64 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Carriongreen2 sentences2024"False statements made to the police are a standard example of admissible evidence on consciousness of guilt." Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 276 (1990). 2023"False statements made to the police are a standard 5 example of admissible evidence on consciousness of guilt." Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 276 (1990). | 10 | 10 |
Commonwealth v. Torresgreen2 sentences2014See Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158 (1997) (“It is well settled that a police inquiry in a routine traffic stop must end on the production of a valid license and registration”). 2004“It is well settled that a police inquiry in a routine traffic stop must end on the production of a valid license and registration unless the police have grounds for inferring that either the operator or his passengers were involved in the commission of a crime ... or engaged in other suspicious conduct.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. at 158 , quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 6, 9 (1996). | 8 | 9 |
District Attorney for the Plymouth District v. Coffeygreen2 sentences2011See Commonwealth v. Leone, 386 Mass. 329, 333 (1982) (“Evidence discovered and seized by private parties is admissible without regard to the methods used, unless State officials have instigated or participated in the search”); see also Dist Attorney for the Plymouth Dist. v. Coffey, 386 Mass. 218, 221 (1982) (“[EJvidence illegally obtained by private parties and turned over to the police is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment”). 2008Attorney for the Plymouth Dist. v. Coffey, 386 Mass. 218, 221 (1982) (“evidence illegally obtained by private parties and turned over to the police is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment”). [T]he policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment [is not intended] to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 488 . | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Torresgreen2 sentences2004“It is well settled that a police inquiry in a routine traffic stop must end on the production of a valid license and registration unless the police have grounds for inferring that either the operator or his passengers were involved in the commission of a crime ... or engaged in other suspicious conduct.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. at 158 , quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 6, 9 (1996). 2001“It is well settled that a police inquiry in a routine traffic stop must end on the production of a valid license and registration unless the police have grounds for inferring that ‘either the operator or his passengers were involved in the commission of a crime ... or engaged in other suspicious conduct’ (citations omitted).” Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158 (1997), quoting from Commonwealth v. Torres, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 6, 9 (1996). 1 Here, there were a number of suggestive factors, each of which, by itself, would not be enough to detain the defendant but when combined amounted to r | 2 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Meehangreen2 sentences2011See Commonwealth v. Meehan, supra at 563-564 . 2011See Commonwealth v. Meehan, supra at 563-564 . | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Robiegreen2 sentences2010I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and begin by observing that “[i]t is well settled that a police inquiry in a routine traffic stop must end on the production of a valid license and registration unless the police have grounds for inferring that ‘either the operator or his passengers were involved in the commission of a crime ... or engaged in other suspicious conduct’ (citations omitted).” Commonwealth v. Robie, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 494, 497 (2001). 2003Torres, 433 Mass. 669 at 674 ; Commonwealth v. Robie, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 494, 498 (2001). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Ferraragreen2 sentences2014See also Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 376 Mass. 502, 505 (1978). 2009See Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72 , 78 n.5 (2005), cert, denied, 545 U.S. 1187 (2006); Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158 (1997); Commonwealth v. Loughlin, 385 Mass. 60, 62 (1982); Commonwealth v. Ferrara, supra at 505 . | 1 | 2 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1999See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21 (1968). 1996That “external patting” limitation — which reflected the actual facts in Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 29 -30 — was not mandated by Terry as the invariably necessary first step in every protective search. | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Cruzgreen2 sentences1994I mean, he was — seemed to be getting out of hand, I think, as far as being loud.” “False statements to the police are standard examples of admissible evidence of consciousness of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Cruz, 416 Mass. 27, 29 (1993). 1994The court observed that “[f]alse statements to the police are standard examples of admissible evidence of consciousness of guilt.” Id. at 29 . | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Corderogreen1 sentence2020At the same time, "[i]t is well settled that a police inquiry in a routine traffic stop must end when the purpose of the stop is accomplished unless the police have grounds for inferring that either the operator or his passengers were involved in the commission of a crime or engaged in other suspicious conduct." Cordero, 477 Mass. at 241 (internal quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Blevinesgreen2 sentences2016Cf. Commonwealth v. Blevines, 438 Mass. 604, 608 (2003) (officer justified in retrieving “hard object” felt during patfrisk to dispel concern it was weapon). 2016Cf. Commonwealth v. Blevines, 438 Mass. 604, 608 (2003) (officer justified in retrieving "hard object" felt during patfrisk to dispel concern it was weapon). | 1 | 1 |
