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17 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nyegreen2 sentences2025See State v. Nye, 295 Or App 559, 564 , 435 P3d 805 (2019) (describing prior case law as requiring furtive movements to be coupled with other alarming conduct— such as disobedience of a police instruction, reluctance to comply, or conduct inconsistent with police inquiry—for the officer-safety exception to apply); Davis, 282 Or App at 660 (holding that an officer’s patdown search was unlaw- ful, where the defendant made furtive movements inside his vehicle as the officer approached, refused to explain what was in his bulging pockets, and showed other signs of recent drug use and preparation to 2025See State v. Nye, 295 Or App 559, 564 , 435 P3d 805 (2019) (describing prior case law as requiring furtive movements to be coupled with other alarming conduct— such as disobedience of a police instruction, reluctance to comply, or conduct inconsistent with police inquiry—for the officer-safety exception to apply); Davis, 282 Or App at 660 (holding that an officer’s patdown search was unlaw- ful, where the defendant made furtive movements inside his vehicle as the officer approached, refused to explain what was in his bulging pockets, and showed other signs of recent drug use and preparation to | 2 | 2 |
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences2019Neville , 459 U.S. at 564 n 15, 103 S.Ct. 916 ("The police inquiry here is highly regulated by state law, and is presented in virtually the same words to all suspects. 2019Neville , 459 U.S. at 564 n 15, 103 S.Ct. 916 ("The police inquiry here is highly regulated by state law, and is presented in virtually the same words to all suspects. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Nye, 295 Or App 559, 564 , 435 P3d 805 (2019) (describing prior case law as requiring furtive move- ments to be coupled with other alarming conduct—such as disobedience of a police instruction, reluctance to comply, or conduct inconsistent with police inquiry—for the officer- safety exception to apply); Davis, 282 Or App 660 (holding that an officer’s patdown search was unlawful, where the defendant made furtive movements inside his vehicle as the officer approached, refused to explain what was in his bulg- ing pockets, and showed other signs of recent drug use and preparation to 2025See State v. Nye, 295 Or App 559, 564 , 435 P3d 805 (2019) (describing prior case law as requiring furtive movements to be coupled with other alarming conduct— such as disobedience of a police instruction, reluctance to comply, or conduct inconsistent with police inquiry—for the officer-safety exception to apply); Davis, 282 Or App at 660 (holding that an officer’s patdown search was unlaw- ful, where the defendant made furtive movements inside his vehicle as the officer approached, refused to explain what was in his bulging pockets, and showed other signs of recent drug use and preparation to | 1 | 2 |
State v. Gardnergreen1 sentence2026See Gardner, 236 Or App at 155 (citing Neville, 459 US at 564 n 15). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lamb
neutral
2 sentences2017On appeal, the state argued that the stop was justified because the officers reasonably suspected that defendant was attempting to help Hamilton evade the police in violation of ORS 162.325 or ORS 162.247. 2 Relying on Court of Appeals cases, the state argued that “‘no authority supports the proposition that an officer cannot, during the course of a [criminal] stop that is supported by reasonable suspicion * * *, inquire whether the stopped person is carrying weapons or contraband.’” (Quoting State v. Lamb, 249 Or App 335, 342 , 277 P3d 581 (2012).) The Court of Appeals disagreed. 2017On appeal, the state argued that the stop was justified because the officers reasonably suspected that defendant was attempting to help Hamilton evade the police in violation of ORS 162.325 or ORS 162.247. 2 Relying on Court of Appeals cases, the state argued that “‘no authority supports the proposition that an officer cannot, during the course of a [criminal] stop that is supported by reasonable suspicion * * *, inquire whether the stopped person is carrying weapons or contraband.’” (Quoting State v. Lamb, 249 Or App 335, 342 , 277 P3d 581 (2012).) The Court of Appeals disagreed. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Rhode Island v. Innis
green
1 sentence2026As we stated in [Innis, 446 US at 301 ], police words or actions ‘normally attendant to arrest and custody’ do not constitute interrogation. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Rudder
green
2 sentences2020The “concept of reasonableness in this context is not biased in favor of the concerns of the police.” State v. Rudder, 347 Or 14, 23 , 217 P3d 1064 (2009). 2020The “concept of reasonableness in this context is not biased in favor of the concerns of the police.” State v. Rudder, 347 Or 14, 23 , 217 P3d 1064 (2009). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Savinskiy
green
1 sentence2019It states that defendant's right to counsel "should not be understood to erect barriers to the police inquiry into defendant's new criminal activity." 364 Or. at 816 , 441 P.3d at 565 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Prieto-Rubio
green
2 sentences2019As Prieto-Rubio explains, after Cobb adopted a narrow scope for the Sixth Amendment, other courts followed suit. 359 Or. at 31 -32 , 376 P.3d 255 . 2019As Prieto-Rubio explains, after Cobb adopted a narrow scope for the Sixth Amendment, other courts followed suit. 359 Or. at 31 -32 , 376 P.3d 255 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Pichardo
green
1 sentence2017Pichardo, 263 Or App at 8 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Salvador
green
