Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1930–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McKenzie v. Cost Bros., Inc.green2 sentences2018See, e.g. , McKenzie v. Cost Bros., Inc. , 487 Pa. 303 , 309, 409 A.2d 362 , 365 (1979) (reiterating the general rule that a possessor of land has a duty to use reasonable care to make the premises reasonably safe for invitees); Miller v. Hickey , 368 Pa. 317 , 324, 81 A.2d 910 , 914 (1951) (noting that a landowner is not charged with the absolute duty of keeping his premises in a safe condition, but rather, is responsible for correcting known defects and ensuring that the property is reasonably safe for invitees); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S, § 343(c)(i) (1965), Comment d. 2018See, e.g. , McKenzie v. Cost Bros., Inc. , 487 Pa. 303 , 309, 409 A.2d 362 , 365 (1979) (reiterating the general rule that a possessor of land has a duty to use reasonable care to make the premises reasonably safe for invitees); Miller v. Hickey , 368 Pa. 317 , 324, 81 A.2d 910 , 914 (1951) (noting that a landowner is not charged with the absolute duty of keeping his premises in a safe condition, but rather, is responsible for correcting known defects and ensuring that the property is reasonably safe for invitees); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S, § 343(c)(i) (1965), Comment d. | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Hickeygreen2 sentences2018See, e.g. , McKenzie v. Cost Bros., Inc. , 487 Pa. 303 , 309, 409 A.2d 362 , 365 (1979) (reiterating the general rule that a possessor of land has a duty to use reasonable care to make the premises reasonably safe for invitees); Miller v. Hickey , 368 Pa. 317 , 324, 81 A.2d 910 , 914 (1951) (noting that a landowner is not charged with the absolute duty of keeping his premises in a safe condition, but rather, is responsible for correcting known defects and ensuring that the property is reasonably safe for invitees); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S, § 343(c)(i) (1965), Comment d. 2018See, e.g. , McKenzie v. Cost Bros., Inc. , 487 Pa. 303 , 309, 409 A.2d 362 , 365 (1979) (reiterating the general rule that a possessor of land has a duty to use reasonable care to make the premises reasonably safe for invitees); Miller v. Hickey , 368 Pa. 317 , 324, 81 A.2d 910 , 914 (1951) (noting that a landowner is not charged with the absolute duty of keeping his premises in a safe condition, but rather, is responsible for correcting known defects and ensuring that the property is reasonably safe for invitees); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S, § 343(c)(i) (1965), Comment d. | 1 | 2 |
Jones v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authoritygreen2 sentences2018See Jones v. SEPTA, 565 Pa. 211 , 217 n.1, 772 A.2d 435 , 439 n.1 (2001) (citing 1 Pa.C.S. §2310) (indicating that the Commonwealth shall enjoy sovereign immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly specifically waives immunity)); 42 Pa.C.S. §8522(a) (indicating that the General Assembly waives sovereign immunity for damages arising out of negligent acts only); accord Rooney v. City of Phila., 623 F. Supp. 2d 644, 662 (E.D.Pa. 2009) (holding that a local government was immune from plaintiffs’ strict liability claims because, in Pennsylvania, exceptions to governmental im 2018See Jones v. SEPTA, 565 Pa. 211 , 217 n.1, 772 A.2d 435 , 439 n.1 (2001) (citing 1 Pa.C.S. §2310) (indicating that the Commonwealth shall enjoy sovereign immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly specifically waives immunity)); 42 Pa.C.S. §8522(a) (indicating that the General Assembly waives sovereign immunity for damages arising out of negligent acts only); accord Rooney v. City of Phila., 623 F. Supp. 2d 644, 662 (E.D.Pa. 2009) (holding that a local government was immune from plaintiffs’ strict liability claims because, in Pennsylvania, exceptions to governmental im | 1 | 1 |
Rooney v. City of Philadelphiagreen1 sentence2018See Jones v. SEPTA, 565 Pa. 211 , 217 n.1, 772 A.2d 435 , 439 n.1 (2001) (citing 1 Pa.C.S. §2310) (indicating that the Commonwealth shall enjoy sovereign immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly specifically waives immunity)); 42 Pa.C.S. §8522(a) (indicating that the General Assembly waives sovereign immunity for damages arising out of negligent acts only); accord Rooney v. City of Phila., 623 F. Supp. 2d 644, 662 (E.D.Pa. 2009) (holding that a local government was immune from plaintiffs’ strict liability claims because, in Pennsylvania, exceptions to governmental im | 1 | 1 |
Edward L. Flanigan v. Burlington Northern Inc., a Corporationgreen1 sentence1993Ybarra at 150 ; Flanigan v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 632 F.2d 880, 883-884 (8th Cir.1980), ce rt. denied, 450 U.S. 921 , 101 S.Ct. 1370 , 67 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981). *219 The trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding negligence per se under FELA accurately reflects this prevailing view. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dunngreen2 sentences1982Commonwealth v. Smith, 409 Pa. 521 , 187 A.2d 267, 270 (1963); Commonwealth v. Dunn, 478 Pa. 35 , 385 A.2d 1299, 1307 (1978); Commonwealth v. Tirpak, 271 Pa.Super. 357 , 413 A.2d 705, 707 (1979). 1982Commonwealth v. Smith, 409 Pa. 521 , 187 A.2d 267, 270 (1963); Commonwealth v. Dunn, 478 Pa. 35 , 385 A.2d 1299, 1307 (1978); Commonwealth v. Tirpak, 271 Pa.Super. 357 , 413 A.2d 705, 707 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Smithgreen2 sentences1982Commonwealth v. Smith, 409 Pa. 521 , 187 A.2d 267, 270 (1963); Commonwealth v. Dunn, 478 Pa. 35 , 385 A.2d 1299, 1307 (1978); Commonwealth v. Tirpak, 271 Pa.Super. 357 , 413 A.2d 705, 707 (1979). 1982Commonwealth v. Smith, 409 Pa. 521 , 187 A.2d 267, 270 (1963); Commonwealth v. Dunn, 478 Pa. 35 , 385 A.2d 1299, 1307 (1978); Commonwealth v. Tirpak, 271 Pa.Super. 357 , 413 A.2d 705, 707 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Tirpakgreen2 sentences1982Commonwealth v. Smith, 409 Pa. 521 , 187 A.2d 267, 270 (1963); Commonwealth v. Dunn, 478 Pa. 35 , 385 A.2d 1299, 1307 (1978); Commonwealth v. Tirpak, 271 Pa.Super. 357 , 413 A.2d 705, 707 (1979). 1982Commonwealth v. Smith, 409 Pa. 521 , 187 A.2d 267, 270 (1963); Commonwealth v. Dunn, 478 Pa. 35 , 385 A.2d 1299, 1307 (1978); Commonwealth v. Tirpak, 271 Pa.Super. 357 , 413 A.2d 705, 707 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Buoncuore v. Pennsylvania Game Commission