Whren v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2016See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (court declined to apply exclusionary rule because police acted reasonably, notwithstanding that stop violated police regulations). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Connollygreen1 sentence2014Where a search warrant is required, however, the standard becomes “probable cause to believe ‘that a particularly described offense has been, is being, or is about to be committed, and that [the CSLI being sought] will produce evidence of such offense or will aid in the apprehension of a person who the applicant has probable cause to believe has committed, is committing, or is about to commit such offense.’ ” Ante at 256, quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 825 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fordgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ford, 394 Mass. 421, 426-427 (1985) (warrantless storage search of trunk of automobile conducted without consent, probable cause, or exigent circumstances and not conducted pursuant to standard procedures established by the police department). 2014See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ford, 394 Mass. 421, 426-427 (1985) (warrantless storage search of trunk of automobile conducted without consent, probable cause, or exigent circumstances and not conducted pursuant to standard procedures established by the police department). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Rosariogreen1 sentence2011In particular, he argues that neither the waiver of his Miranda rights nor the second statement itself was voluntary, and therefore should have been suppressed; and that in any event the statement should have been suppressed under Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56-57 (1996) (Rosario), because he gave it more than six hours after his effective arrest and without waiving his right to prompt arraignment. | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. JLgreen1 sentence2011See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 266 (2000) (a merely physical description, without more, is not sufficient for probable cause to stop an individual). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Leonegreen1 sentence2011See Commonwealth v. Leone, 386 Mass. 329, 333 (1982) (“Evidence discovered and seized by private parties is admissible without regard to the methods used, unless State officials have instigated or participated in the search”); see also Dist Attorney for the Plymouth Dist. v. Coffey, 386 Mass. 218, 221 (1982) (“[EJvidence illegally obtained by private parties and turned over to the police is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Feyenordgreen1 sentence2009See Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72 , 78 n.5 (2005), cert, denied, 545 U.S. 1187 (2006); Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158 (1997); Commonwealth v. Loughlin, 385 Mass. 60, 62 (1982); Commonwealth v. Ferrara, supra at 505 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Eppichgreen1 sentence2009See Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 276 (1990) (“False statements made to the police are a standard example of admissible evidence on consciousness of guilt”); Commonwealth v. Eppich, 342 Mass. 487, 492 (1961) (false statements, particularly when coupled with other incriminating evidence, may be indicative of consciousness of guilt); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 902 (1985) (defendant’s statement to police that he was “partying” at time of alleged burglary, when taken in conjunction with evidence that defendant’s coat was covered in construction dust found near crime scen | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Carpgreen1 sentence2009We have no doubt that Hensley understood that the police inquiry was criminal in nature, unlike the defendant in Commonwealth v. Carp, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 234 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Loughlingreen1 sentence2009See Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72 , 78 n.5 (2005), cert, denied, 545 U.S. 1187 (2006); Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158 (1997); Commonwealth v. Loughlin, 385 Mass. 60, 62 (1982); Commonwealth v. Ferrara, supra at 505 . | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Evansgreen | 1 | 1 |
Cady v. Dombrowskigreen1 sentence2006The community caretaking function is unrelated to the “detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Commonwealth v. Evans, 436 Mass. 369, 372 (2002), quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
| New York v. Quarlesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Alan A.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Olsengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walter v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Storellagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. McCambridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. LePoregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Riveragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Fordegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. D'ONOFRIOgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Santiagogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Santanagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Hoseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Cunninghamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Silva
green
