18 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1912–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rich v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Carver v. Delta Innovative Servs., 379 S.W.3d 865, 869 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012). 2015Carver v. Delta Innovative Servs., 379 S.W.3d 865, 869 (Mo.App.W.D.2012). | 4 | 4 |
Cabinet for Workforce Development v. Cumminsgreen1 sentence2018Cabinet for Workforce Development v. Cummins, 950 S.W.2d 834 , 837 (Ky. 1997) ("The burden was on the claimant to prove that the employer's intentional violation of a specific safety statute or regulation contributed to his injury."). | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. ICI American Holdinggreen1 sentence2012Holding, 347 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
Akers v. Warson Garden Apartmentsgreen1 sentence2011S.D.1985); see also Akers v. Warson Garden Apts., 961 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo.1998) (applying § 287.120.4). | 1 | 1 |
Swillum v. Empire Gas Transport, Inc.green1 sentence2011Under § 287.120.5, “there must be a causal connection between the violation of the employer’s safety rule and the employee’s injury.” Swillum v. Empire Gas Transp., Inc., 698 S.W.2d 921, 929 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
MacOn-atlanta State Bank v. Gallgreen1 sentence1989As stated in Macon-Atlanta State Bank v. Gall, 666 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Mo.App.1984): As a general rule one having actual notice is not prejudiced by and may not complain of the failure to receive statutory notice. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Weber Implement & Auto Co.green2 sentences1985Likewise, the penalty as set forth in Section 287.120(5) RSMo., 1978, as amended, shall not apply.” Under § 287.120.5, RSMo 1978, and Brown v. Weber Implement & Auto Co., 357 Mo. 1 , 206 S.W.2d 350, 355 (1947), the failure of an employee to obey a safety rule does not authorize the reduction of an award unless the injury is caused by such failure. 1985Likewise, the penalty as set forth in Section 287.120(5) RSMo., 1978, as amended, shall not apply.” Under § 287.120.5, RSMo 1978, and Brown v. Weber Implement & Auto Co., 357 Mo. 1 , 206 S.W.2d 350, 355 (1947), the failure of an employee to obey a safety rule does not authorize the reduction of an award unless the injury is caused by such failure. | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louisgreen1 sentence1985Louis, 265 S.W.2d 273, 280 (Mo.1954) (en banc), the court held that, where no violation of a safety rule or custom was shown, a court could not hold as a matter of law that defendant had the duty alleged by the plaintiff and the issue was for the jury. | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.green1 sentence1985In Adams v. Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe Railway Co., 280 S.W.2d 84, 92 (Mo.1955), the court held that, where violation of a safety rule is shown, the evidence need not show that plaintiffs injury could have been reasonably anticipated. | 1 | 1 |
Godsy v. Thompsongreen2 sentences1962Plaintiff relies on Godsy v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 681 , 179 S.W.2d 44, 48 [6], and Baker v. Atkins, Mo.App., 258 S.W.2d 16, 21 [12], In the Godsy case the court considered a safety rule requiring the engine bell to be rung “when an engine is about to move” was in evidence, although not formally introduced, as it was read to the jury and regarded by defendant’s counsel as being in evidence. 1962Plaintiff relies on Godsy v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 681 , 179 S.W.2d 44, 48 [6], and Baker v. Atkins, Mo.App., 258 S.W.2d 16, 21 [12], In the Godsy case the court considered a safety rule requiring the engine bell to be rung “when an engine is about to move” was in evidence, although not formally introduced, as it was read to the jury and regarded by defendant’s counsel as being in evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Atkinsgreen1 sentence1962Plaintiff relies on Godsy v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 681 , 179 S.W.2d 44, 48 [6], and Baker v. Atkins, Mo.App., 258 S.W.2d 16, 21 [12], In the Godsy case the court considered a safety rule requiring the engine bell to be rung “when an engine is about to move” was in evidence, although not formally introduced, as it was read to the jury and regarded by defendant’s counsel as being in evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Ottley v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.green2 sentences1954Co., 360 Mo. 1189 , 232 S. W. 2d 966, 973-974 [9], wherein there was no evidence whatsoever of customary violations of a safety rule with the defendant’s knowledge and acquiescence, and the violations were not “both so open and so continuous as to raise the presumption that the defendant knowingly consented. ’ ’ Defendant contends that plaintiff’s Instruction No. 1 was erroneous in 3 particulars, viz.: (a) There was no substantial evidence tending to show the existence of the custom of defendant’s employees to use kerosene in starting or accelerating fires “under the same or similar circumstan 1954Co., 360 Mo. 1189 , 232 S. W. 2d 966, 973-974 [9], wherein there was no evidence whatsoever of customary violations of a safety rule with the defendant’s knowledge and acquiescence, and the violations were not “both so open and so continuous as to raise the presumption that the defendant knowingly consented. ’ ’ Defendant contends that plaintiff’s Instruction No. 1 was erroneous in 3 particulars, viz.: (a) There was no substantial evidence tending to show the existence of the custom of defendant’s employees to use kerosene in starting or accelerating fires “under the same or similar circumstan | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pennington v. MeadWestvaco Corp.
