ambiguous clause in New Jersey

2022"When construing an ambiguous clause in an insurance policy, courts should consider whether clearer A-3358-19 15 draftsmanship by the insurer 'would have put the matter beyond reasonable question.'" Id. at 274 (quoting Doto v. Russo, 140 N.J. 544, 557 (1995)).

2016“When construing an ambiguous clause in an insurance policy, courts should consider whether clearer draftsmanship by the insurer ‘would have put the matter beyond reasonable question.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Doto v. Russo, 140 N.J. 544, 547 , 659 A.2d 1371 (1995)).

2007Thus, if the ambiguous clause is one concerning an extension of coverage to the insured, it should be "viewed broadly and liberally." Ibid.

2000When obligated to construe an ambiguous clause in an insurance policy, courts should consider whether more precise language by the insurer, had such language been included in the policy, “would have put the matter beyond reasonable question.” Further, insurance policies must be construed to comport with the reasonable expectations of the insured____ Concerning exclusion clauses that proscribe or limit coverage, we have observed that “[i]n general, insurance policy exclusions must be narrowly construed; the burden is on the insurer to bring the case within the exclusion.” Conversely, clauses th

2022Co., 36 N.J. 12, 22 (1961) (stating "[i]n the 5 "[T]he doctrine of contra proferentem, which requires a court to interpret an ambiguous clause in favor of the non-drafting party, usually does not apply in a matrimonial setting because the matrimonial agreement is commonly the product of negotiation, not only over the general terms of the agreement but also over the language in the agreement." Quinn, 225 N.J. at 46 .

2016Id. at 267-68 , 920 A.2d 73 .

2016Id. at 267-68 , 920 A.2d 73 .

2011Hurley, supra, 166 N.J. at 274 , 765 A.2d 195 .

2011Hurley, supra, 166 N.J. at 274 , 765 A.2d 195 .

2000It is an ambiguous standard, but is at least proof by a preponderance of the evidence; beyond that, the issue is left open to the courts. [ 298 N.J.Super. at 560 , 689 A.2d 876 (emphasis added). ] Given the necessary flexibility required by the Code, we are satisfied that trial courts will exhibit under the preponderance standard “the degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should have in the correctness of [its] factual conclusions----” Addington, supra, 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 329 .

2000It is an ambiguous standard, but is at least proof by a preponderance of the evidence; beyond that, the issue is left open to the courts. [ 298 N.J.Super. at 560 , 689 A.2d 876 (emphasis added). ] Given the necessary flexibility required by the Code, we are satisfied that trial courts will exhibit under the preponderance standard “the degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should have in the correctness of [its] factual conclusions----” Addington, supra, 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 329 .

2000It is an ambiguous standard, but is at least proof by a preponderance of the evidence; beyond that, the issue is left open to the courts. [ 298 N.J.Super. at 560 , 689 A.2d 876 (emphasis added). ] Given the necessary flexibility required by the Code, we are satisfied that trial courts will exhibit under the preponderance standard “the degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should have in the correctness of [its] factual conclusions----” Addington, supra, 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 329 .

2000It is an ambiguous standard, but is at least proof by a preponderance of the evidence; beyond that, the issue is left open to the courts. [ 298 N.J.Super. at 560 , 689 A.2d 876 (emphasis added). ] Given the necessary flexibility required by the Code, we are satisfied that trial courts will exhibit under the preponderance standard “the degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should have in the correctness of [its] factual conclusions----” Addington, supra, 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 329 .

2000In McMillan , the Court observed that the sentencing factor, visible possession of a firearm in the commission of the charged crime, was a fact that could be readily ascertained “within the case context.” United States v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188, 1205 (1999) (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84 , 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2415 , 91 L.Ed. 2d 67 (1986)).

2000In McMillan , the Court observed that the sentencing factor, visible possession of a firearm in the commission of the charged crime, was a fact that could be readily ascertained “within the case context.” United States v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188, 1205 (1999) (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84 , 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2415 , 91 L.Ed. 2d 67 (1986)).

1996State v. XYZ Corp., 119 N.J. 416, 423 , 575 A.2d 423 (1990) (citations omitted).

1996State v. XYZ Corp., 119 N.J. 416, 423 , 575 A.2d 423 (1990) (citations omitted).

1991Appellant contends that the trial court “erred in applying an ambiguous standard,” and that DYFS failed to carry its burden of establishing the statutory criteria for the termination of parental rights as construed by our Supreme Court in New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 , 512 A.2d 438 (1986).

1991Appellant contends that the trial court “erred in applying an ambiguous standard,” and that DYFS failed to carry its burden of establishing the statutory criteria for the termination of parental rights as construed by our Supreme Court in New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 , 512 A.2d 438 (1986).

1983He had been trained by his superior officer, attended seminars, conducted a dozen or so investigative tests on the job and had done personal experimentation on his own time. [10] Ambiguous test results barred admissibility in Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980), cert. den. 449 U.S. 986 , 101 S.Ct. 408 , 66 L.Ed. 2d 251 (1980).

1983He had been trained by his superior officer, attended seminars, conducted a dozen or so investigative tests on the job and had done personal experimentation on his own time. [10] Ambiguous test results barred admissibility in Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980), cert. den. 449 U.S. 986 , 101 S.Ct. 408 , 66 L.Ed. 2d 251 (1980).

1983He had been trained by his superior officer, attended seminars, conducted a dozen or so investigative tests on the job and had done personal experimentation on his own time. [10] Ambiguous test results barred admissibility in Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980), cert. den. 449 U.S. 986 , 101 S.Ct. 408 , 66 L.Ed. 2d 251 (1980).

1983He had been trained by his superior officer, attended seminars, conducted a dozen or so investigative tests on the job and had done personal experimentation on his own time. [10] Ambiguous test results barred admissibility in Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980), cert. den. 449 U.S. 986 , 101 S.Ct. 408 , 66 L.Ed. 2d 251 (1980).

1976Unlike the ambiguous standard of care applied in Goldberg which requires "reasonable police protection" ( 38 N.J. at 589-90 ), the requirement in this case is clear, definite and justified by the nature of the problem.

1976The cost of compliance in the instant case, unlike that in Goldberg , will not be imposed "upon the segment of the citizenry which is least able to bear it." 38 N.J. at 591 .

1953Plaintiff contends the clause "* * * and if such death does not result * * * from military or naval service in time of war * * *" is ambiguous in that it is not clear whether the contracting parties intended a constitutionally declared war or undeclared war, and argues the insured's death did not occur "in time of war," since the conflict in which the United States has been and still is engaged in Korea is not a war but merely "a police action"; that under the Federal Constitution, Article I, Section 8, paragraph 11, the power to declare war is vested exclusively in the Congress, and the Congr

1953Plaintiff contends the clause "* * * and if such death does not result * * * from military or naval service in time of war * * *" is ambiguous in that it is not clear whether the contracting parties intended a constitutionally declared war or undeclared war, and argues the insured's death did not occur "in time of war," since the conflict in which the United States has been and still is engaged in Korea is not a war but merely "a police action"; that under the Federal Constitution, Article I, Section 8, paragraph 11, the power to declare war is vested exclusively in the Congress, and the Congr