2 sentences2017"Only after the pat-down gives indication that a weapon is present do the police have the privilege to search further." Commonwealth v. Silva , 366 Mass. 402 , 408 (1974). 10 The Commonwealth makes no claim that the trooper had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the object he felt through the defendant's clothing was a gun or knife. 2010Only after the pat-down gives indication that a weapon is present do the police have the privilege to search further.” Id. at 408 . | 2 | 2010–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Mercado
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 148-50 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. Smith
green
2 sentences2018When considering whether the primary purpose of the police inquiry is to meet an ongoing emergency, "the guiding consideration is whether 'the information the parties knew at the time of the encounter would lead a reasonable person to believe that there was an emergency, even if that belief [is] later proved incorrect.' Thus, the 'primary purpose' inquiry is divorced from the subjective or actual intentions of the individuals involved in a particular encounter." Commonwealth v. Smith , 460 Mass. 385 , 392, 951 N.E.2d 674 (2011), quoting Bryant , supra at 359 , 361 n.8, 131 S.Ct. 1143 . 2018When considering whether the primary purpose of the police inquiry is to meet an ongoing emergency, "the guiding consideration is whether 'the information the parties knew at the time of the encounter would lead a reasonable person to believe that there was an emergency, even if that belief [is] later proved incorrect.' Thus, the 'primary purpose' inquiry is divorced from the subjective or actual intentions of the individuals involved in a particular encounter." Commonwealth v. Smith , 460 Mass. 385 , 392, 951 N.E.2d 674 (2011), quoting Bryant , supra at 359 , 361 n.8, 131 S.Ct. 1143 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Michigan v. Bryant
green
1 sentence2018When considering whether the primary purpose of the police inquiry is to meet an ongoing emergency, "the guiding consideration is whether 'the information the parties knew at the time of the encounter would lead a reasonable person to believe that there was an emergency, even if that belief [is] later proved incorrect.' Thus, the 'primary purpose' inquiry is divorced from the subjective or actual intentions of the individuals involved in a particular encounter." Commonwealth v. Smith , 460 Mass. 385 , 392, 951 N.E.2d 674 (2011), quoting Bryant , supra at 359 , 361 n.8, 131 S.Ct. 1143 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Robles
green
1 sentence2009A judge does not err in instructing a jury that, if they find that a defendant has made false statements to the police, then they can consider the statements as evidence of consciousness of guilt. 6 See Commonwealth v. Robles, supra. The Commonwealth presented evidence that an individual wearing the same distinctive T-shirt as the defendant was observed engaging in an altercation with the victim on Ferry Street and then fleeing into Glendale Park. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Commonwealth v. Mitchell
green
1 sentence2009See Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 276 (1990) (“False statements made to the police are a standard example of admissible evidence on consciousness of guilt”); Commonwealth v. Eppich, 342 Mass. 487, 492 (1961) (false statements, particularly when coupled with other incriminating evidence, may be indicative of consciousness of guilt); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 902 (1985) (defendant’s statement to police that he was “partying” at time of alleged burglary, when taken in conjunction with evidence that defendant’s coat was covered in construction dust found near crime scen | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
1 sentence2008Attorney for the Plymouth Dist. v. Coffey, 386 Mass. 218, 221 (1982) (“evidence illegally obtained by private parties and turned over to the police is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment”). [T]he policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment [is not intended] to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 488 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Jacobsen
green
1 sentence2008Accordingly, any evidence that the minors who burglarized the defendant’s home viewed or Rosario viewed must be admissible as they were mere “private individual[s]” and Raboin does not argue that they were “acting as . . . agent[s] of the government or with participation or knowledge of any government official.” Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113-14 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Commonwealth v. Torres green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Commonwealth v. Richmond green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Commonwealth v. Stack green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Massachusetts v. White green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| United States v. Santana green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Commonwealth v. Tompert green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Commonwealth v. Helme green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Commonwealth v. King green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Commonwealth v. Bradshaw green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Commonwealth v. King green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Commonwealth v. Repoza green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Commonwealth v. Butts green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Burdeau v. McDowell green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Commonwealth v. Hawkes green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.