neutral
1 sentence2018The particular safety violation at issue was not one for which Chase Communications would normally be responsible in the usual course of its operations." 238 S.W.3d at 671 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bradley v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2018In Bradley v. Commonwealth, 301 S.W.3d 27 (Ky. 2009), this Court addressed the liability of the Uninsured Employers' Fund 5 for interest on past-due lump sum death benefits that had been enhanced, as in this case, by 30% pursuant to KRS 342.165(1) for a safety violation. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Duncan v. Accent Marketing, LLC
green
1 sentence2011Duncan v. Accent Marketing, LLC, 328 S.W.3d 488 (Mo.App. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Pemiscot County Memorial Hospital v. Missouri Labor & Industrial Relations Commission
green
1 sentence2011The employer must establish that the violation of the work rule was deliberate and knowing even when the work rule is a safety rule contained in a written manual provided to the employee, McClelland, 116 S.W.3d at 665-66 ; Pemiscot, 897 S.W.2d at 226-29 , and even if a prior viola *498 tion of an employer’s policy resulted in a written warning. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hawkins v. State
green
1 sentence2011The employer must establish that the violation of the work rule was deliberate and knowing even when the work rule is a safety rule contained in a written manual provided to the employee, McClelland, 116 S.W.3d at 665-66 ; Pemiscot, 897 S.W.2d at 226-29 , and even if a prior viola *498 tion of an employer’s policy resulted in a written warning. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Triola v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
green
1 sentence1989The Commission ruled, however: “As noted in Trióla et al. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. [224 Mo.App.258], 25 S.W.2d 518 (Mo.App.19S0), the provision regarding ‘any reasonable rule’ pertains to violations of rules while on the employer’s premises. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Wilmoth v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. Co.
green
1 sentence1985Id. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Elliott v. Des Moines Life Ass'n
neutral
1 sentence1916Co., 163 Mo. 132 , the policy provided certain fixed payments to be made by the assured but contained a safety clause that “in case the death' rate ever exceeds our estimated rates the association will pay for the deficiency' from the emergency or reserve fund until such fund is exhausted, after which an additional premium may be levied pro rata by the executive board, to meet such deficiency.” The court held this provision brought the policy within the meaning of section 5860, Revised Statutes 1889 (now 6950, R. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Jacobs v. Omaha Life Ass'n
neutral
1 sentence1912In Jacobs v. Life Association, 142 Mo. 49 , the defendant was incorporated in Nebraska and licensed to do business on the assessment plan. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Toomey v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias
neutral
2 sentences1912“Whilé the amount of the benefit” says Gantt J., “is absolutely fixed and the assessments are definite sums estimated to be sufficient to realize the amount promised, yet it is obvious that in this safety clause is a provision by which an extra assessment or assessments may be made and power is vested in the executive board to make the levy and the liability of all members to respond pro rata is fixed: It seems to us this.policy meets every requirement of the statute as to insurance on the assessment plan. ” On the ground that, the safety clause made the payment of the benefit in some manner o 1912“Whilé the amount of the benefit” says Gantt J., “is absolutely fixed and the assessments are definite sums estimated to be sufficient to realize the amount promised, yet it is obvious that in this safety clause is a provision by which an extra assessment or assessments may be made and power is vested in the executive board to make the levy and the liability of all members to respond pro rata is fixed: It seems to us this.policy meets every requirement of the statute as to insurance on the assessment plan. ” On the ground that, the safety clause made the payment of the benefit in some manner o | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Aloe v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ass'n
neutral
2 sentences1912“Whilé the amount of the benefit” says Gantt J., “is absolutely fixed and the assessments are definite sums estimated to be sufficient to realize the amount promised, yet it is obvious that in this safety clause is a provision by which an extra assessment or assessments may be made and power is vested in the executive board to make the levy and the liability of all members to respond pro rata is fixed: It seems to us this.policy meets every requirement of the statute as to insurance on the assessment plan. ” On the ground that, the safety clause made the payment of the benefit in some manner o 1912“Whilé the amount of the benefit” says Gantt J., “is absolutely fixed and the assessments are definite sums estimated to be sufficient to realize the amount promised, yet it is obvious that in this safety clause is a provision by which an extra assessment or assessments may be made and power is vested in the executive board to make the levy and the liability of all members to respond pro rata is fixed: It seems to us this.policy meets every requirement of the statute as to insurance on the assessment plan. ” On the ground that, the safety clause made the payment of the benefit in some manner o | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.