police inquiry in Iowa

2015See id. at 383 . 15 “Although Miranda imposes on the police a rule that is both formalistic and practical when it prevents them from interrogating suspects without first providing them with a Miranda warning, it does not impose a formalistic waiver procedure that a suspect must follow to relinquish those rights.” Id. at 385 (internal citation omitted).

2015See id. at 383 . 15 “Although Miranda imposes on the police a rule that is both formalistic and practical when it prevents them from interrogating suspects without first providing them with a Miranda warning, it does not impose a formalistic waiver procedure that a suspect must follow to relinquish those rights.” Id. at 385 (internal citation omitted).

2013J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. at 1379 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 260-61 .

2013J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. at 1379 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 260-61 .

1997The United States Supreme Court has held that “when ... the evidence in question would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible.” Williams, 467 U.S. at 448 , 104 S.Ct. at 2511 , 81 L.Ed.2d at 390 (emphasis added).

1997The United States Supreme Court has held that “when ... the evidence in question would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible.” Williams, 467 U.S. at 448 , 104 S.Ct. at 2511 , 81 L.Ed.2d at 390 (emphasis added).

1987In Neville the court said “in the context of an arrest for driving while intoxicated, a police inquiry of whether a suspect will take a blood alcohol test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.” 459 U.S. at 564 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. at 923 n. 15, 74 L.Ed.2d at 759 n. 15; see also State v. Stroud, 314 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1982).