2 sentences2015Similar to a mere request for identification, “a police inquiry such as a request for consent [to search] is not by itself a show of authority; for a police inquiry to trigger the protections of Article I, section 9, the inquiry must be combined with ‘physical restraint’ or some other show of police authority of the sort that restrains personal freedom.” State v. Salvador, 237 Or App 424, 432 , 241 P3d 324 (2010). 2015Similar to a mere request for identification, “a police inquiry such as a request for consent [to search] is not by itself a show of authority; for a police inquiry to trigger the protections of Article I, section 9, the inquiry must be combined with ‘physical restraint’ or some other show of police authority of the sort that restrains personal freedom.” State v. Salvador, 237 Or App 424, 432 , 241 P3d 324 (2010). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Rodgers
green
1 sentence2012Id. at 622 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Hall
green
2 sentences2008Because we agree that defendant’s consent was ineffective because the police exploited his pr e-Miranda statements in order to obtain it, we do not consider whether the consent was also involuntary. 4 In State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005), the Supreme Court described the criteria for determining when a police violation of a defendant’s right under Article I, section 9, to be free of an unlawful search or seizure may vitiate a later voluntary consent to a search. 2008Because we agree that defendant’s consent was ineffective because the police exploited his pr e-Miranda statements in order to obtain it, we do not consider whether the consent was also involuntary. 4 In State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005), the Supreme Court described the criteria for determining when a police violation of a defendant’s right under Article I, section 9, to be free of an unlawful search or seizure may vitiate a later voluntary consent to a search. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Evans
green
1 sentence2001By its own terms, the case *42 may, at best, stand for the unremarkable proposition that, under the federal constitution, “the police may seize or search a person with such a degree of intensity as may be justified by the articulable quantum of knowledge they have and by the gravity of the police purpose to be served.” Id. at 194 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Lowry
green
2 sentences1986However, in State v. Lowry, 37 Or App 641, 651-52 , 588 P2d 623 (1978), rev den 285 Or 195 (1979), we said that “if the police were directly or indirectly involved to a sufficient extent in initiating, planning, controlling or supporting [the agent’s] activities, the exclusionary protection would apply.” The reason for exclusion is to discourage police from engaging indirectly in interrogation that would be impermissible if conducted directly by the police. 1986However, in State v. Lowry, 37 Or App 641, 651-52 , 588 P2d 623 (1978), rev den 285 Or 195 (1979), we said that “if the police were directly or indirectly involved to a sufficient extent in initiating, planning, controlling or supporting [the agent’s] activities, the exclusionary protection would apply.” The reason for exclusion is to discourage police from engaging indirectly in interrogation that would be impermissible if conducted directly by the police. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Gullings
green
1 sentence1967The stated purpose of this provision was to insure a maximum disclosure of facts in juvenile court. ⑤ As previously indicated in Gullings at 244 Or 173 , if a child is aware of the adversarial nature of the questioning and its implications, and constitutional safeguards are met, the safety of the public requires the use of the information and a maximum disclosure of facts to the juvenile court will not be prejudiced. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Cerny v. Secor
green
2 sentences1960In Rauch v. Stecklein, 142 Or 286 , 20 P2d 387 , this court, speaking through Mr. Justice ROSSMAN, reviewed four cases concerning which the court stated: "It will be observed that in the four cases just reviewed the injury was inflicted under circumstances which made the tortious act hardly an inadvertent one." One of the four cases referred to was the Iowa case of Cerny v. Secor, 211 Iowa 1232 , 234 NW 193 , concerning which this court stated as follows: "* * * In Cerny v. Secor the host elected to drive ahead at a high rate of speed, disregarding a police warning sign which cautioned him of 1960In Rauch v. Stecklein, 142 Or 286 , 20 P2d 387 , this court, speaking through Mr. Justice ROSSMAN, reviewed four cases concerning which the court stated: "It will be observed that in the four cases just reviewed the injury was inflicted under circumstances which made the tortious act hardly an inadvertent one." One of the four cases referred to was the Iowa case of Cerny v. Secor, 211 Iowa 1232 , 234 NW 193 , concerning which this court stated as follows: "* * * In Cerny v. Secor the host elected to drive ahead at a high rate of speed, disregarding a police warning sign which cautioned him of | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Rauch v. Stecklein
green
2 sentences1960In Rauch v. Stecklein, 142 Or 286 , 20 P2d 387 , this court, speaking through Mr. Justice ROSSMAN, reviewed four cases concerning which the court stated: "It will be observed that in the four cases just reviewed the injury was inflicted under circumstances which made the tortious act hardly an inadvertent one." One of the four cases referred to was the Iowa case of Cerny v. Secor, 211 Iowa 1232 , 234 NW 193 , concerning which this court stated as follows: "* * * In Cerny v. Secor the host elected to drive ahead at a high rate of speed, disregarding a police warning sign which cautioned him of 1960In Rauch v. Stecklein, 142 Or 286 , 20 P2d 387 , this court, speaking through Mr. Justice ROSSMAN, reviewed four cases concerning which the court stated: "It will be observed that in the four cases just reviewed the injury was inflicted under circumstances which made the tortious act hardly an inadvertent one." One of the four cases referred to was the Iowa case of Cerny v. Secor, 211 Iowa 1232 , 234 NW 193 , concerning which this court stated as follows: "* * * In Cerny v. Secor the host elected to drive ahead at a high rate of speed, disregarding a police warning sign which cautioned him of | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.