neutral
1 sentence2020Specifically, Murnin contends that the following Commission findings are not supported by the record facts: (1) Murnin fired a gun in a safety zone which resulted in the creation of a danger; (2) Murnin’s admission to releasing three additional dogs onto the coyote when he came upon it injured on the side of the road; and (3) Murnin used his vehicle to pursue the coyote and presented a poor image of hunting to the general public.5 The Commission rejoins that the record adequately establishes that Murnin was convicted of a significant safety violation for unlawfully Shooting On or Across a High | 1 | 2020–2020 |
English v. Lehigh County Authority
green
1 sentence2017The reason given for disciplinary action was Mr. Varga’s “Failure to perform duties as assigned or in a satisfactory manner. ‘Created an unsafe condition or contributing to such conditions’” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick
green
2 sentences1995Id. at- - -, 115 S.Ct. at 1486-87 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 391-92 . 1995Id. at- - -, 115 S.Ct. at 1486-87 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 391-92 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Ragu Foods, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc.
green
1 sentence1993Ybarra at 150 ; Flanigan v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 632 F.2d 880, 883-884 (8th Cir.1980), ce rt. denied, 450 U.S. 921 , 101 S.Ct. 1370 , 67 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981). *219 The trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding negligence per se under FELA accurately reflects this prevailing view. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Hatcher v. United States
green
1 sentence1993Ybarra at 150 ; Flanigan v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 632 F.2d 880, 883-884 (8th Cir.1980), ce rt. denied, 450 U.S. 921 , 101 S.Ct. 1370 , 67 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981). *219 The trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding negligence per se under FELA accurately reflects this prevailing view. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Burlington Northern Inc. v. Flanigan
green
1 sentence1993Ybarra at 150 ; Flanigan v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 632 F.2d 880, 883-884 (8th Cir.1980), ce rt. denied, 450 U.S. 921 , 101 S.Ct. 1370 , 67 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981). *219 The trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding negligence per se under FELA accurately reflects this prevailing view. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Cox v. Baltimore County
green
2 sentences1988A majority of courts have read the savings clause narrowly, finding that it only allows state tort law remedies for matters not covered by the applicable federal regulation. 3 The court, in Cox v. Baltimore, 646 F. Supp. 761 (D.Md. 1986), taking a narrow view of the safety clause, reasoned that the clear meaning of the clause provides that compliance with the federal standard does not protect an automobile manufacturer from liability for design or manufacturing defects, but does in connection with matters not covered by the federal standards. 1988Id. at 764 (citing Chicago and Northwestern Transportation v. Kalo Brick and Title Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981)); Wickerstrom v. Maplewood Toyota Inc., no. 470771 (Minn. Dist. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.
green
1 sentence1988Id. at 764 (citing Chicago and Northwestern Transportation v. Kalo Brick and Title Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981)); Wickerstrom v. Maplewood Toyota Inc., no. 470771 (Minn. Dist. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of NM
green
1 sentence1961These holdings of our highest tribunal faithfully comport with Jefferson’s classic admonition in his First Inaugural Address that “If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.” In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), the Board refused to permit Schware to take the bar examination on the ground that he had not shown good moral character. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Commonwealth v. Reitz
green
2 sentences1957In Com. v. Reitz, supra, 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 122, 127 , 39 A. 2d 522 , the State Council of Defense was authorized to take such precautionary measures as might be necessary for the safety and defense of the civilian population and property in the event of air raids, and to make and enforce rules and regulations for this purpose. 1957In Com. v. Reitz, supra, 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 122, 127 , 39 A. 2d 522 , the State Council of Defense was authorized to take such precautionary measures as might be necessary for the safety and defense of the civilian population and property in the event of air raids, and to make and enforce rules and regulations for this purpose. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
McGrann v. Allen
green
1 sentence1930However, as the accounting is asked of an express trust to convert assets and satisfy shareholders, neither the statute of limitations nor ordinary laches can be interposed to defeat the claim (see McGrann v. Allen, 291 Pa. 574 ), at least in its entirety, no rights of third parties intervening. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.