safety rule in Alabama

2024This Court has held that workers' compensation statutes "should be liberally construed in favor of the employee in order to advance and effectuate their beneficent purposes." Culbreth v. Woodham Plumbing Co., 599 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Ala. 1992).

2000See Culbreth, supra. The burden then shifted to Wal-Mart to present evidence to support its assertion that Usrey was terminated for a legitimate reason; if it did so, then Usrey would have to produce rebuttal evidence tending to show that the reason given by Wal-Mart was not true but was a pretext for an otherwise impermissible termination.

1997See Reed v. Brunson, 527 So.2d 102 (Ala.1988).

1996Our supreme court stated the following in Reed v. Brunson, 527 So.2d 102, 119-20 (Ala.1988): “Under § 25-5-11, an employee may be liable in damages for the death of, or injuries sustained by, a fellow employee; however, such liability can be based only on injury or death proximately caused by the offending employee’s ‘willful conduct.’ ” “In § 25-5-14 the Legislature expressed concern over the rising costs of litigation among co-employees, as well as the disruptive effect that such litigation can have on workers.

1997Section 25-5-11.1, provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o employee shall be terminated by an employer solely because ... the employee has filed a written notice of violation of a safety rule pursuant to subdivision (e)(4) of Section 25-5-11.” In Maro v. Sizemore Security International Inc., 678 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996), this court stated the following regarding the purpose of § 25-5-ll(c)(4): “Section 25-5-ll(c)(4) provides a mechanism for employees to report a violation of a specific written safety rule of the employer by a co-employee in order to preserve a possible future cause

1997Thus, just as this court in [McClain v. Birmingham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 578 So.2d 1299 (Ala.1991),] construed ‘action’ to mean any workers’ compensation claim, not just an action at law, we construe the § 25-5-11.1 requirement of notice of a safety violation as not incorporating all the strict requirements of § 25-5-ll(c)(4).” 624 So.2d at 562 .

2014See McMellon v. United States, 338 F.3d 287 , 295 n. 5 (4th Cir.2003) (observing that “[t]he plaintiffs do not contend, nor could they, that the government, by posting signs that the plaintiffs did not see, increased the risk to the plaintiffs over that which they would have faced had no signs been posted”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 387 F.3d 329 (4th Cir.2004).

2014See McMellon v. United States, 338 F.3d 287 , 295 n.5 (4th Cir. 2003) (observing that "[t]he plaintiffs do not contend, nor could they, that the government, by posting signs that the plaintiffs did not see, increased the risk to the plaintiffs over that which they would have faced had no signs been posted"), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 387 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2004). 35 1130214 Randy also bases his argument that Yanmar America breached the duty to warn on his claim that Yanmar America had failed to ensure that the safety warnings were disseminated in a manner by which they would actua

2014See McMellon v. United States, 338 F.3d 287 , 295 n. 5 (4th Cir.2003) (observing that “[t]he plaintiffs do not contend, nor could they, that the government, by posting signs that the plaintiffs did not see, increased the risk to the plaintiffs over that which they would have faced had no signs been posted”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 387 F.3d 329 (4th Cir.2004).

2014See McMellon v. United States, 338 F.3d 287 , 295 n.5 (4th Cir. 2003) (observing that "[t]he plaintiffs do not contend, nor could they, that the government, by posting signs that the plaintiffs did not see, increased the risk to the plaintiffs over that which they would have faced had no signs been posted"), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 387 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2004). 35 1130214 Randy also bases his argument that Yanmar America breached the duty to warn on his claim that Yanmar America had failed to ensure that the safety warnings were disseminated in a manner by which they would actua

2004No employee shall be held liable under this section for the violation of any safety rule by any other employee or for failing to prevent any violation by any other employee.” Although Wadsworth made no reference in her complaint to § 25-5-11(c), she argued in her opposition to the summary-judgment motions of Jewell and Moore that the issues presented by her case were whether an ergonomic keyboard was á safety device and whether Jewell and Moore had “engaged in willful conduct as defined in § 25-5-ll(c), specifically by the willful and intentional removal of a safety device with knowledge that

1999When a worker knows of a safety rule and consciously does an act in violation of that rule, his act cannot be considered inadvertent. "[S]uch [an] act is deliberately done and is willful misconduct." Sloss-Sheffield Steel Iron Co. v. Greer , 216 Ala. 267 , 270 , 113 So. 271 , 273 (1927).

1999When a worker knows of a safety rule and consciously does an act in violation of that rule, his act cannot be considered inadvertent. "[S]uch [an] act is deliberately done and is willful misconduct." Sloss-Sheffield Steel Iron Co. v. Greer , 216 Ala. 267 , 270 , 113 So. 271 , 273 (1927).

1997Section 25-5-11.1, provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o employee shall be terminated by an employer solely because ... the employee has filed a written notice of violation of a safety rule pursuant to subdivision (e)(4) of Section 25-5-11.” In Maro v. Sizemore Security International Inc., 678 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996), this court stated the following regarding the purpose of § 25-5-ll(c)(4): “Section 25-5-ll(c)(4) provides a mechanism for employees to report a violation of a specific written safety rule of the employer by a co-employee in order to preserve a possible future cause

1995Macon County Comm'n v. Sanders , 555 So.2d 1054 , 1056 (Ala. 1990); Bussey v. John Deere Co. , 531 So.2d 860 , 862 (Ala. 1988).

1995Macon County Comm'n v. Sanders, 555 So.2d 1054, 1056 (Ala.1990); Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988).

1995Macon County Comm'n v. Sanders , 555 So.2d 1054 , 1056 (Ala. 1990); Bussey v. John Deere Co. , 531 So.2d 860 , 862 (Ala. 1988).

1995Macon County Comm'n v. Sanders, 555 So.2d 1054, 1056 (Ala.1990); Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988).

1989See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (where injury was caused by collapse of automobile's roof, fact that manufacturer complied with the only safety standard pertinent did not preclude plaintiff's recovery); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 , 103 S.Ct. 177 , 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982) (although manufacturer complied with FMVSS 209

1989See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (where injury was caused by collapse of automobile's roof, fact that manufacturer complied with the only safety standard pertinent did not preclude plaintiff's recovery); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 , 103 S.Ct. 177 , 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982) (although manufacturer complied with FMVSS 209

1989See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (where injury was caused by collapse of automobile's roof, fact that manufacturer complied with the only safety standard pertinent did not preclude plaintiff's recovery); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 , 103 S.Ct. 177 , 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982) (although manufacturer complied with FMVSS 209

1989Such compliance with "minimum safety standards does not exempt or immunize a manufacturer from common law strict liability." Shipp, 750 F.2d at 418 .

1989Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 156-57 (4th Cir.1978) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 , 670 n. 13 (6th Cir. 1972); Roberts v. May, 41 Colo.App. 82 , 583 P.2d 305, 308 (1978) (fact that automobile was designed in compliance with all federal safety standards not a defense); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201 , 321 A.2d 737, 746 (1974); H.P.

1989Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 156-57 (4th Cir.1978) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 , 670 n. 13 (6th Cir. 1972); Roberts v. May, 41 Colo.App. 82 , 583 P.2d 305, 308 (1978) (fact that automobile was designed in compliance with all federal safety standards not a defense); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201 , 321 A.2d 737, 746 (1974); H.P.