppression of evidence “since exculpatory evidence that might have been developed through that testing procedure was lost.” This Court recognized that there is a “crucial distinction . . . between failing to disclose evidence that has been developed and failing to develop evidence . . . .” Id.

2013No landlord will risk exercising any judgment if he becomes aware by any means of a problem arising on his property-- an unidentified person, a broken window, an unaccounted-for piece of personal property, a nearby fracas, or anything at all that might be viewed in hindsight as having created a 31 “specific situation occur[ring] on the premises that would cause a reasonable person to recognize a risk of imminent harm to an identifiable invitee,” MacDonald, 464 Mich at 335 .

2011Leversee, 243 Mich App at 347 .

2007Hawkins, supra at 500 n 9. 6 We are aware that the disposition of this appeal is not consistent with the disposition of an appeal relating to defendant’s accomplice, Earls.

2001Cf. Sherman, supra at 381 , 78 S.Ct. 819 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). [22] The term "unlawful" was used loosely, of course, because application of the entrapment defense has never required an actual police violation of "the law." [23] While the external regulation of the police is a legislative function, the executive branch is responsible for formulating police policies and supervising police practices.

1981In People v Merchant, 86 Mich App 355, 361 ; 272 NW2d 656 (1978), this Court noted that Opperman "clearly allows the opening of closed containers taken into custody by the police under standard police procedures”.

1981In People v Merchant, 86 Mich App 355, 361 ; 272 NW2d 656 (1978), this Court noted that Opperman "clearly allows the opening of closed containers taken into custody by the police under standard police procedures”.

1980Defendant’s Statements to the Police The standard of review of the ruling permitting use of a defendant’s statements, admissions or confessions is stated in People v Crawford, 89 Mich App 30 ; 279 NW2d 560 (1979).

1980Defendant’s Statements to the Police The standard of review of the ruling permitting use of a defendant’s statements, admissions or confessions is stated in People v Crawford, 89 Mich App 30 ; 279 NW2d 560 (1979).

1971In People v. Nemeth (1932), 258 Mich 682 , the prosecutor read to the jury statements made to the police by defense witnesses.

1971In People v. Nemeth (1932), 258 Mich 682 , the prosecutor read to the jury statements made to the police by defense witnesses.

1969Denial by a witness is generally regarded as conclusive where the alleged statement relates to a collateral matter. 98 CJS, Witnesses, § 611, p 613; McCormick on Evidence, § 36, p-66; People v. McLean, supra . [11] In a similar situation, White v. United States (1965), 121 App DC 287 (349 F2d 965, 967), the court held it error to introduce an inadmissible statement for impeaching defendant's assertion that implied to the jury he would have told the police of his claim of self-defense when first arrested if allowed to speak.

1969Denial by a witness is generally regarded as conclusive where the alleged statement relates to a collateral matter. 98 CJS, Witnesses, § 611, p 613; McCormick on Evidence, § 36, p 66; People v. McLean, supra. In a similar situation, White v. United States (1965), 121 App DC 287 (349 F2d 965, 967), the court held it error to introduce an inadmissible statement for impeaching defendant’s assertion that implied to the jury he would have told the police of his claim of self-defense when first arrested if allowed to speak.